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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Introductory Comment
’’Covenants, without the sword, are but words . . . 
wrote Thomas Hobbes.  ̂ Indeed, at the root of all but the most 
primitive of social organizations there must lie the sanction 
of force: force to assure order, to prevent rebellion at home, 
and to subdue enemies abroad. The manner in which that force 
is organized and controlled will significantly influence the 
interaction of political actors, both at home and abroad.
In Latin America the armed forces have always held a mo­
nopoly over the control of force, the ultimate argument in
2their nation's politics. It is not so strange, then, that 
militarism, or "the domination of the military man over the 
civilian, the undue emphasis on military demands, or any 
transcendence of ’true military purposes’,!’̂  is extremely
■^Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, ed. by Michael Oakeshott 
(London: H. R. Mowbray and Co., 1946), p. 109.
2Robert J. Alexander, Latin American Politics and Gov­
ernment (New York: Harper and Ross, 1965], p. 85.
3John J. Johnson, "The Latin American Military as a 
Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society," in 
The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. 
by John J. Johnson'(Princeton: Princeton University Press,
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common in Latin America. Imparting some perspective to the 
political relationship between the armed forces and the 
civilian groups in Latin America, Elizabeth H. Hyman has 
commented:
Realistically, the military has to be seen as 
a force within the Latin American political uni­
verse which is highly interrelated with civilian 
political forces. While the Latin American mili­
tary is clearly "outside" the political party 
structure as such, still political parties are 
not by any means the exclusive centers of activity 
in Latin American politics, and many disparate 
nonparty forces belong within the political world. 
Among a miscellaneous collection of nonparty "ir­
regular" forces--including unions, student orga­
nizations, radical churchmen, economic pressure 
groups and foreign governments--which contend in 
political contests and confrontations, the mili­
tary is merely one, albeit often the most effective, 
non-party force in the political process.4
The effectiveness of the armed forces, as a nonparty force, is
related to the unique potential it possesses in competing with
other nonparty forces in attempting to influence the political
process. The military is more than a pressure group for it
periodically assumes governing authority, and, therefore, "the
center of power upon which it is supposedly exerting pressure
1962), p. 91. For a corresponding definition and an indispens­
able discussion of militarism, see Alfred Vagts, A History of 
Militarism (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,. 1937) , pp. 12- 
15. For a discussion of the various levels of militarism, see 
Martin Needier, Latin American Politics in Perspective (Prince 
ton: D. Van NostiFand and Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 65-69.
"^Elizabeth H. Hyman, "Soldiers in Politics: New Insights 
on Latin American Armed Forces," Political Science Quarterly, 
LXXXVII (September, 1972), 409.
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becomes occupied by the pressure group itself.
Charles D. Corbett has suggested some causes and charac­
teristics of extramilitary activity in Latin America in recent 
years :
Once the officer’s professional or military- 
oriented education is rounded out by graduation 
from the general staff course, and he finds him­
self involved in larger issues, he becomes con­
cerned about the anomalies of his profession in 
a region that has had a minimum of international 
conflict. In the absence of a serious short- 
range external threat, he frequently universal­
izes the communist threat to the "Western,
Christian" world and posits a role for his coun­
try in countering it. Military interpretations 
of the local manifestations of that threat, and 
considerations of the nature of the military 
response, have led in recent years to a redefini­
tion and great expansion of the concept of na­
tional security. The salient characteristic is 
a nexus of security and economic development that 
transcends the definitions of national security 
policy generally ascribed to other Western coun­
tries.^
7As a result of their "low conflict environment," the Latin Amer­
ican armed forces may be interpreted as having expanded their 
concepts of national security or, more accurately, as having
^Ibid., 410.
^Charles D. Corbett, "Politics and Professionalism: The 
South American Military," Orbis, XVII (Winter, 1973), 936.
7Alfred G. Stepan and Luigi R. Einaudi, Latin American 
Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in 
^ r u  and Brazil Report prepared for the Department of External 
Research, Department of State, R-586-DOS (Santa Monica, Cali­
fornia: The RAND Corporation, 1971), p. 3. For a discussion of 
the relative absence of conflict between Latin American nations 
and the lack of participation by those nations in international 
conflicts on a larger scale, see Robert J. Alexander, "The Army 
in Politics," in Government and Politics in Latin America, ed. 
by Harold Eugene Davis (New Yofkl The Ronald Press Company, 195 8) 
pp. 151-52.
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placed a greater emphasis on one component of national security 
policy, that of internal security policy, concerned primarily 
with the threat of subversion.
Historically, the chief source of friction between the
9republics of Latin America has been their ill-defined borders. 
However, since 1864, the year hostilities with Argentina were 
ended, Brazil, the subject of this study, has been at relative 
peace with her neighbors. Despite bordering on every nation in 
South America except Chile and Ecuador, Brazil has been able to 
define her long borders without recourse to arms. Like her 
neighbors, Brazil is only marginally threatened militarily by 
the outside world. The absence of a direct external threat 
has, in part, caused the Brazilian military to modify its con­
cept of national security and to emphasize the importance of 
eradicating communist subversion and ’’corruption" in public 
office at home.
QSamuel P. Huntington conceives of national security policy 
as existing in three forms: military security policy, internal 
security policy, and situational security policy. The Soldier 
and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Rela­
tions (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvarcT"University Press, 195 7), p. 1.
9William L. Schurz, Latin America: A Descriptive Survey 
(New York: E. P. Dutton and" Company, Inc. , 1963) , p . 2’3S.
^^Brazil's history of peaceful foreign relations is due in 
large part to the efforts of her legendary Foreign Minister,
The Baron of the Rio Branco. For a descriptive summary of his 
contributions, see E. Bradford Burns, ’’Tradition and Variation 
in Brazilian Foreign Policy," in Latin American International 
Politics: Ambitions, Capabilities', and tïïë~ National Tnterests 
of Mexico", Brazil an3~~Argentina, ed. By Carlos A. Astiz'(Notre 
Darnel UniversTty of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 176-80.
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Scope and Objectives of the Study
The present study undertakes to analyze the major internal 
security policies, or those national security policies designed 
to insure domestic political and social order, of the three 
military governments of Brazil between 1964 and 1970 and to 
demonstrate why, by the end of 1970, the various military gov­
ernments had either been unable or unwilling to restore "democ- 
11racy.*' This procedure will include an attempt to account for 
the apparent discrepancies between major speeches, proclaiming 
intentions to return Brazil to a political system open to civil­
ian participation, and the actual policies the governments 
adopted, which made a rapid return to "democratic" forms and pro­
cedures of government impossible.
The major research question is:
What effect did the steadily expanding internal 
security policies of the Brazilian military gov­
ernments between 1964 and 1970 have on the pros­
pects for an eventual return to civilian leader­
ship and to democratic forms and procedures of 
government?
The argument of Vicente Barreto is adopted. His thesis is 
that the "amplification of the concepts of national security has 
given the Brazilian military "carte blanche” to intervene against 
internal enemies or
11Democracy in Brazil carries a much different meaning and 
connotation in Brazil than it does in the Anglo-American exper­
ience, and, therefore, when referring to democracy in Brazil, 
the word democracy will be placed in quotation marks. For a 
brief description and explanation of the Brazilian "democratic 
experience," see pages 15 through 34 of this work.
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anything that contributes or could contribute 
to the weakening of the nation . . . .  National 
security comprehends not only the military pro­
tection of the nation, but principally all 
manifestations of national life, whether in 
political economic, social or cultural areas.
In seeking to extend the Barreto argument, I attempt to 
show that internal security policies, initially designed to 
restore order, permitted the armed forces sufficient penetra­
tion into the political system to enable them to become exploi­
tative of that system. For example, active non-support for the 
regime came to be equated with subversion. Here my efforts will 
be confined principally to the area of internal security policy 
formulation, that is, it will focus on some of the forces influ­
encing the policy formulation of each regime, such as the mili­
tary officers' perceptions of internal communist subversion and 
their attitudes concerning civilian fitness to govern (as ex­
pressed in speeches); the role of Escola Superior de Guerra 
(the Superior War College); and the composition of the hierarchy 
of each regime. The latter consideration involves the relative 
balance of the linha dura (hard line) elements and the more 
moderate, Sorbonne Wing of the armed forces.
I will attempt to indicate how each of the foregoing fac­
tors, or combination thereof, may have caused the military to 
pursue policies that either (1) alienated significant portions
12Vicente Barreto, Cadernos_ Braslleiros (Rio de Janeiro: 
November-December, 1966), 35-39, quoted in Charles D. Corbett 
op. cit., 957.
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of the civilian populace and the armed forces as well, thereby 
rendering a return to "democratic" processes more difficult or 
(2) resulted in institutional modifications of both civilian 
and military structures and the creation of new roles, each of 
which, having acquired momentum and a domain of responsibility, 
assumed a self-sustaining nature and became more difficult to 
dissolve.
William Stokes has written, "Violence seems to be institu­
tionalized in the organization, maintenance, and changing of
13governments in Latin America." Until 1930 Brazil did not 
meet the criteria of political violence developed by Stokes, 
however, it will be demonstrated that in the past two decades, 
violence has become more institutionalized in the Brazilian 
political process.
Aspects of Civil-Military Relations in Brazil
Between 1889 and 1964 the Brazilian armed forces occupied 
an influential, stabilizing position in the Brazilian political 
system. Compared with the experiences of most of the other Latin 
American nations, military intervention in Brazilian politics 
prior to 1964 was marked with temperance. Commenting on the 
Brazilian military during that era, John J. Johnson has re­
marked:
^^William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin 
American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, V [September, 
1952), 445.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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. . . although the Brazilian military has re­
peatedly encroached on the civilian preserve 
and played a decisive role in the political 
life of the nation, it has done so without 
creating turmoil or arousing public wrath,
Because she was able to win her independence without indebt- 
ing herself to a generation of military heroes^^ and because 
of unique internal political developments, Brazil was able to 
escape the normal South American experience of military inter­
ference in public affairs before 1870.
The key to the political organization of Brazil during 
the nineteenth century was the moderating power of the Emperor, 
called poder moderador. Embodied in Article 101 of the Con­
stitution of 1824, the poder moderador enabled the Emperor 
•'to play the role of the balancer to maintain or restore the
1 Apolitical forces of the country." The article provided that 
he might (1) name the members of the Senate from lists se­
lected by indirect election, (2) sanction decrees and resolu­
tions of the general assembly, (3) approve and suspend resolu­
tions of provincial councils, postpone meetings of the general
^^John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin 
America (Stanford, California: Stanford Ünivers'ity Press,
1964), p . 177.
15Ibid., p. 179. The author states that Brazil did not 
develop a "military spirit," as well, in winning her indepen­
dence. Alan K. Manchester contends that Brazil's independence 
"not won on the field of battle but by diplomacy." See, "The 
Recognition of Brazilian Independence," The Hispanic American 
Historical Review, XXXI (February, 1951), 80.
^^Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil 
(Washington, B.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968) , p. 9l
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assembly, as well as dissolve the Chamber of Deputies as re­
quired for the "salvation of the state," (4) freely name and
dismiss the ministers of the state and (5) suspend judges under
17circumstances. Combined with the directives of Article 99,
stating that the Emperor should be inviolable and sacred, the
poder moderador, became so ample in its exercise, that the
remaining three functions (legislative, executive and judicial)
18could not be effectuated without imperial approval.
From 1824 to 1889 the poder moderador, as a "mediating 
but ultimately authoritarian device," was occasionally subject 
to abuse but was generally applied with restraint and sensi­
bility by Pedro II (1840-1889)
Problems soon beset Dorn Pedro and, following a decade of
20irresponsibility by the military, the decade was overturned
17T. B. Cavalcanti, Las Constituciones del Brazil, xxix, 
cited in James L. Busey, "The Old and the New in1:he Politics 
of Modern Brazil," in The Shaping of Modern Brazil, ed. by 
Eric N. Baklanoff (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1969), p. 69.
18Busey, op. cit., p. 69. Joao Pondia Cologeras states 
that the Emperor "deserves to be called a redresseur de torts, 
a sort of Roman censor." See A History of Brazil, trans. and 
ed. by Percy Alvin Martin (ChapelTHill : University of North 
Carolina Press, 1939), p. 221.
IQBusey, op. cit., pp. 71, 82-83.
20Johnson, Military and Society, pp. 187-88. The author 
argues that during the 1880's the military grew increasingly 
insubordinate of Pedro II because of its opposition to slavery 
and because it felt the civilians were not appreciative of its 
presence in Brazilian society. The overthrow of Pedro II was 
peaceful and was supported by an overwhelming proportion of 
the population, he concludes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in 1889 by the military, which then assumed the function of 
poder moderador. Gilberto Freyre has correctly observed that 
since then it has been the armed forces, not the civilian pol­
iticians, who have acted as the ultimate constitutional author­
ity:
. . . from the end of the nineteenth century to 
the present day the army in Brazil--in the last 
decades, the entire armed forces, army, navy, 
and air force--has acted as a substitute for 
the crown during the monarchial days [sic]-- 
that is, as a corrective influence acting, es­
pecially during critical days, to prevent abuse 
or power by any single individual or by any 
particular . . . group within the national 
organization of Brazil.21
The Constitutions of 1891, 1934, 1937 and 1946 all ac­
knowledged the moderating power of the Brazilian armed forces 
and "nowhere does one find evidence that more than a few elected 
officials of the Brazilian government have ever sought to de­
prive the armed forces of the political prerogatives that they
22assumed upon the overthrow of Pedro II." In addition to pro­
viding for the national defense, the armed forces were specif­
ically charged by Article XIV of the 1891 Constitution with
21Gilberto Freyre, New World in the Tropics: The Culture 
of Modern Brazil (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1*959) , p . 207 .
2 2Johnson, Military and Society, p. 233. Alfred C. Stepan 
writes: "My analysis indicates that the military was often felt 
to be the only available structure that could perform certain 
funcfions the participant elite felt had to be performed. Mili­
tary performance of these functions --whether checking the execu­
tive or maintaining internal order--was thus granted some degree 
of legitimacy, even by many groups who were deeply anti- 
militarist." The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in 
firaz.il (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 71), p. 66.
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maintaining Brazil's domestic laws; this assigned domestic 
function was not affected by either the Constitutions of 1934 
or 1937, except that the military's domestic responsibilities
9 Twere more fully delineated. After the military reasserted 
its poder moderador in disposing of the Vargas dictatorship, 
it was once again assigned a moderating function in the 1946 
Constitution.
The poder moderador of the armed forces was described in 
Articles 176 and 177 of the 1946 Constitution. Like all of 
the constitutions of the Republic, the 1946 Constitution con­
tained the requirement that the armed forces were subject to
2 5the authority of the President "within the limits of the law." 
Article 176 states:
The armed forces, constituted essentially by 
the army, navy, and air force, are permanent 
national institutions, organized on a basis of 
hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme 
authority of the President of the Republic, and 
within the limits of the l a w . 26
The last phrase, in effect, conferred upon the War Ministers the
7X“ Johnson, Military and Society, p. 235.
24Busey, op. cit., p. 73. On the question of who exercised 
the poder moderador during the Estado Novo, Busey contends that 
Vargas filled that traditional role with the military never far 
in the background. For a different interpretation of civil- 
military relation during the Estado Novo, see John D. Wirth,
The Politics of Brazilian Development: 1930-1954 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 8.
2 5Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 73.
^^E. Bradford Burns, "The Constitution of 1946," in A Doc- 
uinentary History of Brazil, ed. by E. Bradford Burns (New~YorT: 
Alfred A. Knopt, 1966), p. 366.
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privilege of "discretionary obedience," depending on their
2 7judgment as to the legality of specific presidential orders.
If they concluded such an order threatened the normal function­
ing of the three constituted powers (the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches), for which they were responsible under 
Article 177 ("The armed forces are intended to defend the
Fatherland and to guarantee the constituted powers and law 
2 8and order." ), they could simply deny final authority to the 
President and consequently disobey his order.
In 1930, 1945, 1954, and 1964 the armed forces were called 
upon by civilians to exercise its poder moderador. For exam­
ple, in 1945, a newspaper editorial stated:
The Brazilian armed forces are deeply conscious 
of their responsibilities in the present political 
situation . . . .  It is incumbent on them to main­
tain the constitutional powers and laws of the 
Republic. Nothing is more right and legitimate 
than that the political parties should ask the 
army, navy, and air force to intervene in the 
sense of guaranteeing the election laws already 
designated, and to impede them from being modi- fied:29
On this occasion, as well as in others, it appears the poder 
moderador was interpreted and applied as a power to defend the 
prerogatives of the Congress by removing or restraining the
2 7Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 73.
7 8See Burns, "The Constitution of 1946," p. 366.
290 Journal, August 10, 1945 cited in Stepan, op. cit. , 
p. 102. Stepan uses the editorials of Brazil’s major daily 
newspapers to demonstrate one manner in which the military 
was called upon to exercise its poder moderador in 1945, 
1954, 1955, 1961, and 1964. See pp. 99-115.
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President whenever he clashed with the legislative branch. 
Viewed from this perspective, it seems evident the poder 
moderador inadvertently became a mechanism by which to con­
trol Brazil's prediliction for paternalism, a condition the
30military itself helped to create. The poder moderador
of the military became so ample that the functions of the 
executive office could not be performed without some recog­
nition of the potential application of that power or without
31tacit military approval.
The practical application of the poder moderador between
1945 and 1964 created a framework of expectations in the
civilian populace at large about military activity in the
political arena, principally that the right to overthrow the
President did not imply the right to assume power. Few, if
any, of those who appealed to the armed forces to exercise its
moderating function during that time, asked that body to assume
32power nor did they expect it to assume power. Hence, while a
For a discussion of the military's part in creating 
Brazil's tradition of presidential paternalism during the 
twentieth century, see de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 28.
^^Thomas E. Skidmore stresses that the continued existence 
of any government between 1945 and 1964 was dependent to a 
large extent on the ability of the President to develop 
cobertura militar (military support) and dispositivo militar 
(active military backing). Politics in Brazil, 1950-1964: An 
Experiment in Democracy (London: Oxford University Pres si 
1067), p. 235.
32After conducting an editorial analysis on the editorials 
of the leading Brazilian newspapers that appeared prior to the 
coups of 1945, 1954, and 1964 and the attempted coups of 1955
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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relatively high degree of legitimacy was ascribed to military
33intervention, military rule remained illegitimate.
In summary, several components of civil-military relations 
in Brazil warrant attention because of their impact on Brazil's 
"democratic experience." Briefly they are:
1. All major political actors attempt to co-opt 
the military. A politicized military is the 
norm.
2. The relevant political actors grant legiti­
macy to the military under certain circum­
stances to act as moderators of the political 
process and to check or overthrow the execu­
tive or to avoid the breakdown of the system.
3. Approval given by civilian elites to the po­
litically heterogeneous military to overthrow 
the executive greatly facilitates the con­
struction of a winning coup combination.
4. There is a strong belief among civilian elites 
and some military officers that while it is 
legitimate for the military to intervene and 
exercise temporary political power, it is 
illegitimate for the military to assume the 
direction of the political system for long 
periods of time.34
Until 1964 the manner in which the armed forces could wield 
its force in the application of the poder moderador was shaped 
and influenced by any one of several elite, civilian groups: the 
government, the anti-regime civilians, and the proregime civil-
and 1961, Stepan concludes that no editorial "ever explicitly 
asked the military to assume power, although dozens of the edi­
torials demanded that the military intervene to remove or check 
the executive." Military in Politics, p. 115.
33Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 74.
^^Stepan, op. cit., p. 64.
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ians.^^ The government consisted of the President and his 
advisors; the anti-regime civilians included those who opposed 
not only the government but the regime itself and who want to 
change the basic rules and authority structures; the proregime 
civilians embraced those individuals who generally supported 
the regime but who periodically disagreed with the government 
and wanted to check the executive by other than legislative 
or electoral methods. Depending on the success of any of 
these groups in co-opting the military, the course of Brazil’s 
’’democratic experience” was to be shaped differently by the 
application of the military’s force.
Brazil's ’’Democratic Experience”
R. A. Humphreys has described Latin America’s affinity 
for democratic forms of government in this manner:
Constitutional government and political prac­
tices almost invariably differ. But it can not 
be denied that in Latin America, or at least in 
large parts of that area, the discrepancies between 
them have been peculiarly marked. The theory in 
their hearts, believing, indeed, that it is quite 
unsuited for Latin American conditions, few among 
their statesmen venture to repudiate it with their 
lips.
The political experience of Brazil between 1945 and 1964 sup­
ports the validity of this observation.
Jordan M. Young has argued that Brazil practiced real
3Sibid., p. 67.
? A
R. A. Humphreys, Tradition and Revolt in Latin America 
(New York: Columbia UniversTty Press, 19691, p^ 216.
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37democracy only between 1945 and 1964. . While this may be 
true when the political activities of that era are compared 
with those in earlier periods of Brazilian history, Brazil's 
real political practices between 1945 and 1964 were at vari­
ance with classical and Anglo-American concepts of a democratic
% Osociety, as well as with the provisions of her "democratic"
constitution. In this regard, the Brazilian experience under
a "democratic" constitution was quite typical of Latin American
nations and their constitutions:
. . . these [Latin American] constitutions tend 
to be normative and anticipatory. That is, their 
texts often provide for what the constitution- 
writers hope will come to pass rather than what 
the structure is or can be in reality,
In most cases, when conflicts develop between the "written"
constitution and the "real" constitution, or the existing
power relationships in a political community, the latter has
37Jordan M. Young, "Some Permanent Political Characteris­
tics of Contemporary Brazil," Journal of Inter-American Studies, 
VI (July, 1964), 290.
3RHenry Mayo has listed the following features as being 
characteristic of a classical democratic state: decision-making 
by majority rule, political equality of all citizens, freedom 
to oppose, and observation of the principle of constitutional­
ism, or a "higher law" to Impose limitations on political power. 
See An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1960), ^  S T i Peter H. Odegard has remarked 
that in the Anglo-American tradition representative assemblies 
and the idea of human perfectability have remained central 
tenets of most democracies. See The American Republic: Its 
Government and Politics (New Yorkl Harper and Row, T9"69]̂  
pp. 34-45.
S^George I. Blanksten, "Revolutions," in Government and 
Politics in Latin America, ed. by Harold Eugene Davis "(New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958), p. 142.
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prevailed.
The Brazilian constitution, promulgated September 18, 1946,
theoretically established a presidential, federal political
system with all the mechanisms of a democratic government: free
and fair elections; representative legislative bodies; freedom
of dissent and organization; and numerous political parties.
Primarily the work of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, the
Constitution of 1946 superseded the Constitution of 1937, "an
authoritarian, corporatist document" decreed by Getulio 
41Vargas.
The formation of the new constitution was facilitated by 
the armed forces' removal of the Vargas dictatorship from power 
on October 25, 1945. If one accepts the Young thesis that 
Brazil practiced real democracy between 1945 and 1964, it is 
significant to note that the very document on which that ex­
perience was supposedly based, the Constitution of 1946, 
actually "re-established the institutions of the republic 
more or less as they prevailed before V a r g a s . w h i c h  was 
hardly an era of democracy.
^^George I. Blanksten, "Constitutions and the Structures 
of Power," in Government and Politics in Latin America, ibid., 
p. 227.
^^James L. Busey, "Brazil’s Reputation for Political 
Stability," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (December,
1965), 868.
^^Ibid., 869.
^^On the creation of the Estado Novo in 1937, de Dubnic 
writes that it did not represent the end of democracy, "since
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The majority of those elected to Congress in December,
1945 were either politicians who had actively supported Var­
gas' Estado Novo or politicians from the old, republican era 
who had been stifled by the former dictator's regime. Neither 
group could accurately be labelled as having been particularly 
dedicated to democratic principles. In fact, the two political 
parties created or controlled by the ex-dictator, the Partido 
Social Democratico (PSD) and the Partido Trabhalista Brasileiro 
(PTB), controlled a majority of the seats in Congress at the 
time the new constitution was formed and a d op te d . V a r g a s  
himself was elected to Congress, less than two months after 
his ouster.
In light of the preceding facts, it seems that the Consti­
tution of 1946 was more the statement of a nation's rejection 
of one-man dictatorial rule in the anti-fascist atmosphere of 
the post-World War II days than it was a statement of a commit-
there could not be an end to something that had not really begun." 
de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 12. For a brief discussion of the undem­
ocratic style of the old republican era (1889-1930), see John W.
P. Dulles, "The Contributions of Getulio Vargas to the Moderniza­
tion of Brazil," in Eric N. Baklanoff, op. cit., p. 40.
'‘̂'̂ For a breakdown of the party membership in the 1946 
Brazilian Congress, see Theodore Wyckoff, "Brazilian Political 
Parties," The South Atlantic Quarterly, LVl (Summer, 1957), 292. 
With regard to the participation of the PSD in the 1945 elec­
tions Thomas Skidmore has written: "Final direction came from 
on high, as Vargas personally supervised the organization of 
the PSD in order to support the official candidacy of Dutra." 
Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, p. 56. For a brief discussion of 
Vargas' role in the creation and control of the PTB, see John W. 
F. Dulles, "Post-Dictatorship Brazil, 1945-1964," in New Perspec- 
tives of Brazil, ed. by Eric N. Baklanoff (Nashville: VanderbllT 
University Press, 1966), pp. 9-10; Young, op. cit., 297; and 
Busey, "Brazil's Reputation," 873.
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ment to democratic institutions and processes. It is even 
questionable that the constitution-writers hoped Brazil would 
evolve eventually into a democratic state. Although a dicta­
tor was deposed and a new constitution adopted, the same elites 
continued to control the nation and democracy remained nothing 
but a formal concept.
The Constitution of 1946 "obliged” all citizens over the 
age of eighteen to vote. Exceptions were those who could not 
speak Portuguese, criminals, or those who did not enjoy "full 
political rights," and those who served as enlisted seamen or 
soldiers. The reason for the inclusion of the latter was that 
they could have conceivably been intimidated to vote for the 
candidate endorsed by the m i li t a r y . T h e s e  restrictions 
effectively excluded substantial portions of the population 
from v o t i n g . I n  the 1950 presidential elections, the first
de Dubnic, op. cit. The author contends the establish­
ment of Dutra's democratic regime represented an evolutionary, 
rather than revolutionary, development because the elites re­
mained the same (p. 13). On the political system that followed 
Vargas, de Dubnic writes: "Although the regime changed to a 
formal democracy, the men in power were the men of the Estado 
Novo" (p. 14).
Wyckoff, op. cit., p. 284.
"^^While Jordan Young admits that the electorate constantly 
increased between 1945 and 1964, he also points out that of 
Brazil’s 75 million inhabitants in 1964, her "political popula­
tion" (that is, over the age of 15) was comprised of some 38 
million. Of this 38 million only 19 million were actually 
eligible to vote due to a high rate of illiteracy and sickness. 
See "Some Permanent Political Characteristics of Contemporary 
Brazil," op. cit., 296.
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held under the new constitution, only IS.9 percent of the
population actually voted, but this was a dramatic increase
4 8over the 3.1 percent who voted in the 1930 elections. Those 
who did vote were easily influenced by demagogic appeal, and 
coronelismo, ”a kind of latter day adaptation of feudalism to 
the conditions of republican Brazil,'* flourished in the rural 
areas.Consequently, vote buying was a widespread practice.
Just over five years after his ouster as dictator, Getulio 
Vargas, was elected President of Brazil in 1950, thereby suc­
ceeding Caspar Dutra, whose lackluster administration had 
served as a "caretaker regime for the Vargas f o r c e s . V a r g a s  
used the organization of his party, the PTB, as his personal 
vehicle to power during the democratic phase of his political 
career. While only the third largest party during the fifties, 
its ability to deliver the poor rural vote and to form a series 
of complicated alliances with the PSD and the PSP fPartido 
Social Progressista) enabled its candidates to hold either 
the Presidency or the Vice-Presidency until 1964.^^ The
^^For electoral statistics on the Brazilian elections from 
1945-1965, see Brazil: Election Factbook, No. 2, September, 1965 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Polit­
ical Systems), p. 19. Percentage of population voting in 1930 
election cited in de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 13.
^^For a discussion of electoral fraud and corruption in 
Brazil during the 1950's, see James W. Rowe, "The 'Revolution* 
and the 'System*: Notes on Brazilian Politics, Part I: Seeds of 
the * System*," American Universities Field Staff, East Coast 
South America Series, Vol. XXI (Washington, D.C.: American Uni- 
versitië's' Reports Së'rvice, May, 1966), pp. 13-14.
50de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 14.
SlThe PSD-PTB domination over the Presidency was interrupted 
only by J&nio Quadros' seven month tenure in 1961.
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frustrated members of the opposition party, the UDN (Uniao 
Democratico Nacional), the second largest political party, 
continued to envision democracy in a negative manner: pri-
52marily as means by'which to control Vargas and his forces.
From their inception, all major political parties tended to 
be personalista and, as a result, political contests continued 
to be related more to personalities than to any sort of mean­
ingful political ideas or programs; the chief tendency of 
political parties was to identify themselves as either pro- 
or anti-Vargas, even after his death in 1954.
The Vargas regime was troubled from the start by infla­
tion and communist activity. Because wages were substantially 
increased (as Vargas promised they would be during his cam­
paign) , the cost of living rose 23 percent in 1952. World 
demand for coffee, Brazil’s largest industry and major export 
during the fifties, sharply declined. Communist activities 
increased steadily until 1954, when Joao Goulart, Vargas’
Labor Minister, was forced to resign by the armed forces for 
allegedly promoting communist infiltration into labor unions 
This swirling vortex of political tensions and economic dis­
tress was culminated by the unsuccessful assassination attempt
52de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 14.
^^Johnson states that this move by the armed forces was 
the first in a series of moves that drew the military back 
into active participation in politics. Military and Society,
p. 208.
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on Carlos Lacerda, the most violent critic of the Vargas 
Administration.^^ Investigations soon disclosed that the 
head of the presidential guard had ordered the shooting; 
further disclosures of graft and influence peddling totally 
discredited V a r g a s . U n d e r  intense military and civilian 
pressure to resign, Vargas committed suicide on August 24, 
1954. Proregime civilian forces had first co-opted the 
armed forces to secure the removal of Goulart and then, 
later and more importantly, to check the executive in the 
person of Vargas. In both instances the basic rules and 
authority structures remained intact while the usual legis­
lative and electoral procedures were temporarily suspended.
On learning of Vargas' death, the hostile crowds that 
had been demonstrating against him only moments before did 
an about-face and became full of devotion for the dead Presi­
dent and openly expressed wrath against his e n e m i e s . I m m e ­
diately thereafter, Vargas' now famous suicide note in which
5he severely rebuked unnamed foreign and domestic foes, ' was
54For a discussion of the events surrounding the attempt 
on Lacerda's life, the so-called "Tonoleros Case," and the in­
fluence it exerted in determining Vargas' political fate, see 
J. V. D. Saunders, "A Revolution of Agreement Among Friends," 
The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIV (May, 1964), 
197-213.
SSgee John W. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, Political- 
Military Crises: 1955-1964 (Austin: IJniversity of Texas 
Press, 197ÜTT p. 27 an<r~S¥idmore, op. cit., p. 159.
S^See Samuel Pope Brewer, "Vargas Commits Suicide After 
Ouster by Military," The New York Times, August 25, 1954, p. 1,
S^Soon after the disclosure of Vargas’ suicide note.
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released to the press and a wave of sympathy for Vargas en­
gulfed the country. It became politically impossible for the 
anti-Vargas forces, who had centered their criticisms on the 
person of the former President, to fill the power vacuum.
By his final act of self-sacrifice Vargas 
neutralized the political and psychological 
advantages his opponents had accumulated. In 
death, as in life, Vargas' action was well 
designed to yield maximum political effect.^8
Vice-President Cafe Filho acceded to the presidency and the 
first test of presidential succession under the 1946 Consti­
tution was passed.
In 1955 amidst charges of possible electoral fraud and 
demands for a coup d'etat to prevent the pro-Vargas forces 
from re-assuming office, the Liga pela Legalidade (League for 
Legality) was formed by civilians dedicated to preserving 
Brazil’s "democratic" institutions of free speech and free 
elections. In addition, it was to guard against the threat 
of military interference in the 1955 elections, "a clear indi­
cation" according to de Dubnic
. . . that the holding of free elections was 
still a struggle rather than the routine con­
stitutional procedure it should have been after 
ten years of democratic government.
another version of the note was found and a controversy, as to 
which of the two, if either, was written by Vargas, ensued. The 
two versions are printed in The Quest for Change in Latin Amer­
ica, ed. by W. Raymond Duncan and James Nelson Goodsell 
(Toronto : Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 151-53.
S^skidmore, op. cit., p. 142.
59de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 15.
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As soon as it became evident that the coalition candidates 
of the PSD (Juscelino Kubitschek for President) and the PTB 
(Joao Goulart for Vice President) would win the 1955 presi­
dential election, the anti-Vargas forces began to demand that 
they be prevented from assuming office. Filho, although not 
an ardent admirer of the now martyred former President, 
stressed that the election would be held as constitutionally 
authorized and the victors permitted to assume office. On 
October 13, 1955 Juscelino Kubitschek was elected President 
with only 36 percent of the vote; Goulart, who actually re­
ceived more votes than Kubitschek, was elected Vice President. 
Before they were inaugurated in January, 1956 events were to 
disclose that the election and constitutional processes ceased 
to be an adequate assurance of succession.
Cafe Filho, the lame duck, caretaker President, suffered 
a heart attack on November 3, 1955 and Carlos Luz, the Presi­
dent of the Chamber of Deputies, temporarily took over as 
President. When the military became convinced that Luz was 
collaborating in an attempt to obstruct Kubitschek's inaugura­
tion, he was forced from office by members of the Novimsnto 
Militar Constitucionalista, a legalist military faction devoted
For a breakdown of the votes cast in the 1955 elections, 
see Skidmore, op. cit., pp. 148-49. Under the 1946 Constitu­
tion party alliances and coalitions were legal. Therefore, it 
was possible for a President of one party to be elected with 
a Vice-President of another party.
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to constitutional processes,and replaced by the President 
of the Senate, Nereu Ramos. In late November, Cafe Filho, 
fully recuperated from his illness, prepared to reassume the 
presidency; although this intention was acceptable to Ramos, 
newly appointed War Minister, Texeira Lott, the leader of the 
’’legalist movement” earlier that month, objected on the 
grounds Filho might retain his former ministers whom the 
military regarded with suspicion. Faced with overwhelming 
opposition from an informal alliance of the armed forces and 
the PSD-PTB controlled Congress, Filho was prevented from re­
entering the office to which he was legally entitled. On 
January 31, 1956 Kubitschek ’’took office not only through the
normal processes, i.e., the will of the people, but also the
6 2grace of the army.”
In the final analysis, the presidential musical chairs 
of November, 1955, orchestrated by the armed forces, repre­
sented a short-term victory for the proregime forces and a 
long-term victory for the anti-regime forces. The immediate 
challenge by the anti-Vargas forces to the right to conduct
John W. Dulles discusses this "legalist” move in "Post- 
Dictatorship Brazil,” pp. 32-53. Skidmore suggests that part 
of the reason for Luz’s removal from office was that he was a 
member of the PSD faction that opposed Kubtischek's presi­
dential nomination and was still suspected of being in sympathy 
with moves designed to obstruct Kubitschek when he succeeded 
the stricken Filho. Politics in Brazil, 1950-1964, p. 152.
de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 16.
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elections was subdued and, on this level o£ interpretation, 
the basic rules of the polLtical system were upheld. But the 
"legalist" move actually modified the manner in which those 
rules were enforced. The "legalist" deposition of Luz, 
based on such obscure considerations, and obstruction of 
Filho's return is a clear indication the military was evolv­
ing toward a position where it might exercise wider discre­
tion in applying its poder moderador. The military moves in 
1955 established the framework for the precedent set in 
August, 1961: in order to permit succession of the President's 
office, the military supervised the drastic amendment of the 
basic rules of political interaction among the three constitu­
tional powers.
The Kubitschek Administration was marked by several sig­
nificant features. The new President's political toleration 
strengthened democracy and freedom^ ̂ and his apparent aversion 
for the paternalistic style of Vargas led him to share his 
powers, at times with unscrupulous elites. In his quest for 
economic development he launched Brazil on an economic journey 
on which he promised "fifty Years of Progress in Five Years. 
Money for his programs of national development was obtained by 
printing new currency-- the volume of currency in circulation 
nearly tripled between 1955 and 1 9 6 1 . During the same period.
63xbid., p. 17.
64por a general outline of Kubitschek's ambitious goals 
and strategies, see Skidmore, op . cit., pp. 164-70.
^^Dulles, "Post-Dictatorship Brazil, p. 38.
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however, the cost of living more than tripled, a noticeable 
rise even in light of Brazil's history of chronic inflation. 
(Some observers of the Kubitschek era say he gave Brazil 
"Fifty Years of Inflation in Five Years.
As in the Dutra presidency, the armed forces tended to 
withdraw from public view during Kubitschek's term but they 
remained a potential threat to his administration, primarily 
because of the widespread distrust of Goulart harbored by the 
anti-communist and anti-Vargas officers. Kubitschek deftly 
deterred possible military intervention by increasing military
7expenditures to new highs and by repeatedly denouncing com­
munism. Though hampered during the first part of his term by 
those who refused to accept the legitimacy of his election and 
despite his administration's miserable economic performance, 
Kubitschek emerged as a widely popular leader by the end of 
his term.
The presidential elections of 1960 were conducted in an
atmosphere of freedom and peace; no Liga pela Legalidade was 
6 8necessary. Janio Quadros, a political outsider free of
^^See Young, op. cit., 299. 
fs 7Although most of the attention is given to Kubitschek's 
expenditures on programs of national development, more money 
was spent on military demands than on any single development 
program. See Johnson, Military and Society, p. 208.
^^There is some disagreement as to whom, the armed forces 
or Kubitschek, "guaranteed" the elections, de Dubnic states 
Kubitschek provided this function, op. cit., p. 18. Busey 
states that the armed forces guaranteed^the 1960 elections. 
"The Old and the New," p. 65.
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entangling alliances who promised to sweep away the corruption
and inefficiency of the Kubitschek era, was elected President
69with 44.8 percent of the 11.7 million votes cast. Never a
party man, Quadros had used the organization of the UDN to
achieve his political ends; although his election represented
the first time in Brazilian history an opposition candidate was
elected, his convincing victory over Texeira Lott was more a
personal victory than a triumph for the U D N . T h r o u g h  a
strange series of developments, Joao Goulart of the PTB was
71 *once again elected Vice President.
Confronted with a paralyzing PTB-PSD opposition in Con­
gress and not accustomed to working within the apparatus of 
the UDN, Quadros attempted to appeal directly to the masses 
that elected him; finally, frustrated by his inability to
implement his policies over the obstruction of Congress and
72governmental bureaucrats, he suddenly resigned on August 25,
69For a breakdown of the votes cast for President, see 
de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 123.
70Ibid.. p. 18. One indication of Quadros' political 
independence was his temporary resignation as the presidential 
nominee of the UDN during the midst of the campaign. He re­
portedly resigned in a maneuver to secure his independence from 
political bosses. See Dulles, "Post-Dictatorship Brazil," p. 41.
71For a brief description of the circumstances leading to 
Goulart's election, see de Dubnic, op. cit., pp. 122-24.
72Young states that Quadros did not understand the art 
of log rolling or "pork barreling," which frequently resulted 
in deadlocks with Congress. "Some Permanent Political Fea­
tures," 291.
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1961, less than seven months after his election. In a move
reminiscent of Vargas’ last acts, Quadros issued a written
statement charging that forcus occultas (occult, or hidden,
forces) had brought about his resignation. Regardless of the
7 3motives behind his resignation, it was accepted by Congress ; 
there was no spontaneous uprising in his behalf. The legal 
heir to the presidency was Joao Goulart, a politician who 
symbolized the trust of no important political sectors, in­
cluding the armed forces.
Although Goulart was legally entitled to succeed Quadros, 
a fragmentation of opinion developed in the military hierarchy 
over the question of his succession. The moralists, led by 
the War Ministers, feared Goulart's tendencies to condone 
communist activity and wanted him set aside in favor of a 
more suitable successor; the legalists, or legitimists, on 
the other hand, favored constitutional succession, despite the 
fact that many in this group did not care for Goulart person­
ally.^'^ Neither group held a clear advantage and each remained
7 3Although the reasons for Quadros’ resignation are not 
clearly understood, it is generally believed that he resigned 
because he felt by doing so he would present the people with 
three alternatives; chaos, military rule or his return to 
power on his own terms. He was confident the people would 
choose the third alternative. This interpretation is expressed 
in Skidmore, op. cit., pp. 202-204 and Young, op. cit., 291-92. 
Some research definitely indicates the military did not pres­
sure Quadros into resigning. See Stepan, op. cit., p. 68fn,
"̂̂ It is conceivable that members of this group may have 
been so dedicated to principles that they could not block the 
ascension of Goulart merely on the grounds of what he might do.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
passionately dedicated to its "principles." Finally, the
deadlock was resolved when both factions of the hierarchy of
the armed forces agreed to accept a Congressional compromise
proposal, under which Brazil's presidential system was
scuttled in favor of a parliamentary system. The solution
of the succession problem effected by the divided military
leadership (moralists vs. legitimists) was nothing short of
a major restructuring of the political system. On September 7,
1961 Goulart assumed an office stripped of many of its tradi-
75tional powers.
In assessing the consequences of the military's inter­
vention, it seems apparent that no real political solution 
was reached, at least as far as the military was concerned.
The legalist opinion that the Vice President, as constitutional 
successor, should be allowed to fill the vacancy in the presi­
dency was upheld, but it was tainted in the process. The com­
promise necessary to assure Goulart's accession, a constitu­
tional amendment, only set a precedent that future legalists 
would soon exploit. The legitimists had not prevented Goulart': 
rise to power and, obviously, the mere limitation of Goulart's 
power could not have dispelled their fears of this man.
The terms "moralists" and "legitimists" are borrowed from 
Robert Dervel Evans, "The Brazilian Revolution of 1964: Sur­
gery Without Anaesthetics," International Affairs, XLIV 
(April, 1968), 271.
75For a list of the powers that the presidency lost, 
see de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 32.
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After nearly fourteen months of deliberately promoting
7 Ainefficiency and confusion, Goulart convinced the Brazilian
electorate that the parliamentary system was unworkable ; as a
result, on January 6, 1963 a national referendum returned
Brazil to a presidential system. The much disturbed Goulart
was now able to wield the full extent of the traditional powers
of his office, but, in the words of one author, "In trying to
77please all, he pleased none . . . He did succeed in
uniting his opposition. The armed forces, already fearful
of Goulart’s reacquisition of the presidential powers, soon
began to close ranks in united opposition to the demagogic
president, especially when he attempted to bypass Congress
to secure passage of his "basic reforms" and attempted to
7 Rdivide and control the armed forces. With the rate of infla-
7Qtion exceeding 8 percent per month ' and the political process 
in complete disarray, the armed forces, acting with the strong 
support of proregime forces, forced Goulart from the presidential
^^Skidmore, op. cit., p. 221.
7 7Phyllis Peterson, "Brazil; Institutionalized Confusion," 
in Political Systems of Latin America, ed. by Martin C. Need­
ier (Princeton: D. Van NostraiicTandncoinpany, Inc., 1964), p. 476
78Robert Dervel Evans discusses Goulart’s attempts to 
undermine the officer’s ability to command their forces in his 
work, "The Brazilian Revolution of 1964: Surgery Without 
Anaesthetics," 273.
79Cost of living figures were generally derived by observ­
ing economic developments in the target city of Guanabara. In 
1962, the cost of living rose 55 percent and in 1963 it rose 
81 percent. See Skidmore, op. cit., p. 257.
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palace and into exile in the "Revolution of 1964." "The
arbitrator army had once again exercised its moderating power
80to restore order to the political processes." The events 
that followed this "revolution" were anything but democratic.
The 1964 "revolution" and subsequent political develop­
ments were culmination of forces that had been converging 
since 1889 and 1945. Having assumed the poder moderador in 
1889, the armed forces set about to create a strong presi­
dential regime that could exert better control over the polit­
ical system than could a parliamentary regime. A strong 
presidency was institutionalized in the early days of the 
republic and withstood the constitutional changes of 1934, 
1937, and 1946, though the latter curtailed powers granted 
by the first two. As civilians persisted in the exploitation 
of the office of the President, the armed forces assumed 
greater responsibilities in an attempt to prevent the exces­
sive abuse of those powers. Military interpretations of the 
extent of intervention necessary for the preservation of 
"legality," or of law and order, grew increasingly more 
liberal.
After receding from public view after 1945 the armed 
forces appeared once again during the next decade to resolve 
political problems in and around the office of the President.
80Riordan Roett, "A Praetorian Army in Politics: The 
Changing Role of the Brazilian Military," in Brazil in the 
Sixties, ed. by Riordan Roett (Nashville: Vanderbilt Uni- 
versity Press, 1972), p. 23.
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Vargas was removed from office in 1954 in the interest of 
’’legality” and Filho was denied a return to his office in 
the name of "legality.” Each time the military responded 
to civilian demands for action. In 1961 the concept of 
legality was expanded and it became necessary for the civil­
ians to modify the basic rules of the political system in 
order that the armed forces might defend the legality of that 
system. The armed forces had become more selective in their 
defense of "legality;” the rules which they chose not to de­
fend were either ignored or abolished and replaced with rules 
that were more acceptable. The 1955 intervention established 
the psychological framework for the constitutional modifica­
tion of August, 1961; this amendment set the precedent for 
the drastic constitutional renovation after April, 1904.
The political developments between 1946 and 1964 seem 
to substantiate Busey's observation that while democracy is
p 1
extolled in Brazil, dictatorship is not rejected. The 
memory of Vargas’ dictatorial regime did not hinder his elec­
tion in 1950; the strength of the PTB increased progressively 
until 1964 by exploiting Vargas’ reputation and casting can­
didates in his image.
Brazil has adhered to democracy only in a formal sense; 
democracy, it appears, is accepted more as a convenience to 
be maintained only if useful. Between 1945 and 1964 there was
^^Busey, "Brazil’s Reputation,” 871
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a balance of five to four between the number of times presi­
dents were forced from office and the number of presidential
8 2elections held by popular elections. In the instances of 
direct military action against the President, they generally 
had broad civilian support. Because "democracy" was treated 
as an expedient and not as a principle, it was easily super­
seded by another system when conditions required political 
experimentation. Unlike in the past, the military acted 
independently of civilian demands and used its forces to effect 
"legalist" solutions. The changes in the basic rules of the 
political system did not reflect the changes originally en­
visioned by either the proregime or anti-regime forces.
The "Revolution of 1964"
Revolution, as the term is employed in Latin America, does
not necessarily imply some violent convulsion of society or of
the state. If revolution is defined as
fundamental change in the nature of the state, 
the function of government, the principles of 
economic production and distribution, the rela­
tionship of the social classes, particularly as 
regards the control of the government,
o 2de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 18. There were presidential 
elections in 1945, 195D1 1955, and 1960. Vargas was forced 
from office on two occasions (1945 and 1954). Carlos Luz 
was forced from office in 1955, Cafe Filho denied re- 
installation as President, and Joao Goulart was forced from 
office in 1964.
^^William S. Stokes, "The 'Cuban Revolution* and the 
Presidential Elections of 1948," The Hispanic American His­
torical Report, XXI (February, 1951), 37.
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then "revolutions" in Latin America are rare. Rather a
"typical revolution" in Latin Ameri-ca is a change in the
executive leadership brought about "in a manner or on a
84date not stipulated by the constitution." It is an extra- 
legal method of replacing one government by another which is 
not accompanied by a fundamental change in the social order. 
Although all the military governments have since referred to 
the military action of March 31-April 1, 1964 as a "revolution," 
it was nonetheless a "typical revolution" and not a true revolu­
tion.
The political intervention of the Brazilian military in 
1964 was a direct, personal assault on President Goulart and
8Scould be accurately called a golpe de estado, or a coup d'etat.
It represented the seizure of power from within the political 
system, but the manner in which the leadership was installed 
did not represent an unconstitutional change in governmental 
leadership, so much as it did represent a break with tradition.
Article 177 of the 1946 Constitution had long been the 
legal basis on which the military based its withdrawal of sup­
port for the President once it determined he was functioning 
outside "the limits of the law." After previous coups the 
Brazilian armed forces had traditionally been content to endorse 
the succession of a new or acting civilian President elected or
O A
Blanksten, "Revolutions," p. 119.
o r
Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor," 456.
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appointed by Congress.
In 1964 such niceties were brushed aside and the military
demanded the ’’election’' of one of its own. This demand came
only after Ranieri Mazzilli, the President of the Chamber of
Deputies, was sworn in as Provisional President and ordered
the election of a new President within thirty d a y s a s
specified by the 1946 Constitution.
One result of the 1964 intervention was "revolutionary”
8 7or ’’represented a significant breaking with the past," in
that a former military officer was elected interim President
after the coup. Castello Branco, the former Army Chief of
Staff who drafted the famous memorandum reminding the armed
forces of their traditional responsibilities during the crises
8 8of Goulart’s final days, was elected by an intimidated Con-
89gress to fill the unexpired terms of Quadros and Goulart.
Only the Institutional Act decreed by the military to assure
the election of a military President made the move of force in
901964 a "revolution" in a very general sense.
86"Washington Sends Warmest Wishes to Brazil’s Leader," 
New York Times, April 3, 1964, p. 1.
^^Stokes, "The ’Cuban Revolution'," 37.
8 8For a complete reproduction of this memorandum, see 
Octavio lanni. Crisis in Brazil, trans. by Phyllis B. Eleveth 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 136-38.
89The specifics of the intimidation to which Congress was 
subjected will be developed in Chapter II.
^^Ronald M. Schneider contends the military move could 
not be accurately called a revolution or counterrevolution.
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In the period between April, 1964 and December, 1972 
only an incremental development of structural changes and 
revisions of socio-economic and political philosophies, that 
have resulted in a shift of the distribution of power, have 
transformed the move of force in 1964 into a revolution of 
sorts. Since the label ’•revolutionary” has been used in 
public pronouncements and official documents, as well as by 
students of Brazilian politics, it will be used in the follow 
ing chapters to refer to the groups and individuals that sup­
ported the 1964 coup and the subsequent military governments, 
rather than in its more precise definition.
Definitions and Methods
Since 1945 Brazil has experienced rapid modernization, 
a "multi-faceted process” involving, on one level, a funda­
mental shift in values, attitudes and expectations and the 
diffusion of man’s increased knowledge throughout society by
means of increased literacy, mass communications, and educa-
92tion, on another level. One of the consequences of in­
creased communications and urbanization has been social
The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing” 
Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970 (New York; Columbia'University 
Press, 1971), p. 109. Skidmore argues that only the subse­
quent developments of the military governments have transformed 
the 1964 into a revolution. Politics in Brazil, pp. 308-309.
91Schneider, op. cit., p. 109.
92Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Developing 
Societies (New Haven: Yale University“Press, 1963) , p p 52-33.
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mobilization, or "the process by which major clusters of old
social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or
broken and people become available for new patterns of social-
9 3ization and behavior."
Since non-traditional, advanced practices in political 
and economic life were introduced and accepted on a consider­
able scale, political participation, a form of social mobili­
zation, increased dramatically in Brazil between 1945 and 1964, 
The framework of the 1946 Constitution enhanced the emergence 
of a multi-party system and, lacking any experience with any 
kind of open, competitive party system, Brazil was soon 
plagued by an imbalanced spectrum of political parties and 
a maze of irresponsible political alliances. The problem of 
inexperience with a multi-party system was compounded by the 
emergence for the first time of a mass electorate, which
placed a variety, of demands on the newly institutionalized 
94government.
Samuel Huntington's analysis of institutionalization is
93Karl E. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political 
Development," American Political Science Review, LV (Sep­
tember, 1961), 494.
94Roett, op^ cit., pp. 7-8. Robert M. Levine argues 
that Getulio Vargas was largely responsible for beginning the 
process of politicizing the masses during the Estado Novo.
See The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 19 54-195'8 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 172 , 182- 83. Also 
see Miguel Jorrin and John D. Martz, Latin American Political 
Thought and Ideology (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1970), pp. 2 39-49.
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helpful for understanding the political stability of Brazil, 
as a result of the emergence of a mass multi-party system and 
the questionable capacity of the government's new institutions* 
ability to adapt and to process complex demands. Huntington's 
proposition is that the stability of a given polity depends on 
the relationship between the level of political participation 
and the level of political institutionalization.^^ Due to an 
accelerating rate of political participation and a correspond­
ing low level of institutionalization after 1946, the Brazilian 
political system became characteristic of a praetorian polity,
one in which groups become mobilized into politics without be-
Q 6coming socialized by politics.
Because participation in politics continued to outstrip 
the institutionalization of politics between 1946 and 1964, 
Brazil remained an unstable political system. Since the polit­
ical institutions seemed incapable of refining or mediating 
group political interaction, the armed forces consequently 
enlarged the functions of its poder moderador to fill the 
institutional void: the War Ministers decided "to retain power 
and to resist the expansion of political participation" after 
the 1964 coup.̂ ^
95Huntington, Political Order, p. 79.
96Ibid., p. 83.
97Ibid., p. 235. The author labels the option of "re­
taining power and resisting the expansion of political par­
ticipation" as the "Gastello Branco Option."
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Historically, the Brazilian military has been what David
Easton would term a "politically relevant member" of the
Brazilian political system, or a member that shared in the
9 8effective power of. that system. Like other politically 
relevant members the military placed certain demands on the 
authorities, extended or withheld support for the regime and 
responded*to the outputs of the political system, but it re­
mained a special member of that system; because of its poder 
moderador, the President was deterred somewhat from pursuing 
goals that were unacceptable to the military.
Driven by a variety of forces, the military transcended 
the boundaries of political intervention and assumed power in 
1964. This action resulted in a transformation of the political 
role of Brazilian military from one of a politically relevant
member to one of an authority, in which it was to have the day-
99to-day responsibility for governing.
Easton develops three criteria for occupants of an au­
thority role: they must engage in the daily affairs of the 
system; they must be recognized by most of the members of the 
system as having responsibility for these matters; and their
98David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life 
(New York: John Wiley and^Sons," Inc., 1965), p. 222,
99Ibid., p. 39fn. Note: when referring to a political 
role, one is usually referring to an individual and not an 
institution. However, like many other writers I will refer 
periodically to a "political role" of the military. The 
Brazilian military has been described as occupying a polit­
ical role by Johnson, Military and Society, pp. 177-225.
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actions must be accepted as binding most of the time by most 
of the members, "as long as they act within the limits of 
their r o l e s . H a v i n g  exceeded the traditional limits of 
its poder moderador, the military embarked on a new role that 
lacked precise limits; in a sense, the military then became an 
authority without limits, principally because after 1964 it 
occupied a new role whose functions were in need of definition.
While seeking to determine the limits of its new role in 
resisting the expansion of political participation, the mili­
tary governments consciously altered the structures of authority 
and "the procedures that are expected and accepted in the pro­
cessing and implementation of d e m a n d s . I n i t i a l l y  justified 
as temporary and as necessary to restore order, these altera­
tions persisted as permanent features of the political system.
As a result, the high level of support and legitimacy extended
102to the military leaders at the time they assumed power in 1964 
slowly dissipated. As civilian support for the military govern­
ments subsided, so too, it seems, did the military’s commitment
^^*^Easton, op. cit., p. 212.
^^^Ibid., p. 193.
102At the time the military assumed power with the issuance 
of the Institution Acts it enjoyed a high level of support. The 
major contenders for the presidential election, scheduled for 
October, 1965, supported the "regime of exception" of Castello 
Branco because they felt it was the only institution that could 
guarantee those elections. See Schneider, op. cit., p. 121.
In this regard the primary task of the military was seen to be 
one of systems maintenance. See Stepan, op. cit., p. 63.
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to democratic norms of government.
In order to demonstrate how the military governments' 
policies of resisting political participation evolved over a 
period of time, I have adopted the concept of political re­
cruitment for Almond and Powell. As the nature of the military 
regime grew increasingly repressive, the function of political 
recruitment, "which must be performed in all political systems 
if its roles are to be manned and its structures are to func­
tion," became more selective and restrictive.
The six and one-half years of the "revolution" under 
study are divided into three distinct phases. Chapter II
concentrates on the presidency of Castello Branco, which 
lasted from April, 1964 to March, 1967. Chapter-III focuses 
on the presidency of Artur da Costa e Silva from his inaug­
uration (March, 1967) to December 15, 1968, when Institutional 
Acts #5, granting the President near dictatorial powers, was 
decreed. Chapter IV reviews the remainder of the Costa e 
Silva government and the presidency of General Gerrastazu 
Medici through the end of 1970. Chapter V serves as a con-
1 n TGabriel Almond and Gingham Powell, Comparative Poli­
tics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1966), p. 22. Huntington argues praetorian armies 
that select the "Castello Branco Option" inevitably become 
increasingly repressive. This repression carries over into 
political recruitment.
lO^That the Brazilian "Revolution" may be divided into 
distinct phases has been suggested by Schneider, op. cit., 
p. 109; H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Military Government," Cur­
rent History, LVIII (February, 1970), 74; Robert M. Levine, 
"Brazil at the CrossroadsCurrent History, LXIII (February, 
1973), S3.
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eluding chapter in which I summarize the major trends of the 
first six and one-half years of the "revolution" and assess 
the implications of these trends for the possible return to 
civilian leadership and civilian participation in government 
in Brazil in the near future.
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CHAPTER II
PHASE ONE OF THE "REVOLUTION":
THE ARMED FORCES ASSUME GOVERNMENTAL POWER
This chapter focuses on some of the operative forces which 
may have led the armed forces to abandon in 1964 its function 
of political moderator and to engage in one of political direc­
tor. The time frame under study extends from March, 1964 to 
January, 1967, the approximate duration of the presidential 
term of Castello Branco. During his term the first of the 
"revolution's" many institutional acts were decreed and the 
political system was extensively renovated.
Factors Leading to the Assumption of Power
After assuming the poder moderador in 1889 the Brazilian 
military generally applied it only when it had the support of 
a significant portion of the civilian population. Popularly- 
sanctioned military action against a President acquired an' 
aura of legitimacy. Many argued that such actions could be 
trusted "exactly because the military knew and resj^ected the 
traditional limitations on military intervention that pre­
vented them from assuming the powers of government."^ Prior
%Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 75
44
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to 1964 the majority of the military officers expressed little 
interest in assuming the governing functions of Brazil; in 1964, 
however, the military, encouraged by several developments, ex­
ceeded the "traditional limitations" on military intervention 
and assumed the powers of government. The traditional concept 
of civil-military relations had lost its viability.
Throughout the twentieth century the officer corps held
a relatively high degree of confidence in the ability of
civilians to govern and a correspondingly low appraisal of
2its own political aptitude. Periods of economic boom and 
low levels of domestic conflict reinforced the notion that 
the occasional necessity of military intervention to correct 
political distress did not mean civilians were unable to rule 
competently. Few civilians or military personnel felt such 
brief political encounters by the military qualified its 
officers for political rule. Command and General Staff courses, 
after all, emphasized the improvement of military strategies and 
military combat skills, not the techniques of public adminis­
tration. Except for a small group, most officers probably 
envisioned military intervention as an infrequent necessity 
to restore order in an otherwise stable political system.
With the creation of Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior 
War College), commonly abbreviated as ESG, in 1949 and the 
subsequent development of its positivistic curriculum, the
^Ibid., p. 76.
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balance of officer corps opinion swung in the direction of 
sustained military intervention whenever the political system 
experienced upheaval or dysfunction. To the linha dura (hard 
line) wing of the military, historically the minority opinion 
within the armed forces which professed the bankruptcy of 
civilian rule and the sanctity of military rule, was added 
the so-called "Sorbonne" wing of the military, comprised pri­
marily of the faculty and graduates of the ESG. Because of 
their training, members of the Sorbonne wing^ appreciated the 
complexity of the problems of national development and under­
stood the shortcomings of the solutions proposed by the civil­
ian governments. For this group, military intervention, of 
necessity, would have to include the temporary imposition of 
military rule in order to solve the nation's problems. While 
the condition "temporary” implied the assumption and retention 
of power for a shorter period of time than that proposed by 
the linha dura, it nonetheless exceeded the limit of time 
prescribed by the poder moderador.
Where before the creation of the ESG, the officer corps 
had had little but force to offer as an alternative to a weak 
civilian government, recipients of ESG training developed
3Throughout the remainder of this study, graduates of the 
Escola Superior de Guerra will be referred to as members of the 
Sorbonne wing, Sorbonnists, or soft liners. While my study con­
cerns itself only with the military graduates of that school, it 
is important to note that many of its graduates are civilians. 
See Stepan, 0£^ cit., p. 177 for a classification of the grad­
uates between 1949 and 1966.
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practical and operational alternatives to the strategies of 
national development formulated by civilians. The ESG ex­
panded the political, social, and economic content of military 
education. As Stepan remarks;
The core of the courses consisted of lec­
tures and seminars that attempted to determine 
basic goals for Brazil, the obstacles to these 
goals, and specific policies to achieve them.
The final task of the students at the school 
was to participate in a civil-military team of 
five or six students in the preparation of a 
policy paper.4
It was in this context that the Sorbonne wing, or "soft liners," 
judged the performances of civilian government.
When civilian plans of action proved incapable of success­
fully promoting economic development and ensuring domestic 
peace, those with ESG training began to question the ability 
of civilians to govern and grew increasingly confident of their 
own political capabilities. Their reliance on a strong central 
government and efficient planning resulted in an orientation 
to military intervention that was corrective in nature. Accord­
ing to the soft line assessment, the weak central government and 
the confused, unproductive patterns of decision-making would 
have to be modified and strengthened, if Brazil was to reach 
its full potential.  ̂ The ESG faculty and graduates felt that.
T̂bid., p. 178.
^The ESG shared the widely held opinion among Brazilians 
that Brazil would inevitably become a world power, but it seems 
they were convinced that this "inevitable" development needed 
guidance and direction.
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given sufficient time, they could initiate these changes and 
then restore civilian leadership.
The political and economic chaos of Goulart's final weeks 
strengthened the determination, if not the confidence, of both 
the hard line and Sorbonne wings. Those in favor of permanent 
political intervention justified their claims of civilian bank­
ruptcy in terms of civil disorder and Goulart's attempts to 
divide and control the military, while the adherents of the 
ESG doctrine recognized the need for corrective measures, most 
of which went far beyond the traditional functions of the poder 
moderador. The problem for the continuation of the traditional 
patterns of civil-military relations was that, in addition to 
exceeding the time limits imposed by the poder moderador on 
military intervention, the character of military intervention 
itself would be altered if either group was able to assert its 
authority over the remainder of the armed forces.^ Rather than 
intervening in order to uphold the rules of the political game 
by acting as a corrective influence between conflicting forces.
Besides the linha dura and the Sorbonne wings of the Bra­
zilian military, there was a large, third group known as the 
"oscillating opinion" which fluctuated between the first two 
groups on the question of military intervention in politics.
In certain circumstances its members favored prolonged military 
involvement and in others they supported only the kind of mili­
tary activity authorized by the poder moderador. Whichever 
group, the hard line or the Sorbonnists, gaineïï control over 
this group would obviously control the military and Brazil. For 
a slight variation of this approach, see Jordan M. Young, 
"Brazil," in Political Forces in Latin America, ed. by Ben G. 
Burnett and Kenneth F Johnson (Belmont, California: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, I c., 1970), pp. 577-78.
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the military, acting under the guidance of either the linha 
dura or Sorbonne wing, would be acting as an agent that would 
seek to change those rules.
The military had become increasingly convinced that the 
prolonged economic and political upheavals of the early nine­
teen sixties were contributing to a security crisis. Like many 
of their Latin American counterparts, the Brazilian military 
had come to envision national security "as entailing more than 
conventional military operations. Security came to be seen as 
a part of a large economic, social, psychological, military
7package." By 1964 it appears the linha dura approached se­
curity strictly in terms of restoring order by superimposing
O
military discipline on a chaotic, "hyperpoliticized" society. 
Their simplistic argument was that the traditional social and 
political structures could continue to function so long as the 
newly mobilized political forces were brought under control.̂  
Order was extended the highest priority by the linha dura.
The Sorbonne wing, while stressing the need for order, 
emphasized the necessity of viewing national security as a
7Stepan and Einaudi, op♦ cit., p. 80.
ORoett, op. cit., p. 21.
^Most of the goals desired by members of the linha dura 
stressed order and the elimination of opposing forces. For 
example, they felt if Congress impeded progress in restoring 
order then Congress itself could be dissolved. For a summary 
of the goals of the linha dura, or authoritarian nationalists 
as Stepan refers to them, see de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 165 and 
Stepan and Einaudi, op, cit., p. 115.
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matter of both maximizing the nation’s economic production and 
minimizing all sources of cleavage and disunity within society.
To the Sorbonne, development and security were inseparable.
As a result, its members felt the old social and political in­
stitutions had to be updated in order to deal with the threats 
that underdevelopment and communism posed to the security of 
Brazil. Their rationale appears to have been that once the 
political institutions had been wrested from the control of 
the landed aristocracy and made responsive to the conditions 
of underdevelopment, the military could then oversee a kind of 
national development that would benefit most Brazilians, thereby 
making communism a less attractive alternative.^^
So, by 1964 the majority of officers, whether of the hard
line or Sorbonne wing, who had been proud of their institution’s
12ability to serve as a unifying force, felt confident that their
It appears one may argue that the linha dura and the 
Sorbonnists held contrasting interpretations of Brazil’s national 
motto; Order and Progress. For the linha dura, order received 
priority over progress--progress was to take place only to the 
extent order was assured. The Sorbonnists, on the other hand, 
viewed order and progress as having a symbiotic relationship.
11The Sorbonnists were concerned with communism. Stepan 
writes that during the height of the Cold War the ESG became 
the center of counterrevolutionary strategies to meet the chal­
lenges posed by the international ideological conflict. Ini­
tially, the Sorbonnists were not influential within the military 
but as Brazil’s crisis deeped under Goulart, its doctrines of 
total national planning and combatting internal warfare became 
more relevant. See Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., pp. 82, 84.
1 2Johnson explains that with the fall of Pedro II there 
were only two institutions that could serve to hold the nation 
together: the church and the military. Because more factors
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institution could serve as a governing force.
This invigorated, although diversely based, confidence
on the part of the officers in their ability to govern was
supplemented by popular sentiment for the creation of a
"regime of exception" after the overthrow of Goulart. Unlike
at any time in history before 1964, many significant political
sectors doubted the civilian regime enough to desire the in-
13stallation of a military leader and a military regime. Al­
though such sentiments represented a radical departure from 
traditional civil-military relations, it will be shown that 
they were justified as "necessary to preserve the civilian 
regime," a rather paradoxical bit of reasoning.
With the overthrow of Goulart the civilian consensus was 
that only a prestigious military figure could carry out the 
unpopular programs necessary to restore political and economic 
stability and to guarantee the 1965 presidential elections. 
Yet, in the final analysis public support for an interim mili­
tary figure, who was to correct the political and economic 
imbalances and then return the government to an elected civil­
ian successor in 1965, was of limited significance. Brazil
favored the military and it participated in Brazil’s national 
development, most officers felt the military was the only insti­
tution that could hold Brazil together. See Johnson, Military 
and Society, p. 197. This confidence is clearly apparent in the 
statement or one officer, who in speaking about the*military’s 
ability to stave off civil war by confronting Goulart said, "What 
we tried to do could only be done by the church or the military-- and the church had no guns." "The Soldier as Reformer," News - 
week, August 25, 1965, p. 45.
ISRichard Rose's definition and discussion of the concepts of 
regime and authority are useful here. See "Dynamic Tendencies in 
the Authority of Regimes," World Politics, XXI (July,1969), p. 602.
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would most likely have had a military leader regardless of pub­
lic opinion. First, neither the linha dura nor the Sorbonne 
wing any longer trusted the ability of civilians to solve the 
problems confronting the nation.Second, sufficient time 
remained in the unexpired term of former President Quadros 
that the Constitution required Congress to elect an individual 
to fulfill the unexpired portion. In April, 1964 no presi­
dential aspirant held a decisive edge on his competitors and 
the military, already suspicious of the political allegiances 
of some Congressmen, was uneasy over the prospect of a Congres­
sional deadlock in trying to select a legal successor; such a 
delay would have only tended to prolong Brazil's national 
crisis. Fortunately, public support for a military figure 
made the forceful installation of such an individual unneces­
sary; public support only rendered the military’s inevitable 
assumption of power less illegitimate.
One of the most significant political sectors supporting
the election of a military man as interim President was a
group of seven state governors, including Magalhaes Pinto,
Adhemar de Barros, and Carlos Lacerda, all strong contenders
15for the upcoming presidential elections. Following Lacerda's
^'^Stepan, op. cit. , p. 210.
^^These three men were described by Edward C. Burks as 
the "prime candidates" for the presidential elections scheduled 
for October 3, 1965. "Brazil's Red Hunt Aims at Congress,"
New York Times, April 7, 1964, p. 12.
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call for the election of a military man, these governors agreed 
that a military man could be expected to govern with relative 
impartiality while cleansing the political system of communists 
and while presiding over the 1965 elections. The governors 
finally concurred that former Army Chief of Staff Marshall 
Gastello Branco, an admired member of the Sorbonne Wing, could 
best finish out the unexpired term of Quadros.
The governors’ selection of Gastello Branco was not founded 
solely on selfless considerations. In fact, one of their pri­
mary considerations was that they felt that Gastello’s apolitical 
character, which was repeatedly stressed by his proponents, would 
be an adequate guarantee that the 1965 presidential elections 
would be conducted as the constitution specified- While there 
is evidence to suggest the governors did not reach their deci­
sion voluntarily or in isolation,other factors indicate that 
at least two of these governors acted only to enhance their po­
litical fortunes. Both Pinto and de Barros had supported 
Goulart, despite his policies which served to threaten civil 
war, recognizing they had a vested interest in his remaining 
in office as the best assurance that the elections would be 
held as scheduled. Only when it appeared that Goulart’s 
actions might preclude their running for the presidency did
Edward G. Burks wrote that the governors’ meeting was 
held under the threat that the military might clamp on a state 
of seige if its anti-communist reforms were not enacted. This 
threat had to have influenced the governors* decision to support 
a military figure, even if only slightly. ’’Leaders of Coup 
Press for Purge of Brazil’s Reds," New York Times, April 5,
1964, p. 1.
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1 7they abandon him. It is possible that the other governors 
as well, with political ambitions of their own, may have con­
cluded that further difficulties around a civilian president 
might cause the military to intervene and cancel elections; 
a disastrous development of this kind was probably viewed as 
sufficient cause to support an "apolitical" military figure.
The 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, a leading Brazilian newspaper,
supported the inauguration of a military man because it claimed
1 8Brazil needed a man with "no political connections." The
Uni3̂0 Carioca Femina (Union of Rio Women), instrumental in
organizing anti-Goulart rallies, specifically endorsed Gastello
for the presidency, because he was a general "without political 
19ties." In addition, each of the foregoing endorsements in­
cluded demands that the political system be cleansed of commu­
nism and corruption. After receiving assurances that the 
October, 1965 elections would be held as scheduled, former
2 0President Kubitschek supported the election of Gastello Branco.
With this broad basis of polixical support, Gastello’s 
election by Gongress became a firm possibility. Only a consti­
tutional provision that prohibited a former military officer
1^Stepan, op. cit., p. 200.
f^Editorial, 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, April 5, 1964 cited 
in Stepan, op. cit., p. 211.
1^0 Estado de Sao Paulo, April 4, 1964 cited in Stepan, 
op. cit., p. 212.
20see Schneider, Political System, p. 124 and Stepan, 
op. cit., p. 220 for a supplementary description of Kubitschek's 
part in supporting Gastello Branco.
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from becoming eligible for a political office for ninety days 
following his retirement, had to be deleted or changed to make 
Gastello "constitutionally” eligible for the presidency. The 
apparent spirit of cooperation between the military and civilian 
sectors seemed to indicate that resistance to the removal of 
such an obstacle would be minimal.
An Interim Military Regime is Assured
Just when it appeared that civilian support for a military 
leader had heightened, the Revolutionary Supreme Command, created 
by Marshall Costa e Silva in the early hours after Goulart's 
departure, took steps which demonstrated that the military in­
tended to cleanse the political system of all corrupt and sub­
versive elements linked to the overthrown regime. On April 7, 
1964 the Ministers of War, Navy, and Air Force, who comprised 
the Revolutionary Supreme Command, disclosed to congressional 
leaders the broad outlines of an institutional act (ato 
institucional), which detailed how elected or appointed public 
officials, suspected of corruption or subversion, might have 
their political rights suspended for ten years by a process 
called cassation Ccassacaol. When leaders of the PTB, PSD,
and UDN demurred and responded with a mild, tentative congres-
21sional proposal, the Revolutionary Command simply decreed the
21Schneider argues that Congress favored a selective purg­
ing given the mood and objectives of the revolution but it 
did not favor the massive purge envisioned by the revolution. 
Schneider, op. cit., p. 125.
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First Institutional Act of April 9, 1964, leaving little doubt 
that the Revolutionary Command, not Ranieri Mazzilli and Con­
gress, was the body governing Brazil. Largely the work of 
Francisco Campos, the author of the 1937 Constitution, this 
Act was to serve as the first sign that the military intended 
to retain governmental power, with or without public support.
Institutional Act #1, by no means a new extra-constitutional 
feature on the Brazilian legal landscape by which to wield po­
litical power, boldly stated
. . . the Revolution does not seek to be legiti­
mized by Congress. It is the latter which re­
ceives its legitimacy from this Institutional 
Act, itself a result of the exercise of the Pop­
ular Sovereignty inherent in all R e v o l u t i o n s . 22
Its authority derived from the moral force of the "revolution"
the Act contained nine major Articles:
I. The Constitution of 1946 and its amendments ex­
cept as modified by the Act', were "sustained."
II. The President and Vice-President, whose man­
dates were to terminate on January 31, 1966, 
were to be elected by an absolute majority of
a roll call vote of the members of the National 
Congress within two days of the promulgation of 
the Act. To that end, this Article removed the 
provision that military chiefs were ineligible 
for the Presidency.
III. The President was given the power to initiate 
Constitutional amendments; Congress was required
22 For a complete reprint of the First Institutional Act, 
see E- Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1970), pp. 390-93. William Busey explains 
how "exceptional measures" quite like the Institutional Act 
have been a part of Brazilian politics since the Regency (1831- 
1840). "The Old and the New," pp. 61-63.
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to act on such proposals within thirty days 
and to pass them by an absolute majority 
rather than a two-thirds vote.
IV. Congress was required to act within thirty 
days on all legislation submitted by the Presi­
dent. "If not so considered, such legislation 
shall be deemed approved."
V. The President was given exclusive authority to 
initiate bills of finance, which the Congress 
was not allowed to amend.
VI . The President was authorized by broadly ex­
panded powers to declare a state of seige.
VII. Constitutional guarantees relating to job
security were suspended for six months; the 
President and the State governors were ex­
tended the power to dismiss public employees 
who threatened the "security of the Nation, 
the democratic way of life, and honesty in 
public administration."
IX . The next regularly scheduled election was set 
for October 3, 1965.
X. The Supreme Command was empowered to suspend 
the political rights of any citizen for ten 
years and to cancel the mandates of elected 
officials "in the interest of peace and national 
honor." Upon assuming office, the President 
was to inherit these powers which he could then 
exercise for sixty d a y s . 23
This unilateral proclamation represented the first substantive 
evidence that the military was more disposed to become a direc­
tor of politics, instead of continuing to act as a moderator of 
politics,Article X was an obvious departure from the tradi­
tional poder moderador because with it the military assumed a
2 5political prerogative formerly exercised only by civilians.
23These are paraphrases of nine of the Act’s eleven articles. 
2^Stepan, op. cit., p. 124.
25The cancellation of mandates was common practice throughout
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Article II cleared the way for Gastello to become the "constitu­
tionally" elected President of Brazil; once this formality was 
passed he could assert a great deal of control over the decision­
making process and the political activities of the political 
system.
Institutional Act #1 had the effect of vastly strengthening 
the powers of the chief executive, although Provisional Presi­
dent Mazzilli did not exercise any of these powers. Instead, for 
several days the Supreme Command vigorously applied Article X 
while most other governmental activities were held in abeyance. 
The first list of cassations was issued on April 10; it con­
tained the names of sixty persons, including former Presidents 
Quadros and Goulart and more than forty members of Congress.
All of those whose political rights were "cassated" were denied 
the right to vote (a provision of the 1946 Constitution that was 
retained) or to hold an elective or appointive office for ten 
years ; they were required, however, to pay taxes.
The primary objectives of the Supreme Command seemed to be
7 7to "de-communize" and to "de-corruptize" the political system.
the Empire and more infrequently during the Republican era. Only 
the selective nature of the Institutional Act was a departure from 
tradition. See Busey, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
^^while it is generally agreed that 40 Congressmen were cas­
sated, there is some disagreement as to the total number of indi­
viduals whose rights were cancelled. Edward C. Burks wrote that 
a total of 60 persons were cassated. "Forty Congressmen Ousted 
in Brazil," New York Times, April 11, 1964, p. 1. Dulles writes 
there were one Hundred names on the first list of cassations.
See Unrest in Brazil, p. 358.
Z^These same words were used by the New York Times in assess-
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In applying the power of cassacao the Supreme Command acted as 
both judge and jury. The members of the Supreme Command estab­
lished their own criteria in determining whose rights were to 
be cassated and then ruled on the guilt or innocence of any
individual, but the exercise of these powers was not subject
28to judicial review. Under the guise of national security 
many opponents or questionable supporters were either intimi­
dated or removed from national political life.
On April 11, the day after the first round of cassations,
an intimidated Congress gave Castello Branco 361 of the 366
29votes cast for the presidency; there were 72 abstentions. ‘
The fact that he was elected by a roll call vote was signifi­
cant because the vote of each Congressman was placed in the 
public record, thus enabling the Supreme Command to determine 
which Deputies and Senators had abstained or had voted against 
Castello. These members could then be placed under close 
scrutiny and perhaps later cassated for sufficient cause. It
ing the intent of the Institutional Act. April 12, 1964, p. 4. 
Later, the Castello Branco government announced that its aims 
were to cleanse the nation of corruption and communism. See 
Ronald M. Schneider, James Daugherty, and James Rowe, eds., 
Brazil: Election Factbook, Number 2, op. cit., p. 15.
2^0ne part of Article X reads: "The exercise of these 
powers shall not be subject to judicial review." Burns, His­
tory of Brazil, p. 393.
Z^The total number of votes totalled 438 (366 + 72 ab­
stentions). Since Congress was composed of 475 members at the 
time of the revolution, apparently only 37 Congressmen were 
cassated on April 10, instead of 40. Three ballots were cast 
for Juarez Tavora and two for former President Dutra.
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seems this threat of cassation created a condition of deter­
rence. Many Congressmen probably voted for Castello only to 
preserve their political rights. For example, fifty-three 
PTB Congressmen, who most likely would not have voted for 
Castello in the absence of the threat of cassation, did vote 
for him perhaps because they realized that as members of the 
deposed President's party they would be highly suspect and 
easily subject to cassation, if they appeared to be opposing
the military's efforts to end the persisting influence of 
30Vargas.
As Stepan suggests, the expulsion of a major group of 
politicians from the political arena presented a dilemma to 
the military.
On the one hand, if the military withdrew from 
politics, these politicians could be expected to 
re-enter politics strengthened by their years of 
martyrdom and untarnished by the shortcomings of 
those who had the responsibility for governing.
More importantly, the military assumed that these 
men would be hostile to them. On the other hand, 
if the military did not accept the inevitable re­
turn of these politicians to politics and to 
positions of power, the military would have to 
retain power themselves or stay in readiness in 
the wings to enforce their veto.31
The Supreme Command had perhaps unwittingly produced a situa­
tion that would require prolonged, if not permanent, military
30Schneider explains that the Revolutionary Supreme Com­
mand was determined not to repeat the "mistake of 1954" when 
the Vargas forces emerged scarcely weakened by the 1954 coup. 
They wanted to remove all corrupt and subversive elements linked 
to the overthrown regime. Schneider, op. cit., p. 124.
31* Stepan, op. cit., p. 224.
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7 7intervention. It appears the intricacies of this dilemma 
were not sufficiently appreciated by the Supreme Command, 
otherwise they would not have permitted the election of 
Castello Branco, a Sorbonnist dedicated to a swift return 
to constitutional normalcy. As the ramifications of the cassa­
tions became more evident, a tension would develop between the 
Sorbonne wing, led by Castello, and the linha dura.
With the cassations already posing potential problems, 
the armed forces purged many high-ranking officers who had 
hesitated to support the March 31 coup or who had remained 
loyal to Goulart throughout his difficulties. While the purge 
affected only a small proportion of the officer corps, it was 
to result in a built-in obstacle to military withdrawal from 
politics. In most instances middle level officers (captains 
and majors) had acted vigorously to purge colonels and junior 
generals by having them transferred from active duty to reserve 
status, which was the equivalent of retirement. If reinstated, 
which probably would have been the case when a civilian govern­
ment assumed power (ostensibly by the 1965 presidential elec­
tions) , these purged officers would then pose a threat to the 
very institutional unity the Supreme Command was trying to 
restore; undoubtedly, many of the purged officers would seek 
revenge against their lower ranking comrades, if given the
32Ibid., p. 225. The author explains that any successful 
extrication strategy required coming to terms with the politi­
cal and military forces previously banned. In the absence of 
recognition of this problem, extrication would be difficult.
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opportunity.
The Revolutionary Supreme Command, in acting to consoli­
date the new regime and to initiate a housecleaning of the 
forces that rallied to or failed to confront Goulart, laid the 
groundwork for long-term military involvement in politics, 
something that it failed to understand or refused to admit.
Castello Branco: The First President o£ the "Revolution"
In the formative stages of the First Institutional Act 
Castello Branco and other moderates had attempted to soften 
the hard line views of Francisco Campos and Carlos Madeiro 
da Silva, the two men who actually wrote the Act. When the 
Act was decreed, however, it was evident the hard line opin­
ions had prevailed in most cases, especially in getting the 
period of deprivation of political rights raised from five to 
ten years. Castello, who favored a strong but less authori­
tarian position, inherited powers more suited to an advocate 
of the hard line views.
As a graduate and former faculty member of the ESG and 
a participant in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy
3 3The group of purged officers posed another kind of 
problem. Being specialists in the art of violence, many of 
these officers found themselves underemployed and often be­
came available to movements attempting to disrupt the mili­
tary regime. Their inability to transfer military skills, 
along with their resentment, was to cause the regime problems 
in succeeding years. See Stepan, op. cit., p. 225.
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during World War Castello Branco was generally regarded
as a "soft line" officer. Like most Sorbonne officers, he 
believed it was essential to come to grips with the structural 
problems of Brazil's political and social system. Unlike the 
linha dura elements, who felt subversion and corruption were 
the fundamental problems and who traced all social ills to 
"bad" individuals, Gastello's background led him to believe 
that institutional weaknesses were more responsible for polit­
ical instability than was the absence of extraordinary public 
f i g u r e s . P a r t s  of his inaugural speech reflected his per­
ception of military intervention as being more of a short-term
•tfi
corrective function than a protracted punitive function.
First, he acknowledged his doctrinal responsibilities:
"I will preserve with honor and loyalty the Constitution of
 ̂Stepan writes that the FEB's participation in World War 
II provided its members with a powerful socialization exper­
ience.- Because of that experience, its members tended to be 
favorably inclined toward the United States and its example of 
democracy. Another characteristic of its participants was that 
they disliked anything that seemed to them to be narrow, un­
realistic, emotional nationalism. Ibid., pp. 242-44.
35The linha dura argued that Brazil lacked this kind of 
public figures and" that what was needed to fill the void were 
disinterested, virtuous military leaders, not more self- 
seeking civilians. Schneider, op. cit., p. 143.
36it seems that Gastello's inaugural pledges have to be 
understood as sincere promises and that primarily because of 
subsequent confrontations with the linha ^ r a  did it become 
necessary to modify his positions. His background and serious 
disposition caused most observers to conclude that his term 
would be marked by "unspectacular seriousness." None expected 
him to develop political ambitions. See New York Times, April 
6, 1964, p. 11 and New York Times, April 13, 1964, p. 5.
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Brazil, including the Institutional Act that is a part of it.”
It seems that by professing his loyalty to both the Constitu­
tion and the Institutional Act, Castello was accepting the 
expanded executive powers with the understanding that some of 
these powers were subject to time limitations and that when 
these powers did expire he would revert to the powers extended 
to his office by the Constitution. With regard to his tenure 
of office, as spelled out by the Institutional Act, and the 
succession of office he said, "My behavior shall be that of 
a head of State who will harbor no hesitations in the process 
to elect a Brazilian to whom I shall transfer my office on 
January 31, 1966." This passage does not in any way indicate 
Castello feared the prospect of a civilian succeeding him; it 
has to be understood to mean that he would surrender his office 
to the candidate receiving the most votes in a direct election 
held on October 3, 1965. The Institutional Act had done nothing 
to modify the direct election of the President, provided for by 
the Constitution, though it did entitle military personnel to 
pursue elective office. Therefore, it was conceivable that a 
military officer might defeat his civilian rivals in the popular, 
presidential elections, but such a victory would presumably be 
the result of voter preference, not special advantage.
None of the preceding comments are meant to imply that 
Castello had no reservations about the fitness of civilians 
to govern. His March 20, 1964 memorandum expressed his con­
cern over the common practice of some politicians who sought
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to rebuke political parties and to substitute for them "juntas
dominated by communists and who, to the horror of the law,
insolently look to bring pressure on the powers of the Repub-
3 7lie by union coercion through strikes and strike threats."
In order to avoid syndicalism and end the practice of faction­
alism, which he felt resulted in the kind of divisiveness of 
which communism thrived, Castello promised to be the President 
of all Brazilians, "not the head of a faction."
His inaugural address rejected reactionary, right-wing 
measures for dealing with communism. Instead, he called for 
"economic development through moral, educational, material 
and political elevation." It was not clear if the "moral 
elevation" referred to by Castello was the same as the 
"moralization of institutions," or the judging of corrupt 
officials and the seizure of illicit gains, that War Minister'
? O
Costa e Silva had requested on April 11. One thing was 
clear: Castello, like the linha dura, recognized that the 
problems of corruption and subversion posed a special kind 
of threat to the nation, but unlike the hard line's pleas for 
punitive action, the new President apparently felt it was fund­
amentally . more important to remove the conditions that facili­
tated corruption and subversion. While some public officials
3 7lanni, op. cit., p. 138.
^^See Edward C. Burks, "Castello Chosen in Brazil," New 
York Times, April 12, 1964, p. 4.
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would have to be dismissed, he felt it was essential to en­
courage officials to have a larger purpose in public office 
than personal gain.
Upon his inauguration Castello enjoyed the confidence 
of nearly all political sectors. His Cabinet, although it 
did not necessarily represent particular civilian or military 
groups, has been labelled as "centrist conservative.""^^ The 
members of the Cabinet (eleven civilians and five military 
figures) as well as the Branco Administration in general, 
shared the common attribute of holding an intellectual commit­
ment to an ideal form of democracy. As one author writes, 
"though they tended to see political debate as an obstacle 
rather than an intrinsic part of the process of democracy, 
nonetheless they believed their goal was an ideal democracy.
At times the Administration's attachment to "ideal democracy" 
resulted in the adoption of policies that tended to blur the 
distinctions between themselves and the linha dura.
Perhaps feeling compelled to cleanse the political system 
of subversive and corrupt figures in order to ensure that 
steady progress toward the goal of "ideal democracy" was not 
to be jeopardized, the Castello Branco government continued in
39Castello tried to set an example for all public officials 
to follow. He was the first President to ever declare all of 
his personal wealth prior to entering the presidency. See "The 
Road Back," Time, April 24, 1964, p. 24.
^^Schneider, op. cit., p. 132.
^^Stepan, op. cit., p. 234.
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the direction indicated by the Revolutionary Supreme Command 
and its Institutional Act. Under Article X, which detailed 
cassacao, some 400 people, including former President Kubits­
chek, had their political rights suspended before Castello 
allowed this discretionary power to expire on June 15, 1964. 
All 400, with the exception of Kubitschek, who was the target 
of an adverse publicity campaign orchestrated by the linha 
dura to discredit him, were the victims of charges brought in 
secret before a panel of officers and civilians, which pre­
sented their recommendations to the President. No defense was 
p e r m i t t e d . B y  June 15, 1964 forty-four Federal Deputies had 
had their political rights cancelled, leaving about 8 percent 
of the nation’s voters without congressional representation.
A newly created agency, Comissao Geral de Investigacoes 
(General Investigations Commission), was authorized to conduct 
investigations of governmental operations during the Goulart 
era. Reports of this commission's findings, which generally 
reflected an anti-Vargas and anti-Goulart bias, were sent to 
the President for final action. When Article VII of the First 
Institutional Act expired in October, 1964, nearly 9,000 pub-
^^Ronald M. Schneider, "Interim Regime in Brazil," Cur­
rent History, XLIX (December, 1965), 352.
^^On this point the military regime was severely criti­
cized. The Brazilian Council of Bishops issued a memorandum 
that demanded that Brazilians be given the "sacred right of 
defense." See "Seeds of Injustice?" Time, June 12, 1964, p. 50
'^^"Quest for Moderation," Newsweek, April 27, 1964, p. 59
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lie employees had been dismissed on charges of national security 
violations or corruption.
In the months succeeding the March 31 coup some extremes 
were notable, but Gastello's demands for moderation and ra­
tionality prevented widespread abuse of governmental power.
The new President was deeply committed to moderate reforms, 
and not to reactionary measures, within the limits of the Con­
stitution and the Institutional Act. To the chagrin of the 
linha dura he dutifully permitted Article VII and Article X 
to lapse on their specified dates despite demands by the hard 
line that they be extended. Succumbing to the realization that 
his government could not complete its economic and electoral 
reforms in the time allotted by the Institutional Act, Castello 
did, however, allow his term of office to be extended from 
January 31, 1966 to March 15, 1967 by a Constitutional amend­
ment of July 22, 1964.^^ It is significant to note that it 
was Congress, not Castello Branco or the military, which pro­
posed this amendment; it was attached by conservative Congress-
4 7men to an electoral reform bill initiated by the President.
‘̂ ^Schneider, "Interim Regime," 352.
46xhis development seems to have represented a partial 
triumph for that part of the military command which felt the 
revolutionary command should have staked out a five year period 
of office rather than the 22-month term the Institutional Act 
outlined. Juan de Onis, "Brazilian Regime Rebuke Lacerda,"
New York Times, April 19, 1964, p. 24. Shortly after his term 
was extended", Castello began to use a familiar analogy: that 
Brazil was in a long, dark tunnel and needed to move as quickly 
as possible toward the light. See "A View from the Tunnel,"
The Economist, October 17, 1964, p. 254.
47"More Time: Election Postponed," Time, July 24, 1964, 
p. 36.
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In public Castello only very reluctantly accepted the fourteen
month addition to his term; most Brazilians, except the major
presidential contenders, accepted the postponement of the
4 8presidential elections with indifference.
With the Castello Branco Administration displaying little 
interest in public opinion and more concern with balancing the 
extreme proposals of the linha dura, 1964 closed without much 
sign of renovation or reform. The government was beginning to 
experience an erosion of public support. The anti-inflation 
economic policies began to evoke hostile reactions once their 
effects were felt. Federal interventores, sent by the govern­
ment to replace state and local officials who had been dis­
missed under Article VII, were a constant source of tension.
It was not until the middle of 1965, when the government im­
posed restrictions on political party activities, that the 
strongest supporters of the "revolution" turned against it.
Acts of Political Reform: Signs of Tension
Throughout 1964 Castello Branco had frequently expressed 
his dissatisfaction over the manifest weaknesses of the polit­
ical party system and the defects in the electoral process.
As early as May, 1964 he called for, but did not initiate, 
legislation establishing strict controls over the influences 
of economic power and political patronage on the electoral
4 8de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 18.
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49process. It was not until July 15, 1965 that these reforms 
became law in the form of the Ineligibilities Act, the Polit­
ical Party Statute, and the Electoral Code. Despite initial 
assessments that the reforms would favor wider and more effec­
tive political participation,^^ these laws tended to resist 
such an expansion. All of these reforms permitted more effec­
tive, centralized control over the electoral process. Accord­
ing to Roett: "These represented the first substantive revisions
of the pre-1964 political rules of the game.
The Electoral Code, which automatically became law when 
Congress failed to consider it within the thirty day deadline 
specified by the First Institutional Act, attempted to reduce 
the number of political parties by fashioning exacting stan­
dards that the parties had to maintain if they were to retain 
5 2 'legal status. It attempted to increase party responsibility 
by abolishing party alliances and to improve party discipline 
by requiring voters to select legislators from the same party. 
Politicians were now required to be residents of the state
For a discussion of one dimension of Brazil's political 
patronage, see Lawrence S. Graham, Civil Service Reform in 
Brazil : Principles vs. Practice (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, monograph #l3, 1968), pp. 125-39.
^^Schneider, "Interim Regime," 353.
^^Roett, op. cit., p. 31.
c 2For a list of the requirements the political parties werî 
expected to maintain, see "Detribalizing Politics," Time,
July 23, 1965, p. 32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
they sought to represent. The running mates of successful 
gubernatorial and presidential candidates were automatically 
elected, thereby making it impossible for a President, say 
of the UDN, to be elected with a Vice-President of the PTB 
as had happened in 1960. Consistent with the ESG analysis 
of the old multi-party system, regarding its detrimental 
defects, this code ensured greater order in the electoral 
process and gave electoral courts expanded supervisory powers 
over internal party affairs. The possible abuse of such ex­
panded supervision was not to become apparent until the 
gubernatorial elections in October, 1965.
The Political Party Statute, passed by Congress but
5 5restored to almost its original form by the President, es­
tablished procedures for the organization of new political 
parties. It included residency requirements and a provision 
prohibiting an individual from running for more than one of­
fice; both were intended to tie a candidate more closely to 
his constituency. Other provisions were designed in theory 
to abolish the practice of favoritism and nepotism by the 
party hierarchy and to permit the infusion of individuals who 
had been discriminated against by party leaders. On this point, 
it appears this statute attempted to foster wider participation. 
While a great deal of importance was attached to grass roots 
politics and civil education to free the parties of traditional
S 5For a discussion of how the President exercised a kind of 
item veto, see Schneider, Political System, p. 158.
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party control, no adequate mechanisms of implementation were 
p r o v i d e d . A s  a result, old party leaders would continue 
as dominant forces in local politics.
The Ineligibilities Act, like the Electoral Code, auto­
matically became law due to Congressional inaction. Somewhat 
unlike the other two measures, this act contained reactionary 
overtones: several of its provisions aimed to deny candidacy 
to former Cabinet Ministers of the Goulart Administration, as 
well as leading anti-regime politicians.^^ Those who had 
heretofore sided with the "revolution" in the pursuit of its 
political reform goals strenuously objected.
Upon the Act's submission for congressional approval, 
Carlos Lacerda, whose support had been instrumental in Cas- 
tello's election, denounced the bill as "bad, narrow, hypo­
critical, judicially wrong, politically wrong, morally wrong-- 
another error of the r e v o l u t i o n . T h e s e  caustic remarks, 
the first sign of estrangement between Lacerda and the "rev­
olutionary government," were typical of the protests that 
erupted in response to the provision that denied candidacy 
to those who had allegedly compromised "the normalcy of an
It is possible that since this was the only statute 
passed by Congress that the exclusion of an implementary mech­
anism was a deliberate oversight by that body, since many of 
its members stood to lose their strong party positions if 
such a device had been provided.
5 5Roett, op. cit., p. 31.
^^"Laying the Ground Rules," Time, July 2, 1965, p. 31.
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élection through abuse of economic power, act of corruption,
5 7or improper use of the powers of public office." Former 
Minister of Transportation, Helio de Almeida, and ex-Finance 
Minister, Sebastiao Paes de Almeida, both leading contenders 
in the gubernatorial races in their states, were specifically 
singled out by the Act and denied candidacy by the electoral 
courts.
Unpopular decisions handed down by the newly empowered 
electoral courts only tended to heighten the mounting protests 
against federal intervention in state and local government. 
Federal intervention, in the form of military tribunals which 
judged the fitness of politicians and administrators in the 
states of Ceara and Goias in late 1964, drew widespread 
criticism, especially toward Gastello Branco.
In the case of Ceara, four legislators were arrested by 
a general of the linha dura on charges of communist subversion; 
when Gastello ordered that they be released, the general, who 
now had the backing of War Minister Costa e Silva, refused and 
a stalemate ensued. There were open discussions amongst offi­
cers about a coup against the President until the state legis­
lature revoked the legislators* immunity, thus making it legal
5 8for the military to arrest them. , Many began to ask who was
c nThis is a translated excerpt from the Ineligibilities 
Act. See Schneider, Political System, p. 180.
C O y
For a brief explanation of the events in Ceara, see 
"A Hard Line," Time, December 4, 1964, p. 40.
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in charge, the moderate Gastello or the linha dura? If Gas­
tello was in charge, they wondered, why had he not prevented 
such an abuse of power against democracy.
In the state of Goias the Supreme Court granted a writ 
of habeas corpus to governor Mauro Borges, who had been 
imprisoned in the wake of what had come to be called "the 
Ceara Solution." His crime had been his refusal to dismiss 
members of his staff whom the military tribunals had denounced 
as communists. Gastello, sworn to uphold the Constitution but 
perhaps realizing his political life depended on reaching a 
compromise with the linha dura, ordered the officers concerned 
to obey the Court's decision but sustained Borges’ removal 
from office, which was precisely what the linha dura wanted.
On the surface it appeared Gastello was deviating from his 
pledge not to rely on reactionary, right-wing reforms; more 
epithets were hurled in his direction.
In May, 1965 Gastello once again upheld a Supreme Court
decision when he ordered the release of Miguel Arraes, the
governor of Pernambuco who had been arrested thirteen months
59earlier on charges of subversion. Seeming to proclaim his 
dominance over the right-wing investigating commissions and 
the linha dura, he ordered all inquiries into the Goulart 
Administration completed as soon as possible. Arrests imme­
diately tapered off but the damage to Gastello’s credibility
^^’’A Hard Blow to the Hard Line," Time, April 30, 1965 , 
p. 46.
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was already done: even while expressing his determination to 
promote a swift return to democracy,many Brazilians regarded 
him as indecisive and as incapable of controlling the linha 
dura.
Inevitably, Gastello’s policy decisions pleased no one-- 
neither the moderates and leftists, who complained about his 
muffling of politics, nor the conservative civilians and the 
linha dura which scoffed at his loyalty to democracy. The 
austere economic-recovery policies of Finance Minister Roberto 
Campos continually served as a cause of government unpopularity, 
In fact, de Dubnic suggests that much of the anti-government 
activity during this time stemmed more from dissatisfaction 
with economic policies than from political repression.
Campos' diagnosis of Brazil's economic woes was similar 
to those of the Goulart Administration, but the new team's 
steadfast determination to fully implement its essentially 
technocratic solutions offered a sharp contrast to its prede­
cessors. The new finance team's policies of restoring a high 
economic growth rate by encouraging international financial 
assistance was opposed by those deeply committed to economic 
nationalism; efforts to reduce inflation by freezing wages
Gastello consistently expressed his intention to re­
tain the participant-representative institutions of Brazil 
despite demands by the hard line that they be closed. He was 
on record on numerous occasions as being opposed to any moves 
that smacked of police-statism. See Milan J. Kubic, "Brazil's 
Adroit New Leader," The Reporter, December 17, 1964, p. 22.
bide Dubnic, op. cit., p. 165.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
and by controlling credit met with opposition from both labor 
and the producing sectors. As one presidential aide was 
quoted as saying to an American scholar, "Now we know how your 
State Department people felt after the first year of the Alli­
ance for Progress. All we've earned for a year of hard work 
are brickbats and h o w l s . T h e  effectiveness and the corres­
ponding unpopularity of his administration’s economic policies 
seemed to substantiate claims that Gastello Branco appeared 
more concerned with solutions than with public opinion and 
"theatricized results
Reviewing the first year of the "revolution," the Diario 
de Noticias observed:
. . . The Revolution’s Institutional Act has 
been used, sometimes rather indiscriminately, 
for punitive aims. The President said in one 
of his speeches that the revolution was not 
exclusively for punishing. But this is the 
impression some observers have. The visible 
aspect of the revolution has been a nearly 
daily spectacle of purges and sanctions.
Suspension of some Constitutional guarantees 
gave rise to demonstrations of hate, to small 
personal revenges inspired by envy and resent­
ments
62por a brief explanation of President Branco’s policies 
of economic austerity and their effect on the various economic 
sectors,see Schneider, Political System, pp. 149-72.
63"Year End Report," Newsweek, April 12, 1965, p. 63.
his eulogy to Gastello Branco, Roberto Gampos said of 
him: "He had an aversion to easy promises and theatricized re­
sults. He deeply dreaded creating false hopes in the people. He preferred to accustom the people to the discipline of truth."
Also see "Brazil: The Price of Unpopularity," Time, July 28,
1967, p. 30.
65Editorial, Diario de Noticias cited by Leonard Gross in 
"South America’s Moment of Truth," Look, March 23, 1965, p. 42.
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While the reference to "a nearly daily spectacle of purges" 
might overstate the case against political repression, this 
summary draws attention to the increased middle-class disen­
chantment with the "revolution." Economic and political 
recovery under the direction of the military had become in­
creasingly difficult to tolerate as time progressed.
The Elections of October, 1965: Pursuit of Electoral "Normalcy" 
Encouraged by the victory of a pro-government candidate 
in the mayoral election in Sao Paulo in March, 1965, Gastello 
Branco decided to push forth in his campaign to guarantee 
scheduled elections as a step toward the maintenance of the 
participant-representative features of the regime.
Despite references by the linha dura to several violent 
uprisings which this group claimed were indicative of a large- 
scale, subversive threat to national security,Gastello and 
his Cabinet continued to assure the nation that the October, 
1965 gubernatorial elections would be held, in spite of the 
dangers to which the government might be exposed. Justice 
Minister Milton Campos assured Brazil, "The government wants 
elections. It wants them clean, authentic, democratic and it
f\ 7will promote them with full guarantees of liberty." The
f\ AThe fact that one of these violent uprisings was led by 
an ex-officer who had been purged by the military in 1964 drama­
tizes what Stepan has .referred to as the "nontransferability of 
military skills" (see footnote 33 of this chapter).
Year After," Time, April 2, 1965, p. 36.
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President appeared a bit more appreciative of the dangers in­
herent in conducting elections in the midst of the widespread 
government unpopularity. With reference to the gubernatorial 
elections he stated, "Democracy always takes a c h a n c e . O n  
another occasion he was quoted as saying that the revolution 
was "not afraid of the ballot box. But just to make certain 
the possibility of a major government defeat was minimized, 
Branco had earlier secured the passage of a constitutional 
amendment that would more fully guarantee that "corrupt" or 
"subversive" elements would be prevented from returning to 
power. Congress, apparently convinced of the chief executive’s
commitment to democratic procedures, overwhelmingly approved
70the amendment. Armed with this constitutional amendment, the 
Ineligibilities Act, and control over the electoral courts, the 
government sought to deny candidacy to individuals that the 
President found undesirable.
It soon became evident that in the major states, where the 
elections were of national significance, the initial nominees, 
of the PTB and the PSD, the parties identified with Vargas and 
Goulart (and therefore corruption and communism), were undesir­
able. First, the PTB nominee for the governorship of Guanabara,
^^"The Soldier as Reformer," Newsweek, August 23, 1965, 
p. 45.
69»'Eyeing A New System," Time, September 3, 1965, p. 41.
70por a breakdown of the voting on the military’s pro­
posal to curb political opposition, see Schneider, Political 
System, p. 154.
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Helio de Almeida, was denied candidacy under the Ineligibilities
Act. Then, retired Army Marshall Texeira Lott was denied the
same nomination for failing to meet the residency requirements
71set forth in the reform acts. Frustrated and perhaps aware 
of the strong possibility of the PTB-PSD victory, the PTB 
joined with the PSD in supporting Francisco Negrao de Lima.
Next, Sebasiâ'o Paes de Almeida, nominated for the governor­
ship of Minas Gerais by the PSD, was charged with "abuse of 
economic power" and his candidacy cancelled under the Ineligi­
bilities Act. Israel Pinheiro, a Kubitschek protege, succeeded 
Almeida for the, PSD nomination.
In the other nine states holding gubernatorial elections 
the government exercised less discretion in determining the 
candidacy of its opponents. But governmental interference in 
Guanabara had caused a further erosion of popular support 
throughout Brazil. Rising unemployment, increased taxes, the
government’s harsh treatment of its opponents became important
72election issues.
The October 3 elections demonstrated that direct elections 
are extremely hazardous for a "revolutionary" government which
71Because Lott had become disenchanted with the "revolu­
tion" and had labelled it on many occasions as being "undemo­
cratic," many felt the military would have to trump up some 
charges to deny his candidacy. But this became unnecessary when 
it was discovered Lott was in violation of residency require­
ments. See "Eyeing a New System," Time, op. cit., p. 41.
7 2Schneider, Political System, p. 164. Also, see Brazil; 
Election Factbook, Ho. 2, op. ciTJ, pp. 24-25.
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tries to wrench political power away from traditional ruling
elites while it is advancing the cause of economic austerity
and political reform. In Guanabara, Negrao de Lima received
71nearly 52 percent of the vote, dealing a crushing blow to 
both his UDN opponent, Flexa Ribeiro, and Carlos Lacerda, 
who had staked his presidential ambitions on a victory by 
Ribeiro. Immediately after the election Lacerda resigned his 
UDN presidential nomination. In Minas Gerais, Israel Pinheiro 
defeated his UDN rival with 55 percent of the vote and under­
mined the political fortunes of yet another presidential aspi­
rant, Magalhaes Pinto. In both instances the influence of 
Juscelino Kubitschek, whose cassacao had proved to be an 
unpopular move, was regarded as decisive.
Of the eleven states that held elections, pro-government 
candidates, usually members of the UDN, emerged victorious in 
five states.Considering the adverse circumstances under 
which the elections were conducted, supporters of the regime 
tried to make the case that government-sponsored candidates 
had not fared too badly. The linha dura, on the other hand, 
interpreted the victory of candidates identified with Kubits­
chek as a defeat of the ideals of the 1964 election. Its
73For a summary of the election results for all eleven 
states, see Brazil: Election Factbook, No. 2, op. cit., pp. 
90-91.
^^The government's candidates won governorships in the 
states of Goias, Maranhao, Para, Paraiba, and Parana. Thefubernatorial election in the state of Algoas was so close here had to be a run-off election, which the pro-government 
candidate finally won.
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members had opposed these elections from the beginning on the 
ground that the antagonisms caused by Gastello’s policies of 
economic austerity would result in the election of non­
revolutionary or anti-revolutionary politicians who would
75threaten the advance of the "revolution." The results in 
Guanabara and Minas Gerais tended to confirm these fears.
Hard line fears over the symbolic resurrection of pre­
revolutionary politics were compounded when Kubitschek ended 
his self-imposed, sixteen-month exile and returned to Brazil 
to a hero's welcome. Their fears turned to anger when Gastello 
announced his intention to uphold the elections, despite his
7 Aadministration's and the "revolution's" apparent setbacks.
Fearing the President had abandoned the "revolution," on 
October 5 members of the linha dura placed the First Army, 
stationed outside Rio de Janeiro, on alert to move against him. 
Talk of a coup against Gastello abounded. Into this super­
charged atmosphere stepped War Minister Costa e Silva, who
reassured the officers of the First Army; "You must trust
7 7your commanders. They are as revolutionary as you are." He
7Sxjiis is Stepan's analysis of the hard line's objection to 
the elections. If correct, it reflects a curious bit of reason­
ing by the linha dura because it tends to ignore the impact that 
the revolution's policies of political repression may have had 
on the elections. Cassations alone were nearly as unpopular as 
the revolution's economic policies. See Stepan, op. cit., p. 225 
and Schneider, Political System, p. 161.
76The Gastello Branco Administration maintained that PSD vic­
tories and UDN defeats at the state level should not be equated 
with voter endorsement or repudiation of the national administra­
tion. See Brazil: Election Factbook, No. 2, op. cit., p. 91.
77"The Other Barrel," Time, November 12, 1965, p. 46.
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did not specify whether by "commanders" he was referring to 
the members of the Revolutionary Supreme Command, of which the 
President was not a member, or to the military hierarchy in 
general, of which Gastello was the commander-in-chief. The 
distinction is important because, it will be recalled, in the 
exercise of the poder moderador historically it had been the 
War Ministers who had judged the legality of presidential acts; 
in this case, if the three Ministers, who had become members of 
the Supreme Command, decided a presidential action was not con­
sistent with "revolutionary" principles, they could direct the
7 8armed forces to oust Gastello Branco. The situation was 
further confused by the fact that Gastello had acquired wide­
spread respect as an officer and so there was a question of 
how many officers would remain loyal to him regardless of the 
War Ministers’ judgment. Unity within the armed forces was 
essential, if action against a President was to be successful. 
After meeting with President Gastello Branco, presumably 
to judge the President’s dedication to "revolutionary" prin­
ciples, Costa e Silva emerged and announced to the younger, 
more conservative officers;
I guarantee to you, my young commanders, 
that we know where we are going. The present
78It appears the President was no longer required to act 
"within the limits of the law" because it is not clear that by 
assuming power the military as an institution was acting within 
the law. Legality was secondary to the principles of the "rev­
olution."
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chiefs are as revolutionary as the young com­
manders. I guarantee to you we will not turn 
back.79
The reference to *'we” seems to indicate that Costa e Silva had 
concluded that Gastello was sufficiently revolutionary to con­
tinue to lead the "revolution" along with the Supreme Command. 
There is no evidence the other two Ministers of the Supreme 
Command participated in the assessment of Gastello’s "revolu­
tionary" character, suggesting Costa e Silva alone acted as the
Q Q
pivotal force that saved the President from expulsion.
Besides expressing ideals that must have coincided with 
Costa e Silva's perception of "revolutionary" ideals. Presi­
dent Branco agreed to strengthen the powers of the executive
office in order to reinvigorate the "revolution" by decreeing
81a second institutional act, if necessary. With this assur-
79Stepan, op. cit., p. 256. Costa e Silva had never been 
regarded as an advocate of the linha dura opinion, but rather 
as a mediator between the hard line and the Sorbonnists. His 
activities in this crisis seemed to indicate he was moving 
progressively toward the hard line. Ronald Chilcotte deftly 
anticipated this development. See "Suppressing the Future," 
Nation, November 23, 1964, p. 370.
80This is significant because it represented a vast con­
centration of power in determining the application of the poder 
moderador, itself a dangerous precedent. Stepan suggests that 
while Costa e Silva could have undoubtedly led a coup against 
Gastello Branco, the Marshall preferred another route to the 
presidency. Stepan, op. cit., p. 257.
^^After this arrangement was made, it became necessary to 
decree such an act. Several authors have suggested that had 
Gastello failed to issue the Second Institutional Act, it may 
well have cost him the presidency. See Brazil: Election Fact- 
book Supplement, No. 2, edited by Ronald Schneider (Washington, 
D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 
November, 1966), p. 3.
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ance, continued military obedience of the President was guaran­
teed, but Gastello still faced civilian opposition to his 
decision to uphold the.elections.
Carlos Lacerda, the bête noire of Brazilian politics, 
demanded the elections be annulled. His support for the 
’’revolution" had previously been tempered by what he felt 
would most fully benefit his own political advantages. As 
soon as the Branco government acted in a manner that endan­
gered his chances of being elected President, Lacerda first 
criticized and then condemned the "revolution." His guberna­
torial candidate soundly defeated and the momentum of public 
sentiment now squarely behind Kubitschek, Lacerda lashed out 
when he learned the election results would be enforced:
The army should declare that the revolution 
has ended. The revolution no longer exists.
It doesn’t exist because it was betrayed.
President Gastello Branco assumed power in the 
name of the army. I ask if the army agrees 
with what he has done and what he is d o i n g .
The implication of these remarks was that because the Supreme
Command, of course, did not agree with the President’s decision
regarding the called elections it should instruct the armed
forces to remove Gastello and replace him with an individual
who would annul the elections. This done, Lacerda’s political
fortunes would have been restored to their pre-election levels.
However, his call for action against the President received
little serious attention. One result was that Lacerda was forced
^^’’Answer for a Critic," Time, October 22, 1965 , p. S3
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into the opposition camp and no longer remained a troublesome 
critic within the "revolution."
Schneider suggests that the Gastello Branco government
actually preferred the defeat of Lacerda's and Pinto's hand-
picked candidates. His argument is that both men had become
liabilities to the revolution and that the government forces
felt individuals of the opposition could be counted on to seek
an accommodation with the regime and cause fewer problems than
8 3the politically ambitious, "revolutionary" governors. If 
this was the case, it appears the Branco forces badly misjudged 
the impact that such opposition victories would have on the 
linha dura.
Having promised Costa e Silva that he would initiate inter­
nal control legislation, Gastello requested that Congress adopt 
measures that called for (1) the institution of a parliamentary 
system or a hybrid system greatly enhancing the powers of the 
executive, (2) the incorporation into the Constitution of those 
provisions of the Institutional Act requiring prompt Congressional 
action on presidential proposals and those granting the President 
expanded legislative discretion, and (3) the expansion of the 
jurisdiction of military courts in matters of national security.
He also proposed that the membership of the Supreme Court be 
raised from eleven to sixteen justices and called for the re­
establishment of the government's right to suspend political
^^See Schneider, Political System, pp. 163, 169.
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rights. Congress refused to ’’consider" these groposals despite
pleas by the new Justice Minister, Juracy Magalhaes, to adopt
84"such apparently undemocratic measures to save democracy."
On October 27, 1965, less than a month after the guberna­
torial elections, Brazil awoke to the promulgation of the 
Second Institutional Act. Its contents seemed to make it 
clear that the linha dura had exacted a high price for permit­
ting Gastello Branco to remain in office, but as Schneider 
points out:
. . . Although the issuance of such an act was 
forced upon Gastello by the hard liners, he had 
retained substantial control over its specific 
content, and would determine its applications.®^
Institutional Act #2 sustained the 1946 Gonstitution and 
its amendments, except as modified by the Act. The general 
outlines of all the measures earlier proposed to Gongress found 
expression. The Supreme Gourt, which had served as the last 
holdout against the more flagrant unconstitutional actions of 
the revolution, was revitalized: the membership was increased 
and the President was empowered to dismiss and appoint members 
at will, thus offsetting the existing majority of judges ap­
pointed by Kubitschek and Goulart and assuring the regime of 
a reliable majority in all cases. Military courts were extended
84ibid., p. 171. It is significant to note that Magalheas 
became Justice Minister only after Roberto Campos resigned 
because of his opposition to the increased prospects of uncon­
stitutional moves by the military regime.
^^Ibid., p. 172.
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exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving national security. 
The power of cassation was renewed and further restrictions 
were placed on those whose rights had been cancelled. When 
deemed ’'necessary to preserve the social and political order," 
one of these individuals could be placed under house arrest 
or prohibited from visiting certain places. They were pro­
hibited from participating in union elections and "political 
activity.
The other, more significant, measures of the Act included:
1. Article IX provided for the election of the 
President. "The National Congress meeting in 
public session shall elect the President and 
Vice-President by roll call vote. The candi­
date who receives an absolute majority of the 
votes cast shall win the election.
2. Article XIII authorized the President to de­
clare a state of seige for up to 180 days in 
order "to prevent or subdue the subversion of 
the internal order."
3. Article XVIII stated: "Present political parties 
are hereby abolished and their respective slates 
of candidates cancelled."
4. Article XIX excluded from judicial competence 
all of the acts of the Supreme Command and of 
tl\e federal government in the First and Second 
Institutional Acts, as well as all resolutions 
passed since March 31, 1964 regarding the can­
cellation of legislators’ mandates. In addi­
tion, complementary acts designed to implement 
or elaborate institutional acts, were to be 
free of judicial review. Decreed laws were also 
extended this judicial immunity.
5. Article XXXI empowered the President to recess Con­
gress by decree or by complementary act.
Direct quotes from Article XVI of the Act. For a com-, 
plete English reprint of the Act, see Burns, History of Brazil, 
pp. 394-98.
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Under the announced intention of restoring political order, 
this Act abruptly concluded the relatively smooth departure 
from political traditions that had been underway since April, 
1964. Tutelage moved more toward direct control.
The emasculated and carefully supervised political parties, 
having failed to yield the desired results, were abolished. 
Fearing the resurgence of pre-revolutionary politics despite 
the widespread application of cassacd'o and the laws of ineli­
gibility, the government snatched the election of the President 
from the people and foisted it upon Congress, a more easily 
intimidated body which could be counted on to produce the de­
sired electoral results. The patterns of political recruit­
ment and the procedures that are expected and accepted in the 
processing and implementation of demands had undergone further 
modification--modifications which no longer seemed temporary.
The Second Institutional Act seemed to indicate that Gas­
tello Branco's commitment to tutelary democracy had been aban­
doned. In his speech accompanying this Act he left no doubt 
that his devotion to the re-establishment of constitutional 
normalcy had been misplaced.
The revolution is alive. It will not retreat.
It has promoted reforms and will continue to 
undertake them. However, agitators are menacing 
the new order precisely when the revolution is 
trying to give the people practice in the discip­
line of exercising democracy.87
"The Hard Line," Time, November 5, 1965, p. 56. The 
speech’s reference to "practice of the discipline" seems to 
imply the Branco Administration could envision a kind of demo-
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The essence of the last sentence is that the people had not 
learned their lessons of discipline well enough, for they had 
not voted for revolutionary candidates. What was apparently 
needed was more discipline and the elimination of so-called 
’’agitators.’* These goals would be provided by Institutional 
Act #2.
The reference in Gastello’s speech to a kind of conspir­
atorial force represented a hard-line interpretation of the 
body politic. Only in September the President had insisted 
on conducting elections despite linha dura opposition, but by 
the end of October his position appeared completely inverted, 
or substantially compromised toward hard line persuasions.
Why Gastello Branco altered or otherwise abandoned his earl­
ier positions can be explained, in part, by his realization 
that a prolonged crisis with the linha dura might have been 
culminated with his ouster as President; so in order to retain
office, Gastello succumbed to the same hard line demands that
8 8he had resisted for so long.
cratic society and all they had to do was train the masses 
accordingly.
Q ONumerous scholars suggest this motive. That Gastello 
may have acted out of this kind of consideration is quite 
probable if one accepts Stepan’s proposition that the military 
is more prone to overthrow a military government than a con­
stitutional government for at least two reasons: the disincen­
tives, i.e., the fear or reluctance to overthrow an electorally 
legitimated government, are decreased; and because the military 
feels an increased responsibility for the performance and suc­
cess of the government, it may be more intolerant of slowness 
in reform and compromise. See Stepan, op. cit., pp. 253-54.
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There are other forces which may have caused Gastello's . 
apparent surrender to hard line pressures. Stepan points out 
that it is possible that Gastello felt hard line demands, if 
unfulfilled, would have eventually resulted in the implemen­
tation of a "naked dictatorship." Rather than continue to 
oppose these demands and possibly be removed from office and 
replaced by a member of the linha dura, Gastello may have felt 
it best to institutionalize a much stronger government, so that 
his successor, while exercising more authoritarian powers,
would be required to govern within the confines of law, not
89according to the whims of the linha dura. This explanation 
is, of course, problematical: in the process of institutional­
izing a stronger executive office, Gastello was actually 
yielding to the caprice of the hard line.
Roett sujggests that Gastello felt the future development 
of Brazil depended more on military unity than on the constitu­
tional principle of direct elections.While this observation 
recognizes that Gastello’s military education and training 
emphasized national development, it seems to distort the im­
portance Gastello placed on military unity vis à vis tutelary 
democracy. His subsequent application of the Second Institu-. 
tional Act made it clear that military unity would not be pur­
sued at the expense of Brazil's practice in democracy. Gas­
tello’s complete submission to the linha dura was more apparent
89ibid., p. 256.
^Opoett, op. cit., p. 32
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than real.
One result of the October, 1965 crisis was that public 
support for the military regime continued to decline, perhaps 
because many Brazilians felt betrayed by Gastello Branco, the 
man who had promised moderation in all reforms. Institutional 
Act #2 seemed to violate the spirit of this promise. Yet the 
President used his increased discretionary powers against the 
linha dura, instead of initiating further purges of the civilian 
ranks as had been expected. He closed down a far-rightist mili­
tary group knows as LIDER (The Radical Democratic League), es­
tablished and supported by the more extreme elements of the 
linha dura. He reassigned many of the officers who had plotted 
against him in the post-election crisis ; he placed one of his 
most trusted generals in command of the First Army outside Rio. 
Finally, he guaranteed the inauguration of both Negrao de Lima 
and Israel P i n h e i r o. U nd e r the Second Institutional Act, a 
kind of military unity not anticipated by the linha dura was 
achieved and the popularly-elected candidates were sworn into 
office.
Having regained the initiative and reasserted his domi­
nance over the military, Gastello then sought to fill the po­
litical vacuum created in October, when all political parties 
had been abolished.
For a description of the events surrounding Negrao de 
Lima’s inauguration, see ’’Riding the Tiger,” Newsweek, Decem­
ber 20, 3965, p. 50.
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Complementary Act #4 of November 20, 1965 provided for 
the provisional registration of political organizations that 
had the support of 120 federal deputies and 20 federal sena­
tors. Nearly 250 deputies and more than 40 senators joined 
the government-sponsored Alianca Renovadora Nacional (The 
National Renovating Alliance, or ARENA). Those joining ARENA 
were generally former members of the UDN and the more conserva­
tive wing of the PSD, who had formed the Revolutionary Parlia­
mentary Bloc prior to the promulgation of the Second Institu­
tional Act. In this regard, the Complementary Act only 
legitimized the institutionalization of political alliances 
that had existed under the old party system, except there were 
now to be only two parties.
The opposition forces formed the Movimento Democratico
Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement, or MDB). The ranks
of the MDB were composed primarily of the ex-PTB and liberal
9 2PSD congressional representation. Where there had been four­
teen political parties there were now only two, brand new par­
ties, resulting in a profound simplification of Brazil's 
political party system. No longer would there be confusing 
divisions within parties with regard to support for the revolu­
tion and its policies. While legally only transitional political
92For a discussion of the members of both parties and the 
resulting chances in the composition of Congress, see Brazil : 
Election Factbook Supplement, No. 2, pp. 18-19 and Roett, op. 
cit., p. 361
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93groupings, ARENA and MDB forced politicians into a position 
where they had to identify themselves as "for" or "against" the 
revolution. Democracy in form had been retained but it was not 
clear how Brazil would evolve from this condition to the "ideal 
democracy" envisioned by the Branco Administration.
On February 5, 1966 Institutional Act #3 was issued; the 
rules of the political game were more extensively modified.
Among other changes, the Act replaced the direct election of 
governors with their selection by state legislatures by an 
absolute majority vote, replaced the election of the mayors 
of capital cities with their appointment by the governors of 
the states, and scheduled federal legislative elections for 
November 15, 1966, a little over a month after the October 
presidential election. It is significant to note that this 
Act, unlike the first two, did not directly extend any new 
powers to the President, although its effect was to centralize 
power further: it established a system under which "revolutionary" 
candidates could not lose an election at any level, no matter how 
unpopular the "revolution." Because of this Act the government 
only had to concern itself with the election of state and fed­
eral legislative representatives. With major restrictions 
already placed on such elections by Institutional Acts and 
political party statutes-, the military regime could eliminate 
any formidable MDB opposition and nearly assure itself (through
^^Brazil: Election Factbook Supplement, p. 18.
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ARENA) a majority of the seats in federal and state legisla­
tures. The National Congress would then elect the ARENA can­
didate for President; the* state legislatures would elect the 
ARENA candidates for governor, who would in turn appoint the 
mayors (presumably ARENA members) of the capital cities.
It seems Institutional Act #3 represented one response of 
an administration that had thought through the ramifications of 
Complementary Act #4. By forcing the opposition into an iden­
tifiable group, the government had unwittingly raised the stakes 
of the political game. While the government could deny candi­
dacy to some opposition candidates, it could not deny candidacy 
to all of them and still win even limited support for its show­
case democracy.Given the widespread animosity toward the 
military regime, an opposition candidate could well have ex­
ploited this unpopularity and ridden its victory. In such a 
case it would be difficult for the government to deny that such 
a victory represented a repudiation of the nation administra­
tion.^^
This gradual encroachment by the military regime into the 
electoral process seems to substantiate Frances Poland's con­
tention that democratic procedures and liberties were decimated 
in "bits and pieces" and not in large "chunks." See "The Pros­
pects for Brazil: Costa e Silva's Military Dictatorship," New 
Leader, LII (January 20, 1969), 7.
^^There was no indication that the Branco Administration 
intended to pursue this kind of policy, principally because of 
its concern for world opinion and its commitment to tutelary 
democracy.
^^See fn. 76 of this chapter. The government utilized this 
argument after its October, 1965 defeats.
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If, for example, an MDB gubernatorial candidate and a 
slate of opposition, legislative candidates were elected in 
their respective elections, they would serve as a rough indi­
cator of how unpopular the military government was. If voters 
concluded that the MDB was a strong opposition, in succeeding 
elections they may have voted for MDB candidates to express 
their opposition to the military government, thus further erod­
ing the dominance of ARENA and dramatizing the effects of a 
self-fulfilling prophesy. If unchecked, this kind of develop­
ment could have resulted eventually in the MDB becoming the
9 7"in" party and ARENA becoming the "out" party. Institutional 
Act #3 would serve as a check against the MDB gaining any 
electoral momentum.
The "Revolution" Solves the Problem of Succession
As the October, 1966 presidential elections neared, specu­
lation turned to whom would succeed Gastello Branco. Under 
Article XXVI of Institutional Act #2 the President was ineligible 
to succeed himself, though this was not a serious obstacle. Only 
three months after issuing Institutional Act #1 the government 
deviated from the election schedule the Act provided. Elections 
still had not become a routine constitutional procedure.
After the 1964 "revolution" the UDN replaced the PTB-PSD 
as the "in" party, or that party which controlled the President's 
office. Perhaps the UDN was only the "in" party because neither 
the PTB nor the PSD was the "in" party and not because the Presi­
dent was a member of its party. When the new party system was 
established, ARENA automatically became the "in" party.
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Reluctantly, Gastello Branco allowed Marshall Costa e Silva
to be nominated as ARENA'S presidential candidate but only after
the War Minister promised to continue Gastello’s economic and
political policies. This promise was only a formality, however,
because Costa e Silva would have been the ARENA candidate even
in the absence of such a pledge; implicit in the hard line’s
acceptance for his call for discipline during the October, 1965
9 8crisis was that he would be Gastello’s successor. Had the 
President denied Gosta e Silva the nomination, it was possible 
that another military crisis would have erupted. Faced with 
this real possibility, Gastello really had no choice: the 
promise he evoked from Costa e Silva appears to have been an 
attempt to clear his conscience of the reservations he had 
about a member of the linha dura assuming the greatly expanded 
powers of the presidency.
Gastello was described as being more concerned with the
99continuity of ideas and structures, not people. While one 
author suggests Gastello was interested in a civilian succes­
s o r , b y  June, 1966 there were few prominent civilians who 
had not fallen into disfavor with the "revolution” or who had 
not had their political rights suspended. When Adhemar de
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 170.
99Interview with Roberto Campos cited in Stepan, op. cit.,
p. 219.
100
September 10, 1966, p. 11.
^^*^Milan J. Kubic, "Top Brass in Brazil," New Republic,
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Barros was removed as governor of Sao Paulo, he joined Magal- 
h#es Pinto, Carlos Lacerda and Juscelino Kubitschek as former 
presidential contenders who no longer warranted serious atten­
tion as Gastello's possible s u c c e s s o r . F o r  a time, there 
were fears that Gastello would opt for continuismo, or simply 
suspend the election and retain power himself. But his aversion 
to the continuity of men included the extension of his own rule.
Gosta e Silva’s election, which was never really in doubt, 
became a foregone conclusion when the MDB refused to dignify 
what it called a "fraudulent" election by running a candidate. 
Governmental interference in the September 3, 1966 gubernatorial 
elections, tended to compound MDB suspicions that the government 
would interfere in the presidential elections to the extent that 
opposition would be useless.
In the state of Rio Grande do Sul a large number of ARENA 
politicians refused to endorse the ARENA candidate for governor 
and joined with the MDB in supporting another candidate, a man 
who was respected by the military. The government responded by 
cancelling the mandates of four deputies who had joined with 
the MDB in this case and issued a list of cassations against 
deputies in other states in order to guarantee conformity with
In a public opinion poll conducted by Jornal do Brasil 
71 percent of the respondants said they would vote tor either 
Kubitschek or Lacerda for President, whereas only 12 percent 
replied they would vote for Gosta e Silva. So while the first 
two individuals were clearly the most popular candidates, they 
could not be seriously considered as Gastello’s successor be­
cause they were at odds with the regime. See Stepan, op. cit., 
p. 257.
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102ARENA nominees. - On July 18, 1966 the government decreed 
Complementary Act #14 which made it more difficult for the MDB 
to nominate an alternate to succeed a candidate whose candidacy 
had been denied. This was one overt sign the government wanted 
no opposition where possiblejust as it had interfered in the 
October, 1965 gubernatorial elections, the government could be 
expected to deny candidacy to some individuals, but unlike in 
1965, in 1966 once the MDB lost a candidate it could not re­
place him. As a result, the ARENA nominee would run unopposed.
On July 22, 1966 Complementary Act #16 made it illegal for 
an ARENA legislator to switch to the MDB or to vote for an MDB 
candidate in a gubernatorial or presidential election. Faced 
with certain.defeat, the MDB contemplated self-dissolution or 
abstention in the September elections as a sign of protest.
The government, however, responded by decreeing Complementary 
Act #17, which authorized cassac'âo for any legislator who might 
resign for such motives. As a prelude to the presidential elec­
tions, the MDB was forced to participate in the government's 
showcase democracy. Abstention was presumably conceived by the 
government as being detrimental, for it might have tended to 
underscore the absence of substance in the government's "demo­
cratic elections."
10 2The individual in question was Rui Cirne Lima, a juri 
the regime was considering for appointment to the Supreme Cou 1 
It seems in this instance the government placed principle over 
expediency: ARENA candidates were supposed to win, even though 
the MDB candidate was perfectly acceptable to the government.
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By forcing practice in the discipline of exercising 
democracy, however, the government only exposed the facade 
of democracy it had constructed. On September 3 all twelve 
ARENA candidates for governorships were elected by state 
legislatures throughout Brazil, a dramatic improvement over 
the "revolution’s” performance in October, 1965. With the 
presidential elections only one month away, the futility of 
the MDB was apparent. If the government's party was able to 
win twelve out of twelve gubernatorial elections, what chance 
would the MDB candida,te have in the election of the President?
In light of the government’s improprieties prior to the guber­
natorial elections, the MDB leadership decided opposition to 
the government was hopeless and dangerous. As one MDB spokes­
man explained his party’s decision not to nominate a presidential 
candidate: "Any sort of opposition candidate would help the 
government present itself, particularly abroad, as what it is 
not."103
Following his resignation as War Minister in July, Costa 
e Silva embarked upon a three month, nationwide campaign, which 
he continued even after the MDB refused to oppose h i m . I t  
appears he tried to play down his political aptitude, ostensibly
1 n ?"Unwilling Opposition," Time, August 19, 1966, p. 34.
^^^Schneider contends Costa e Silva’s campaign, even under 
these circumstances, was not without some value. It permitted 
him to learn more about the country and the people he would be 
governing and it presented him to the people in a non-military 
context for the first time. See Political System, p. 182.
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to preserve the image of a soldier-above-politics he had pro­
jected during the October, 1965 crisis. In surely the under­
statement of the decade in Brazilian politics, he said, "I
may be weak politically, but ray party is the army, and it is 
105strong." Ambiguity shrouded his campaign; be continually 
referred to vague programs that were still in the formative 
stages. He stressed the need to "humanize” the revolution’s 
economic policies, but just how this was to be done was said 
to be under study. By evading searching questions, Costa e 
Silva did little to comfort the middle class which had borne 
the brunt of the revolution's policies of economic austerity 
yet many Brazilians were optimistic that political repression 
and economic revitalization would be relaxed under Costa e 
SilvaL..
Campaign oratory was fraught with promises to establish 
"dialogues with the people" in order to be the President of 
all Brazilians (just as Castello had promised). On one occa­
sion he explained:
The big historical role of ray government will 
be to consolidate the 1964 revolution. Return 
of full democracy . . . .  Redemocratization of 
the country without new overthrows, without vio­
lence . 107
Despite Costa e Silva’s attempts to promote an image of himself
^^^Kubic, "Top Brass in Brazil," p. 12.
^^^See "Brazil's New Leader-Inheri ts Old Woes," U.S. News 
and World Report, October 17, 1966, p. 24.
^^^Kubic, "Top Brass in Brazil," p. 12.
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as a defender of democracy, Brazilians beheld his campaign
10ftwith indifference and boredom. Simply stated, there was
no reason for them to believe that the "showcase democracy"
would not endure, for while Costa e Silva could attempt to
promote different personal images, he could not change the
fact that his election was hardly democratic.
On October 3, 1966 Costa e Silva received the votes of
25 2 ARENA federal deputies and 40 ARENA federal senators, as
well as the votes of three unaffiliated and MDB deputies. The
majority of the MDB representation abstained. Of the 475 total
votes Costa e Silva could have received, he received only 295;
the remaining 180 votes were listed as abstentions.Members
of the ARENA bloc abided by the restrictions of Complementary
Act #16 which prevented them from changing parties, although
this was an obscure triumph because there would have been no
111MDB candidate to have voted for if they had changed parties.
 ̂ p . 13. One observer quipped, "We're bored by 
their campaign. We care for them about as much as they care 
for us."
lOGcosta e Silva promised that, if elected, he would gov­
ern the country within a "strictly democratic" regime. If the
procedure by which, he was to be elected was to serve as any in­
dication as to how he interpreted "strictly democratic," it 
appears Brazilian democracy was in for even more modifications. 
See Schneider, Political System, p. 175.
H^After Institutional Act #2 (Complementary Act #4) was 
decreed ARENA controlled 297 congressional seats and MDB and an 
unaffiliated group known as Sem Legenda controlled a total of 
178 seats. Two MDB deputies voted for Costa e Silva, but 178
MDB, two ARENA and two Sem Legenda congressmen abstained. See
Schneider, Political System, p. 178 and Roett, op. cit.
H^This Act perhaps only tended to hold down the number of 
ARENA party members who abstained.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
The result of the presidential election was received with
little surprise or fanfare. As one commentator wryly observed,
"In the U.S. the results of an election are known six hours
112later. In Brazil, six months before." By first solidifying 
its decisive electoral vote in Congress with its Sixteenth Com­
plementary Act and then intimidating its opposition to the ex­
tent it offered no candidate, the "revolution" had created an 
environment that was conducive to winning elections but not to 
the acquisition of popular support. Subsequent events were to 
indicate that Castello Branco, now a lame duck President, was 
more concerned with institutionalizing the "revolution" than 
with public opinion.
Institutional Act #4: Institutionalizing the "Revolution"
By October, 1966 the new Constitution, which had been pro­
posed by the President in April, was ready for congressional 
consideration and approval. Part of the ARENA delegation sug­
gested that the government perform one more purge on Congress 
before that body undertook consideration of the new constitu­
tion because they felt the MDB would effectively obstruct its 
adoption. The President, seriously dedicated to the swift
approval of the document for which he claimed a great deal of 
responsibility, responded by cancelling the political rights 
of six MDB congressmen; when the President of the Chamber of
112 Frances Poland, op. cit., p. 6.
^^^See Schneider, Political System, p. 184.
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Deputies refused to honor these cassations, the government de­
creed Complementary Act #23 of October 20, 1966.
The latest Complementary Act ordeTred Congress recessed 
until November 22, 1966, because, as it stated, there existed 
in Congress
. . .  a group of counter-revolutionary elements 
whose objective it was to disturb the public order 
and upset the coming elections of November IS, thus 
compromising the prestige and authority of the leg­
islative power.
Article XIII of the Second Institutional Act authorized the 
President to declare a state of seige for up to 180 days in 
order to prevent the "subversion of,the internal order," but 
why he had decided on thirty days was confusing. Whether or 
not the government felt that by having Congress in recess 
during the national legislative elections ARENA'S electoral 
prospects would be improved (thus helping to assure swift 
action on the new Constitution) was not clear.
This Complementary Act has two important effects. First, 
it established the precedent of allowing the executive to 
silence the legislative branch whenever it suited the govern­
ment’s needs. Since becoming President, Castello had repeatedly
115resisted efforts to close Congress, but now, apparently with
ll^Direct quote from the Complementary Act cited in Roett, 
op. cit., p . 34.
ll^On one occasion Castello Branco said, "You have heard de­
mands that Congress be subjugated and even eliminated so that the 
’revolution would have a free hand to be arbitrary. The fact is 
that had this not been prevented , .  ̂ the consequences would 
have been most serious . . . .  Soon we would have reached the 
stage of police system fencing the country by a circle of force 
and oppression." See Kubic, "Brazil’s Adroit New Leader," p. 22.
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the Constitution in the balance, he was willing to close a 
recalcitrant Congress lest its activities and opinions influ­
ence the Brazilian voter. In addition, this Act had the ef­
fect of placing further strains on the relationship between 
the military regime and ARENA. In the controversy over the 
cassation of the six federal deputies many pro-administration 
legislators felt compelled to oppose the regime. As the con­
troversy unfolded and relations continued to decline, the 
Branco Administration must have decided it would be better to 
obscure these "inter-revolution" problems by closing Congress 
instead of allowing further deterioration in public. Such a 
development would have only tended to strengthen the MDB.
Whatever the government's motivations for closing Congress, 
the direct elections on November 15, 1966 consolidated ARENA's 
control in Congress. It increased its membership in the Chamber 
from 254 to 277 seats and from 43 to 47 seats in the Senate. On 
the other hand, the MDB lost ground in both bodies; its member­
ship in the Chamber dropped from 150 to 132 seats and from 21 to 
19 seats in the S e n a t e . Y e t ,  while ARENA was stronger as a 
result of the election, the "revolution" had not thereby neces­
sarily increased its influence in Congress. As Schneider points 
out, during their campaigns many ARENA candidates had tried to 
establish their independence from the national regime and, given 
the government's unpopularity, many such candidates were un-
^^^See Roett, op. cit., p. 37
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117doubtedly elected. The question now was whether ARENA'S
decisive numerical superiority could be translated into an
advantage for the "revolution,” especially with regard to the
new Constitution.
By December, 1966 Castello appeared intent on eliminating
debate and altering the procedures of decision-making in order
to secure the passage of the new Constitution. Apparently,
a r e n a’s majority was not regarded as a reliable majority. On
December 7, 1966 the President decreed Institutional Act #4,
which convoked an "extraordinary" session of Congress to "vote"
U Sand "promulgate" a new Constitution. ' Although the Act pro­
vided procedures to determine a Mixed Commission, that was to 
consider the original draft, and set strict time limitations 
for the constitution’s ratification, the Act empowered the 
President to decree the new Constitution if Congress failed 
to approve it. Even though some 1500 amendments were pro­
posed, Congress finally adopted a version that varied very 
little from the original draft. (The 1967 Constitution is 
presented in Chapter III.)
As on so many previous occasions, the adoption of the new
117For a discussion of these elections and the strategies 
employed by both parties, see Schneider, Political System, 
pp. 185-87. One indication that ARENA'S showing on the national 
level was deceptive was the aggregate result of the state elec­
tions: the MDB realized a net gain of 43 seats nationwide.
118See Burns, History of Brazil, p. 400.
119por excerpts from the Fourth Institutional Act, see 
ibid., pp. 400-401,
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Constitution made it evident that behind the facade of demo­
cratic procedures there was very little substance to the 
"revolution's” style of democracy. Stemming from a wide­
spread feeling within the "revolution” that the objectives 
and principles o f  the Institutional Acts should be more perm­
anently institutionalized, the implementation of the new Con­
stitution represented an attempt to align the "written" con­
stitution with the "real" constitution. Deviation from the 
1946 Constitution was so common that that document had become 
inoperative.
The First Phase of the "Revolution": An Assessment
In the interest of public order and national security 
Brazilians were subjected to cassac'ao, loss of elective and 
appointive office, and a gradual curtailment of political pre­
rogatives during the first phase of the "revolution." The 
character of the military's expanded doctrine of internal 
national security slowly evolved from one of a temporary, 
corrective nature, that sought to restrain the continuation 
of demagogic, populist politics, to one of a more permanent 
nature, that by 1967 was attempted to institutionalize the 
principles and objectives of the "revolution," however they 
might be interpreted. The military did not necessarily intend 
that this transition should take place, although an unfortunate 
combination of factors tended to minimize the differences of 
opinion within the military and make such a development almost 
inevitable.
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Castello Branco's military training at the Escola Superior 
de Guerra had emphasized that the relationship between national 
security and national development was one of mutual causality. 
But because of the President's favorable inclination toward an 
ideal form of democracy, which saw debate as an obstacle rather 
than an intrinsic part, he had a latent bias for order somewhat 
like that of the linha dura. Originally, he had intended to 
implement policies designed to control the Vargas and Goulart 
forces, but when these proved ineffective, Castello was forced 
by considerations of political expediency to retreat from his 
pledges of moderation and to adopt a more extreme position on 
political reform. Each concession he made to the linha dura 
resulted in the gradual erosion of political prerogatives open 
to civilian politicians and in the concentration of vast powers 
in the office of the executive.
The President's apolitical character, which was hailed 
as the best guarantee that true "democracy" would be restored 
during his "caretaker" regime, seems to have been partially 
responsible for the undemocratic developments between 1964 and 
1967. His feeling that any attempt to win support for his 
plans was a form of demagoguery placed him in a precarious 
position when the linha dura issued its frequent ultimatums: 
lacking substantial civilian or military support for his causes, 
he was forced to comply or face expulsion; His distaste for 
political persuasion became a liability for the cause of democ­
racy because, had he attempted to cultivate military support for
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his decision to uphold the October, 1965 gubernatorial elections, 
he may have been able to resist the hard line's demands and the 
Second and Third Institutional Acts might have never been de- 
creed/^°
The patterns of political recruitment were most affected 
by the changes in Gastello's political reform policies. At 
first some politicians and civil servants were forced from 
office; then standards were established by which to declare 
candidates ineligible for election. Political parties were 
forced to undergo modifications and finally abolished; when 
ARENA and MDB were created, numerous restrictions were placed 
on the ability of the MDB to compete with the "revolution's** 
party. It is apparent that these alterations were implemented 
in part because of the voters' failure to support the "revolu­
tion.'* When the government realized the electoral system was 
not functioning according to its expectations, it simply im­
posed controls that made its experiment in tutelary democracy 
yield the desired results. In many cases these controls were 
justified as essential to the public order but their real 
effect was to permit the military "carte blanche" to intervene 
against its political enemies and other perceived threats.
By the middle of March, 1967 there was no question that 
the military had the day-to-day responsibility for governing
170Stepan suggests some of the problems growing out of 
the President's apolitical character. See Stepan and Einaudi, 
op. cit., pp. 94 and 111.
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Brazil. The relatively minor changes in the norms and procedures 
of the decision-making process that had been instituted by the 
First Institutional Act were finally replaced by an abandonment 
of those processes by the end of Castello Branco’s term. Decreed 
laws, an irregularity in Brazil’s post-war "democratic exper­
ience," were adopted as a regular mechanism of decision-making 
after the success the government realized with Institutional 
Act #4.
The elections of October, 1965 represented a crucial junc­
ture in the course the "revolution" took. Had Castello Branco 
resisted the linha dura, a kind of democratic normalcy would 
have been re-established. But because the linha dura success­
fully elicited a major concession from the President, in the 
form of the Second Institutional Act, only the amenities of a 
democratic system, such as a legislative body and a free press, 
were preserved and only to the extent they did not interfere 
with the "revolution’s" pursuit of its objectives and princi­
ples.
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CHAPTER III
PHASE TWO OF THE "REVOLUTION":
DISILLUSIONMENT AND POLARIZATION
Carminhando
There are soldiers who are 
armed but not loved 
Mostly lost with their 
weapons in their hands.
In the barracks they 
learn the old lesson 
Of dying for the country 
and living for nothing.
There is hunger on the 
great plantations 
And desperation marching 
through the streets.
But still they take the flower 
as their strongest refrain 
And believe that the flowers 
can overcome the cannon.
Geraldo Vandre, Brazilian poet, 
circa September, 1968
Artur da Costa e Silva entered the presidency in March, 
1967 pledging to "humanize the revolution." Many Brazilians 
interpreted this pledge presaged a significant liberalization 
of the "revolution’s" social and political policies. Their 
expectations severely disappointed, many Brazilians began to 
openly oppose the military regime. The regime's repressive 
response toward increasing manifestations of opposition led
110
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to further polarization and by December, 1968 it was apparent 
a more rigorous renovation of the political system was neces­
sary.
Castello Branco’s "Revolutionary" Legacy
The final weeks of the Castello Branco government were 
marked by a renewed intensification of its ’’mood of puritanism” 
begun in April, 1964.  ̂ In concluding his drive to transform 
Brazil into a disciplined society, capable of exercising de­
mocracy, President Branco decreed what has been termed an 
’’orgy of Calvinistic legislation" during the first months of 
1967, thereby retaining the reformist image of his government 
to the end. As a result of these laws, the new Constitutiqn 
promulgated January 24, 1967 and scheduled to go into effect 
on March 15, 1967, and other carefully devised presidential 
strategies, Castello Branco left his successor, Artur da Costa 
e Silva, a political arena that was more orderly and more dis­
ciplined than it was when he inherited it in 1964.
Between October, 1965 and March, 1967 nearly 250 individuals 
were cassated under the provisions of Institutional Act #2; but 
ninety of these cassations were decreed between February 8 and 
March 15, 1967, suggesting there was a final attempt on the 
part of Castello to finish purifying the political system before
For a further discussion of the puritan-like style of the 
Branco government, see Mary Charlesworth, "The New Regime," New 
Statesman, May 8, 1964, p. 712 and "Brazil; Some Unpleasant 
Business," Time, January 13, 1967, p. 30.
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2the power of cassation expired on March 15. This drive for 
purification was accompanied by a preference for unobstructed 
reforms. On the last three days of February, 1967 151 laws 
were decreed, bringing the total to 312 in a little over a 
year and 191 in less than three months. When resistance to 
reform measures was anticipated, Castello simply decreed the 
desired reforms. For example, rather than confront the en­
trenched interests in Congress on the vital issue of currency 
reform, Castello legislated by executive decree a substantial 
devaluation with the introduction of a "new cruzeiro" worth 
1000 old cruzeiros. While most decrees of this period did not 
implement such fundamental changes as the currency reform, they 
nonetheless brought about a radical modification of the decision­
making process. The facade of participant democracy that had 
been so precariously preserved throughout the Branco government, 
appeared to be on the verge of complete dissolution by the end 
of Branco’s term. Decree laws had become the rule and popularly 
legislated measures the exception.
Although Brazil had witnessed an erosion of civil liberties 
during the first phase of the "revolution," freedom of the press, 
was not restricted in a highly authoritarian manner during that 
phase, although it was restrained somewhat. In fact, sufficient 
freedom of the press existed to enable the news media to un­
cover and publicize fraudulent practices during the October,
^See Schneider, Political System, p. 199 
^Ibid., pp. 195, 200.
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1965 elections, the government saw to it that these situations 
were corrected. In light of such evidence Busey argues that 
the Castello Branco government can be legitimately described 
as "quasi-democratic" and "semi-authoritarian."^ Yet, with the 
passage of the Press Law by Congress it appears that the Branco 
government, with congressional backing, created the machinery 
through which succeeding governments might more easily estab­
lish themselves as more authoritarian and less democratic.
The Press Law provided for the punishment (for up to four 
years) of anyone publishing or broadcasting anything "prejudicial 
to national security" or "any news or information of a secret 
matter," regardless of whether the secrecy had been declared 
by government directive or judged so by the courts.̂  This law, 
which did not go into effect until March 15, 1967, had the effect 
of increasing government supervision over and of imposing poten­
tial censorship of the communications media. - While it is true 
that the Branco government did not exercise the powers of the 
Press Law, it is also true that by proposing and securing congres-
7 *sional approval for such a reform, it created an additional
4de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 23-
^Busey, "The Old and the New," p. 68.
^See "Brazil: Some Unpleasant Business," p. 30, and Lester 
A. Sobel, ed., -Facts on File Yearbook, Vol. XXVII (New York: 
Facts on File, Inc., 1967) , p . 40.
^It is not clear why Congress passed this law (304 to 168) 
while it opposed so many of Gastello's proposals and forced him 
to decree them. Perhaps, as with the Constitution, Congress re­
served the right to seek fundamental changes in this law with 
the Costa e Silva government. See Schneider, Political System, 
pp. 198-99.
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weapon for the "revolution" to use in dealing with its adver­
saries: it legitimized the censorship of opposing viewpoints 
under the guise of national security. Under the law not only 
would the government no longer be expected to answer charges 
of its abuses and shortcomings, but also the media would 
now be required to prove that their disclosures did not vio­
late the national security. (See Chapter IV).
Perhaps Gastello’s single most important contribution to 
the "revolution" was the 1967 Constitution. This document im­
parted legal permanence to the major provisions of the first 
four institutional acts and provided for further centraliza­
tion of power in the national government. About the 1967 Con­
stitution Peter Ranis has written:
Perhaps the most paternalistic of the Latin 
American constitutions, it purports to seriously 
regulate the political sector while increasing 
the prerogatives of the national government over 
the state and municipal constituent authorities.°
During congressional deliberations on the proposed constitution 
one of the proposals drawing the most strenuous objections was 
one calling for the deletion of "United States" from the name 
of the country. Many congressmen felt that such a change would 
only legitimize the further centralization of power, but, be­
cause of the "rubber stamp role," that had been imposed on it. 
Congress was unable to prevent this and other changes.̂
^Peter Ranis, Five Latin American Nations: A Comparative 
Political Sdudy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 19 71), p. 190.
^See "Institutional Act #4 : Institutionalizing the ’Revolu­
tion’," Chapter II.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
Just as it was proposed, the approved constitution repre­
sented the principles of the "revolution.*' Under Article 76 
the President and Vice-President, who were required to run on 
the same ticket, were to be elected by an electoral college 
composed of members of the National Congress and delegates 
named by the legislative assemblies of the states. Article 83 
assigned the executive branch exclusive power to initiate leg­
islation in budgetary, fiscal, and security matters. The 
national government was given the exclusive right to collect 
all taxes (except those on real estate), which were then to 
be distributed on an equitable basis. The executive ivas 
authorized to issue decrees in the areas of national security 
and public finance, to decree a state of seige, and to order
federal intervention in the affairs of state and local gov- 
10ernments.
The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were each permitted 
forty-five total days to act on an executive measure unless such 
a measure was declared "urgent." In such a case, a joint ses­
sion of Congress was required to consider the legislation within 
forty days. Legislators were prohibited from holding any other 
elective post and each legislator was subject to the loss of 
his mandate if he failed to attend more than half of his chamber's
For translated excerpts of the 1967 Constitution, see 
Burns, History of Brazil, pp. 402-10. For a general discussion 
of this constitution, see Ranis, op. cit., pp. 190-92 and "All 
Wrapped Up," The Economist, CCXXII (January 7, 1967), 35.
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ordinary sessions during each legislative period. The members 
of the National Congress were still to be elected by "direct 
and secret" elections.
Obviously, many of these provisions were direct adapta­
tions of the "revolution's" institutional acts but with an 
important qualification: there were no longer any expiration 
dates for the expanded powers of the executive nor was the 
indirect election of the President any longer a temporary 
electoral device. These modifications had been institution­
alized as permanent components of Brazil's constitutional 
framework.
If one accepts Peterson's proposition that Castello Branco 
pushed through the new constitution because he felt Costa e 
Silva might give way to pressures to "soften" the line of the 
"revolution" once he assumed p o w e r , t h e n  it might also be 
argued that the outgoing President pursued a strategy of mili­
tary promotions designed to insulate the succeeding government
from the pressures of the linha dura. Due to an unusually large
12number of vacancies in the upper ranks of the armed forces, 
Castello was afforded the opportunity to promote a large number 
of officers to strategic positions. During the final three 
months of 1966 seven new full generals were named; all of them
^^Peterson, op. cit., p. 555.
1 ?
T h e s e vacancies were created when high-ranking officers 
retired in order to take advantage of the military's retirement 
benefits which were scheduled to be terminated by Castello.
See Schneider, Political System, p. 210.
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shared Gastello's general military and political philosophies. 
In several cases officers more closely associated with Castello 
were promoted over those associated with the linha dura.
Just as the new Constitution initially limited Costa e 
Silva's freedom to deviate from the course the "revolution" 
had followed under Castello, so too by promoting officers 
loyal to the Sorbonne ideology was Castello able to strengthen 
the influence of the "soft line" in the hierarchy of the mili­
tary. Ostensibly, these officers would serve as a safeguard 
against pressures by the linha dura to force the "revolution" 
in an even more repressive direction. Ideally, Costa e Silva 
would move neither in the direction of popular opinion nor in 
a direction dictated by the linha dura as a result of the new 
Constitution and Gastello's military promotions.
Whereas many Brazilians had welcomed the 1964 coup with
1 3either popular support or indifference, by the beginning of 
1967 just as many were turning against the revolutionary gov­
ernment. Gastello's austere economic and political policies, 
according to one author, combined to make his "one of the most 
unpopular regimes in Brazilian political history.
It appears Gastello's unpopularity in the sphere of eco­
nomics stemmed directly from the success of his policies;
1 3See Nicholas Raymond and Winthrop P. Carty, "Elections 
in Brazil: The Revolution Digs In," The Reporter, September 8, 
1968, p. 44 and "Brazil: Government by the Consent of the 
Governed," New Republic, April 16, 1966, p. 17.
^^Peterson, op. cit., p. 533.
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inflation had been reduced from an annual rate of 144 percent 
in 1964 to 41 percent in 1966.^^ One of the prices for cool­
ing of the economy, which required wage, price, and credit 
controls, was unpopularity. In the sphere of politics his 
unpopularity apparently stemmed from unfulfilled promises. 
Castello had failed to prevent the ’’revolution” from taking 
on a reactionary character and had failed in his attempts 
to facilitate a swift return to democratic normalcy as he had 
promised. If anything, by the end of Gastello’s term Brazil 
indeed seemed headed in the opposite direction.
Costa e Silva: Humanizing the "Revolution”
As the inauguration of Costa e Silva neared, Brazilians
became hopeful that his government would transform campaign
pledges to "humanize the revolution” into liberal policies
that would relax the austere measures of his predecessor. As
Schneider explains, upon his inauguration
. . . Costa e Silva enjoyed the advantage that 
almost all important segments of public opinion 
expected his administration to be a relief from 
the increasing authoritarian trend of the first 
revolutionary regime.
While most were not optimistic that full-scale changes in the
X 7revolutionary order were forthcoming, those with the highest
^^’’Brazil; The Price of Unpopularity,” Time, July 28, 
1967, p. 30.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 20 3.
l^According to a public opinion poll conducted by the 
journal, Manchete, prior to Costa's inauguration, nearly half 
the respondants expected Costa’s government to be ’’better” and
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expectations that the ''revolution" would be liberalized under 
Costa e Silva were to be the most bitterly disappointed.
Even though he graduated from the Escola Superior de 
Guerra, Costa e Silva's political and military philosophies 
only superficially resembled those of Castello Branco. But 
despite his differences with the Sorbonne ideology, Costa e 
Silva could not be accurately labelled as a member of the 
linha dura. Where Castello had come to act as a kind of 
mediator between the soft line and the linha dura by the end 
of his term, Costa e Silva's position relative to both of 
those groups was more obscure.
His actions during the October, 1965 military crisis 
had won him the support of the linha dura, but since then 
he had retreated, at least publicly, from, his close associa­
tion with that group. Instead of opposing the linha dura in 
defense of stated principles (as Castello had done in defense
of his "ideal democracy"), Costa e Silva appeared more amenable
18to reaching compromises with it. The compromise Costa e 
Silva struck with that conservative military faction resulted
only 3 percent felt it would be worse. The expectation for 
major changes remained relatively limited. See Schneider, 
Political System, p. 20 3 fn.
^Scosta's first concession to the linha dura was in the 
appointment of his Cabinet officers. All of the military per­
sonnel ranged from either "strong" to "moderate" in their affil 
iation with the hard line, according to Schneider. Ibid., pp. 
207-208. Rosebaum writes that Costa, "while not identified as 
a hard-liner, was not an opponent of their policies and values, 
but a skillful conciliator of conflicting military positions." 
See "Brazil's Military Regime," Current History, LVIII (Febru­
ary, 1970), 74.
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in an increase of hard line influence in governmental matters 
during the second phase of the revolution, especially after 
Costa e Silva’s policies proved incapable of subduing his 
government's opposition.
Costa e Silva's "campaign” for the presidency had demon­
strated that he was favorably disposed toward influencing 
public opinion, both at home and abroad. Faced with no oppo­
sition and, therefore, his election guaranteed, there was no 
reason for Costa e Silva to have pledged to "humanize the 
revolution" and to establish dialogues with the people except 
to encourage popular backing for his administration. This in
itself was at variance with the Sorbonne's disdain for public
19opinion. Even after his election he appeared determined to 
project an image of himself as a strong leader of reform, who 
unlike his predecessor was willing to extend, individualized 
attention to even the most downtrodden Brazilian.
In a news conference in New York City in January, 1967 the 
President-elect stated he was intent on "transferring prosperity
to the people" and on viewing "man as the individual, man as an
20entity." Brazilians, who had labored for nearly three years 
under Castello's formal, uniform policies of austerity received 
these kinds of expressions with a feeling of hope--hope that
^^Ibid., p. 201.
20See Gerde V/ilcke, "Brazilian Vows Gains in Economy," 
New York Times, January 31, 1967, p. 77.
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the path toward economic and political recovery under Costa e 
Silva would require less suffering and fewer individual sacri­
fices .
Costa e Silva's inaugural speech and his first policy 
statements were a curious blend of evasiveness and confusion.
On the one hand, he said he would be unafraid of public opin­
ion, but on the other hand, he said he would not yield author-
2 2ity to mass opinion. It appears that while the President
would presumably permit differences of opinion and possibly
adjust his policies accordingly, he would not tolerate any
attempt to mobilize opinion against the government which
might influence the decision-making process itself. The anti-
7 %populist character of the "revolution" remained intact," but 
Costa e Silva implied opposing viewpoints were welcome. In 
fact, authority was to continue to be exercised at the discre­
tion of the "revolution" and opposition tolerated only to the 
extent it did not interfere with the government’s policies.
With reference to what he termed were his administration’s 
sources of support (ARENA and the armed forces), the President
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 212.
22For a brief account of Costa’s inaugural speech, see 
Paul Montgomery, "Costa Is Inaugurated in Brazil," New York 
Times, March 16, 1967, p. 21. For an account of his first 
policy statements, see Paul Montgomery, "Humanist Regime 
Pledged in Brazil," New York Times, March 17, 1967, p. 18.
See Jerry L. Weaver, "Assessing the Impact of Military 
Rule: Alternative Approaches," in Military Rule in Latin Amer 
ica: Functions, Conseqi^ences, and Perspectives, ed. by Phil- 
lippe C. Schmittèr (Beverly'Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 
1973), p. 59.
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attempted to clarify the confusion over the role of opposition
in his government:
We might not be a popular government but we 
will be, without shadow of doubt, a government 
for the people in the most profound sense of
that expression.24
So, while everyone might not have agreed with the decisions of 
the "revolution,*' it nonetheless was to continue to determine 
the public will. This position did not represent a change from 
the position Gastello had assumed, but rhetorical expressions 
like "government for the people" must have encouraged Brazilians 
to expect to have a voice in the shaping of their destinies.
Compared to the frenetic activity of the Branco Administra­
tion’s final weeks, at its outset the Costa e Silva government 
appeared "inactive." The new Cabinet was comprised of eight 
civilian and eight military figures, with the latter holding
an edge in terms of the political importance of their posi- 
25tions; none of its members were holdovers from the previous
government and the Cabinet, as a whole, lacked the intellectual
26qualities of the Branco Cabinet.
Generally, the "influential" military figures around Costa 
e Silva were admired by the linha dura. Interior Minister 
Albuquerque Lima, Chief Military Aide Jaime Portella, and
^^New York Times, March 17, 1967, p. 18. 
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 206. 
Z^lbid., p. 205.
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General Carrastazu Medici, head of the National Intelligence 
Service, all
. . . owed their positions in the second govern­
ment to the fact that, symbolically and actually, 
they represented the opposite of the ideas and 
career patterns of the core group of officers in 
the 1964-1967 government . . . .  In fact, these 
officers came to power in response to the more 
nationalist officers, who were dissatisfied with 
the achievements of the first military government 
and because of their desire for the military in 
general to be more popular.2?
Thus, the essentially technocratic, Branco government was re­
placed by a less vigorous and more publie-opinion-conscious 
government.
It is possible that Costa e Silva and his influential 
advisors decided that, because the "revolution” had been so 
institutionalized by the new Constitution that its persistence 
was no longer an issue of debate, opposition to the regime's
2 8various political policies would steadily diminish over time. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that apparently in 
order to augment its popularity, the new government must have 
decided that a revision of Branco's economic policies was neces­
sary.
2 7For a discussion of the "influentials” in the Costa e 
Silva government, see Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., pp. 111-112.
Costa e Silva felt the "revolution" had given Brazil a 
responsible political system that had to be given a chance to 
work. Rollie Poppino suggests that in this resolve Costa failed 
to recognize that Congress had only reluctantly adopted indirect 
elections and expected them to be reversed by the new President. 
See "Brazil; Second Phase of the Revolution," Current History, 
I.VI (January, 1969), 11.
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After prolonged deliberation the government eased infla­
tion controls and adopted a less favorable policy toward United 
States investments. While Stepan has suggested that the adop­
tion of a stronger nationalist position resulted from civilian 
29pressures, Roberto Campos asserts that Costa e Silva felt
that by relaxing Castello's long-range economic policies his
popularity, both within the military and among civilians, would 
30be increased.* Regardless of the new President's motivations, 
as soon as the "revolution's" policies were relaxed inflation 
started to rise. By 1967 inflation had been reduced to an 
annual rate of 25 percent, the lowest in more than a decade ; 
but after economic policies were eased a bit it rose 14.S 
percent in the first half of 1968.^^
If Campos' assertion that Costa e Silva was sufficiently 
concerned with public opinion to try to influence it by effect­
ing policy changes is valid, then the President was playing a 
dangerous game. With his concern for continued economic recovery, 
the President would have to re-tighten economic controls if in­
flation reached unacceptable levels ; and this could be accom­
plished by disappointing heightened expectations and with a sub­
sequent loss of support. So it was with many of Costa e Silva's
29Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., pp. 97, 111.
^^Ibid., p. 95.
^^"Brazil: A Paradise on the Edge of Trouble," U. S. News 
and World Report, September 2, 1968, p. 66.
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policies; an initial promise, raised expectations and then 
failure to secure the implementation of these promises in the 
form of policies, accompanied by a loss of political support.
Problems with the Opposition
Costa e Silva inherited a number of unresolved problems 
from Gastello Branco. Since the latter half of 1966 a wide 
variety of opposition elements had been trying to establish 
a comprehensive alliance in order to more effectively confront 
the government. Late in the Branco period student groups and 
various sectors of the Catholic Church had begun to denounce 
openly the ‘'revolution's” restrictions on certain forms of 
political activity. And as Costa e Silva was inaugurated, the 
delicate alliance between ARENA and the military government re­
mained unpredictably balanced. It was in dealing with these 
critical situations that Costa e Silva was to make his contri­
bution to the "democratic revolution."
In August, 1966, shortly after the MDB had been severely 
restrained by a series of complementary acts, Carlos Lacerda, 
who had seen his presidential ambitions destroyed by the 
military government, consulted with ex-Presidents Kubitschek 
and Goulart over the possibility of launching a united opposition 
movement. Frente Ampla (Broad Front) , the informal organization 
resulting from these consultations, was founded on the unlikely 
assumption that these men and the people they represented, with 
such diverse and outright conflicting political philosophies, 
could form a cohesive opposition movement. While Frente Ampla* s
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leaders were apparently able to make the necessary rapproche­
ments, the movement itself was destined to failure from the 
beginning.
Frente Ampla first moved to test the Costa e Silva govern­
ment’s intentions in the area of dissent, in order to force the 
government to choose between its campaign pledges of normaliza­
tion and that of revolutionary continuity. Lacerda directed 
the former editor of Tribuna da Imprensa, Helio Fernandes, to 
publish political articles, a violation of regulations placed on 
cassados (those whose political rights had been cassated). The 
linha dura regarded this action as a "provocation," but the 
President resisted their calls for punitive action on this and 
other occasions; his failure to react decisively encouraged the 
Frente Ampla to plan further moves designed to expose the govern­
ment as just another military* government or to reveal it as a
32true "government of the people."
Several members of the government, perhaps appreciating 
Lacerda’s strategic position in the Frente Ampla and the real 
possibility of the center-left elements of the MDB joining an 
opposition movement, tried to arrange a reconciliation between 
Lacerda and the "revolution.’' This attempt had a disruptive 
effect on the infant Frente Ampla; its organizational work 
ground to a halt. Lacerda, after all, was the key to Frente 
Ampla’s leadership because, while he had signed separate pacts
32Schneider, Political System, p. 213.
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33with both Goulart and Kubitschek, no evidence indicates the 
latter two ever exchanged mutual agreements. When Frente Ampla * s 
leadership became suspicious that Lacerda (being the political 
opportunist he was) was seeking realignment with the "revolution" 
in order to enhance his presidential aspirations, the Frente 
Ampla fragmented along personality l i n e s . T h e  organizational 
hierarchy of the Frente Ampla was so fragile that the government 
did not have to assert itself to disrupt it.
The fortunes of Frente Ampla did not improve- Since its 
inception it had not enjoyed the support of the executive com­
mittee of the MDB and was thus denied the support of the only 
recognized body of opposition, itself at odds with the "revolu­
tion," but apparently not willing to risk being further sup­
pressed. Janio Quadros refused to join the Frente Amp1a ; thus
it was denied the presence of a popular figure who might have
35been able to mobilize a mass movement. When by the middle 
of 1967 the attempted reconciliation between Lacerda and the 
"revolution" had failed to materialize, Lacerda assumed his 
traditional role of denouncing the incumbent government, per­
haps in an attempt to mobilize support for his ill-conceived
? ?See Roett, op. cit., pp. 37-38 and Schneider, Political 
System, pp. 195, 2 22.
3-1'Schneider states the Frente Ampla was never really able 
to overcome the mutual distrust of Juscelinistas, Lacerdistas, 
Janguistas, and the Janistas and remained throughout a leader­
ship at the top. Political System, p. 223.
35Roett, op. cit., p. 38.
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coalition. Though divided and ineffective, the Frente Ampla 
did succeed in exacerbating tensions between the military gov­
ernment and the opposition, enough that when Fernandes and 
Lacerda greeted Gastello’s death in June, 1967 with scathing 
attacks on the ex-President, Fernandes was imprisoned and 
Lacerda barred from further television appearances.
From its predecessor the Costa e Silva government in­
herited a ticklish student opposition. Since being outlawed 
in 1964 the National Union of Students (UNE) had been forced 
to meet and conduct its activities in se*cret.^^ Being in agree­
ment with some of the students’ grievances, Dominican priests 
in Belo Horizonte allowed the UNE to conduct its 28th,Congress 
in one of its buildings in July, 1966. Encouraged by their 
success in holding a large, secret student meeting, in Septem­
ber, 1966 college students quickly closed ranks in opposition 
to newly-imposed tuition payments. This movement rapidly 
flared into a general strike of university students across 
Brazil, something expressly prohibited by the Suplicy Law of 
1964.
The Suplicy Law had placed student organizations under 
strict government supervision, requiring that they be free of 
ideological or political content; for that reason few politically
According to George H. Dunne, the pro-Goulart UNE was a 
prime target of the 1964 coup after it eliminated Goulart. See 
’’Happening in Sao Paulo," America, September 23, 1967, p. 306.
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minded students joined the organizations that replaced the UNE.
Schneider posits:
The rationale of the law was that, with the 
troublemakers removed and autonomy severely re­
stricted, student organizations could be used to 
channel interests toward academic matters. This 
proved quickly to be an illusive vision, if not 
a complete illusion.37
The September, 1966 general strike was a clear indication that 
the goals of the Suplicy Law were unrealistic. Nonetheless, 
the Gastello Branco government reacted to the strike along the 
rationale of that law by arresting a large number of Sao Paulo 
students to set an example for the remainder of the country.
The students retaliated with a series of sympathy strikes, 
culminated by a ’’National Day of Struggle Against the Dicta­
torship" on September 22, 1966. But the basic issues of dis­
sent and freedom of speech went unresolved.
The students welcomed Gastello’s departure but greeted 
Gosta e Silva with guarded optimism, suspicious of most of 
his campaign promises except the ones pledging to be more respon­
sive to student needs and to initiate policies that would improve
X Reducational opportunities. If the students were selectively 
perceptive in being at all optimistic that Gosta e Silva would 
be an improvement over Gastello, they also proved to be impatient, 
When the new President's promises to "humanize the revolution" 
failed to be followed up with specific policies, tensions between
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 230. 
^^New York Times, March 17, 196 7, p. 18.
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the disgruntled students and the government peaked.
Costa e Silva did not appear intent on immediately estab­
lishing dialogues with the students. In July, 1967 the mili­
tary police forcibly arrested a large number of Sao Paulo
students in an attempt to thwart the holding of the UNE’s annual
C o n g r e s s . M u c h  to the surprise of the government, the 29th 
Congress of the UNE was held later that month in defiance of 
the government's attempted intimidation. Once again the Catholic 
Church was implicated in the illegal meeting of the UNE. A
Benedictine monastery near Campinas was the site of the daring
29th Congress.
Successfully hoodwinked and embarrassed by a band of 400 
students who attended the UNE Congress, the government, in 
seeking to repair its damaged stature, over-reacted. Dissatis­
fied by the insistence of the Campinas monks that they had no 
idea they were acting as hosts to the outlawed UNE, the govern­
ment arrested scores of priests and nuns associated with the 
Campinas monastery, violating the sanctuary of churches and 
setting off a nationwide, but scarcely unified, Church protest 
in the process. Most influential members of the Church's 
hierarchy denounced the government's invasions of monasteries 
to arrest priests. A dissident, conservative wing of the
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 232.
40xhe Campinas monks allegedly told the military police that, 
since the students had not asked for their spiritual services, 
they thought it best to leave the students to their own devices 
and consequently did not know what was going on. The police 
found this disciplined lack of curiosity hard to believe. For 
a rather detailed discussion of this church-state confrontation, see Dunne, op. cit., pp. 306-307.
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Church, as well as the conservative press, however, assailed 
the Dominicans and Benedictines as agents of subversion. By- 
over-reacting the government had facilitated the likelihood 
that the progressive Church and the students could unite in 
common cause against the government.
By the end of 1967 the Costa e Silva government, despite 
its announced intention to enter into dialogue, had failed to 
win the confidence of the students. According to one student 
spokesman, the effect of the government’s lack of comprehension 
and the heavy handed methods employed by the military police 
throughout 1967 had been "to unite the students against the 
government, something years of left wing propaganda had not 
been able to a c h i e v e . E v e n  though opposed to the UNE the 
same spokesman 'touched upon some of the basic shortcomings of - 
the Costa e Silva government.
Every constructive criticism or attempt to 
present a grievance is dismissed as the result 
of "inexperience," or as "subversive propaganda."
The "dialogues" turn out to be boring monologues. 
Solutions are put off and the truth disguised.
This lack of faith aggravates the general lackof confidence.'̂ 2
Costa e Silva's policy toward students during 1967 seemed to 
have alienated even the more conservative students who could 
have been expected to support the government, had it converted 
some of its promises into concrete policies.
"̂ Îbid. , p. 308. 
^^Ibid.
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On the military’s attitude toward political mobilization 
Stepan has written:
Clearly in 1964 the Brazilian military most 
feared chaos and communism. They felt the need 
for a strong government to check inflation and 
subversion. Given this vision of societal 
disintegration, they perceived all groups en­
gaged in confrontation and mobilization politics 
as potentially dangerous.^3
Because the progressive Church (liberal and radical churchmen) 
had persisted in their support for the Basic Education Movement 
(MEB) even after the 1964 coup, despite efforts by the govern­
ment to terminate that movement, the Church found itself in 
political conflict with the military governments.
One of the goals of the MEB, which was initiated in 1961, 
was to make people critically aware of their situation. Accord­
ing to this movement ’’development" was defined as intrinsically 
related to political participation, critical awareness (called 
conscientizacao), and mass mobilization.^^ The "revolution," 
which had assumed sole responsibility for overseeing national 
development and which viewed the expansion of political partici­
pation as detrimental to that development, attacked the MEB as 
an undisguised attempt to disrupt its anti-mobilization strategy 
and as a threat to the national security. While there was an 
essential philosophical difference between conscientizacao and 
the pre-revolutionary, populista technique of mass mobiliza-
4 3step.an and Einaudi, o p . cit. , p. 86.
44por a discussion of the primary objectives of the MEB, 
see Emanuel de Kadt, Catholic Radicals in Brazil (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 19/1), "pT 123 and Utepan and Einaudi, 
op. cit., p. 86.
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tion,"^^ the government chose to regard the MEB as a form of 
demagoguery and subversion, thereby unnecessarily alienating 
many dedicated lay and clerical proponents of the MEB.
Deeply influenced by the philosophies of Mounier, the more 
liberal and radical members of the Church found themselves in- 
controvertibly opposed to condoning a dictatorial form of gov­
ernment for the sake of future generations without popular 
consent. Tensions between this group, as visible adversaries 
of dictatorship, and the military government, which defined 
itself as "democratic,” were inevitable. And because the 
Church, in general, had acquired a greater social consciousness 
and had formulated alternative solutions to Brazil's problems, 
even the more moderate and conservative members of the Church 
found themselves at odds with the government.
In an August, 1967 speech assailing the failures of the 
Costa e Silva government to bring "prosperity to the people," 
Dora Helder Camara, the respected Archbishop of Recife and a 
founder of the MEB, summed up the Church's new concern for 
social problems.
45por an explanation of the distinctions between these 
two phenomena, see de Kadt, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
46de Kadt discusses the influence of Mounier in the 
Catholic Church. See Catholic Radicals in Brazil, pp. 91-93. 
Mounier wrote that it was wê ll and good for a generation to 
sacrifice its well-being to a future generation, "but there 
has to be assent to it without which there are only arbitrary 
methods and sterile effects." Emmanuel Mounier, "Christianisme 
et communisme," Feu la Chrétienté', translated and quoted in Roy 
Pierce, Contemporary FrenchPolitical Thought (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1966) , p. 75.
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Today the priest can not be satisfied only to 
say his prayers, standing with folded arms before 
the problems that afflict the masses . . . .  For 
too long we have acted as a brake; now we must 
act as an accelerator; for had we spoken out more 
clearly in the past, millions of human beings 
would not today be experiencing penury and 
misery . . . .  I am not a partisan of violence, 
but I am of the opinion that we can not be con­
tent with the hyricism of fine phrases that 
solve none of the grave social problems.
In addition to implicitly defining a new social policy for the
Church, which was apparently to be offered as an alternative to
the government's "fine phrases," the speech included references
to the failure of capitalism to solve Brazil’s problems.
Dorn Holder's speech, like so many other speeches by church­
men during 1967 and 1968, seemed to challenge the government for 
the leadership of national development. The suggestions of 
Marxian alternatives to national development were in strong 
contradiction to the stringent anti-communist principles of 
the "revolution." It is not surprising, then, that the Costa 
e Silva government, which in the tradition of the "revolution" 
felt development could only be realized by resisting political 
participation and developing a strong capitalist economy, inter­
preted this kind of speech as an attempt to subvert its political
4 8and economic reforms.
The conservative members of the Catholic Church hierarchy,
4 7Cited in Dunne, op. c_̂ j_, p. 309.
4 8Norman Gall discusses the tensions between the military 
government and the Church in "Latin America: The Churcli Militfnit," 
Commentary, April, 1970, pp. 28-31.
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upset over what they felt was an infiltration of the Church by 
communists, revived the "Society for the Defense of Tradition, 
Family, and Property" (TFP) , which had so effectively helped to 
mobilize support against Goulart in 1964. After quickly winning 
government and military support it launched a vigorous campaign 
against the members of the progressive Church who had been 
speaking out against the government.
At this point, it seems, the government incorrectly per­
ceived the conservative and the more progressive Catholics as 
comprising two, distinct collections of uniform attitudes, one 
supporting and one in opposition to the government. In fact, 
the Church's hierarchy was comprised of clergy with widely 
varying political views. And whereas the Castello government 
had managed to avoid significant clashes with the Church, Costa 
e Silva's government did not. With the linha dura wielding more 
influence in governmental matters, high-ranking officers began 
to levy verbal assaults against all progressive Catholics, call­
ing them Marxists, leftists, and subversives. The result was to 
polarize the Church's hierarchy by forcing moderate and liberal 
clergy to identify with either the extreme right or extreme 
left.*^^
Thomas C. Bruneau explains the process of polarization 
in the Catholic Church during the Costa e Silva government in, 
"The Changing Political Role of the Catholic Church," in Con­
temporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development, 
ed. 15y Jon Rosenbaum andTWi11iam Ü. Ty1er (New York: Praegec 
Publishers, 1972), pp. 317-18.
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Where prior to 1964 the Church had cooperated with the 
state in effecting social change (primarily by passively sup­
porting the government’s policies), by the end of 1967 the 
Church found itself in opposition to the state on the issue 
of social development. Although the progressive Church had 
continued to support the same kind of development policies 
begun under Quadros and Goulart, the military government had
adopted policies that emphasized political and social stabil- 
50ity. Because of its outspoken manner, by 1967 the Church 
had placed itself in a position of opposition to the govern­
ment and was the only formal institution that consistently
51dared to criticize the regime's excesses.
As the government’s problems with the student organizations 
and the Church increased, its relation with Congress, particu­
larly with the supposed pro-government ARENA, also continued to 
deteriorate. After failing to assume the political initiative 
during the new government's period of indecisiveness (March to 
June 1 9 6 7 ) , ARENA gradually began to assert itself to the 
extent that by the end of the 1967 session Costa e Silva was 
confronted with a parliamentary revolt. For the first time
Thomas C. Bruneau discusses the erosion of church-state 
relations over the question of political and social change in 
his work, "Power and Influence; Analysis of the Church in Latin 
America and the Case of Brazil," Latin American Research Review, 
VIII (Summer, 1973), 41-43.
^^Bruneau, "Changing Political Role of the Catholic Church,"
299.
^2$ee Schneider, Political System, pp. 211, 213.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
Congress rejected a presidential decree law and attempted to 
circumvent the constitutional provisions which prevented it 
from initiating legislation involving additional government 
expenditures. More significantly, twenty-nine ARENA legis­
lators voted for an MDB-sponsored constitutional amendment
5 3calling for the restoration of direct presidential elections. 
Although the ramifications of this revolt were as potentially 
dangerous as the end-of-the-session revolts in 1965 and 1966, 
Congress was not forced into recess nor were any cassations 
decreed.
The first nine months of the Costa e Silva government 
had been marked by undulating outbursts of dissent and 1967 
closed with a lull in political confrontations. Yet, the 
antagonisms between the government and each pocket of opposi­
tion remained unresolved, requiring only a catalyst to touch 
off a chain reaction of protest and confrontation.
1968: Confrontation and Reaction
In a series of interviews during December, 1967 Admiral 
Jose Saldanha da Gama, Minister of the Supreme Military Tri­
bunal, disclosed that the military’s position of national 
leadership was still a subject of debate within the military 
itself. In one such interview Saldanha observed:
The military continue to interfere violently 
in the nation’s destinies; it is everywhere de­
fending something that it calls national security 
but that I call internal security. The military
53ibid., p. 224.
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does not live its basic purpose which is prep­
aration for the external defense of the country.
The enemy of the military is the civilian popu­
lation; it [the military] exists to occupy ihe 
country; it is everywhere except in the barracks 
where it ought to be, carrying out its purpose.^4
Subsequent interviews with the prestigious Saldanha da Gama 
further demonstrated that the military was far from united on 
the question of whether it should retain power or withdraw to 
its traditional position of poder moderador. Once broached, the 
question of the military retaining power became a critical issue 
of public debate, forcing the Costa e Silva government to pro­
vide what the linha dura felt was an expedient answer.
Coincident with the publication of Saldanha da Gama’s inter­
views, Carlos Lacerda engaged in another barrage of criticisms of 
the incumbent government, presumably in an attempt to increase 
tensions within the armed forces to the benefit of his flounder­
ing Frente Ampla. If at this point he could have convinced a 
substantial portion of the civilian population that his condem­
nations were shared by influential military personnel (whom he 
hoped would express more criticisms of the military government), 
the possibility of a successful opposition movement would be­
come more viable. He did succted in establishing dialogues 
with Albuquerque Lima, thereby exposing the conflicting inter­
pretations within the military of its political function; but 
while Lacerda was able to encourage anti-government demonstra-
^^For excerpts of several of Saldanha da Gama's interviews 
with Galera, the student magazine of the Navy School, see ibid., 
p. 225 .
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tions, he was still unable to mobilize a wide following for 
his Frente Amp1a.
As the fourth anniversary of the "revolution'* approached 
university students, who had been relatively quiet since August, 
1967, planned massive protest demonstrations against the mili­
tary government. On March 28, 1967 military police killed a 
student as they attempted to break up such a demonstration, in 
the process creating a martyr for the student movement. This 
death also served to heighten the already increasing public 
sympathy for the students' cause. On March 29 fifty thousand 
persons, including thousands of non-students, attended the slain 
student's funeral, touching off a series of massive sympathy 
demonstrations which marched under slogans like "Down with the 
Fascist DictajLorship" and "Organized People Will End Dictator­
ship."^^ Because such demonstrations were held in violation of 
a government ban on them, the government chose to interpret and 
deal with them as part of a subversive plot.
In Rio de Janeiro priests and nuns, who had participated in 
an April sympathy demonstration, were brutally assaulted by 
military security forces. This type of government brutality 
only served to reinforce the Church's sympathy for the students, 
who themselves were being dispersed by increasingly violent 
t a c t i c s . B u t  such government tactics also had broader imnli-
SSpobert 0. My hr describes this entire phase of the student 
movement in his work, "Student Activism and Development," in 
Contemporary Brazil, op. cit., pp. 358-60 .
^^See "Surpassing All Limits of Unpopularity," Time,
July 5, 1968 , p . 34.
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cations for the entire political system. As one author ex­
plains . . little opportunity was afforded the moderates
to find ways to avoid polarization and ultimate violent con- 
5 7frontation.*• But the government, feeling it had '’a monopoly 
on honesty, patriotism, and national i n t e r e s t m u s t  have 
concluded that for reasons of national security it was neces­
sary to repress any opposition.
Convinced the Frente Ampla was coordinating civil protest, 
the government declared that organization illegal. Because of 
this decision, Lacerda acquired a large sympathetic following, 
something he had been unable to do while promoting the Frente 
Ampla. By July even influential ARENA deputies had begun to
insist that it alter its policy toward the s.tudents. and listen
59to some of their demands. Instead, Costa e Silva ignored 
these requests by the "revolution's" own political party. In 
an error of tactical judgment Costa e Silva decided at this 
point to implement a reform proposal calling for a reduction 
of government expenditures on education, a move that was viewed 
as a betrayal of his earlier pledges to expand educational 
facilities. This apparent complete disregard for public 
opinion seems to indicate that Costa e Silva was becoming 
increasingly subject to the pressures of the linha dura.
57schneider, Political System, p. 262.
^^See Howard J. Wiarda, "Crisis is Coming in Brazil,"
New Republic, September 14, 1967, p. 16.
^^Mhyr, op. cit., p. 359.
^^See New York Times, March 17, 1967, p. 18.
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In the eyes of the regime, resistance to its initiatives 
had come to be equated with subversion.With the conven­
tional forms of opposition either outlawed or rendered inef­
fective by the government's arbitrary use of its expanded 
constitutional powers, violence soon replaced demonstrations 
as the predominant form of protest. Bombing of government 
facilities and thefts of military arms and explosives prolif­
erated. Thousands of suspected "subversives” were rounded up
in mass arrests, including the 739 who attended the UNE's 30th 
62Congress.
The government was not without its allies during the on­
slaught of violence. Inspired by the government's Department 
of Public Order and Security (itself only under the nominal 
control of the President), groups like the Anti-Communist Move­
ment and the Comando Caca Communistas (Communist Hunters Com­
mand) were formed. They acted like vigilante groups who 
exterminated "subversives" without fear of government reprisal, 
justifying their violence with mottoes like: "For every dead 
democrat we'll kill five Communists." As one Communist Hunter 
spokesman explained, "Through our violence we hope to provoke a
^^See Schneider, Political System, p. 110.
/ I  O
Expecting a violent showdown with the students attending 
the Congress, hundreds of armed military policemen surrounded 
the site of the Congress, only to find unarmed, sleeping stu­
dents. See "Edging Toward the Brink," Time, October 25, 1963, 
p. 48.
63see "Threat from the Right," Newsweek, December 9, 1968, 
p. 52.
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rightist reaction in the indecisive government so that the 
leftists can be totally eliminated.
Government and military personnel were repeatedly impli­
cated in the activities of these anti-communists groups and 
the Costa e Silva government appeared reluctant to dissociate 
itself from them. As the head of security for the state of 
Rio de Janeiro explained, "There is no doubt the terrorist 
actions of the right have actually helped us by putting fear 
into the left." Considerations of national security appar­
ently encouraged the government to rely on a progressively 
narrowing political base on the right; those not in total 
agreement with the government seemed to be classified as 
"subversive" opponents.
The problems of a military partially but not completely 
in power (e.g., permitting the existence of a "representative" 
legislative body) had by now become evident. An insecure gov­
ernment of men thoroughly indoctrinated with a rather rigid 
doctrine of national security had been prone to exaggerate the 
subversive threat and to meet demonstrations of opposition by 
excessive repression. As a result, a vicious cycle had been 
set in motion: repression led to violent reaction which only 
generated more repression.
In 1966 Sidney Lens suggested that a government which lacks 
popular support, as the Branco government did at the time, must 
one day perform a "massive bloodletting" or be swept aside by a
64ibid.
65ibid.
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r ev o l u t i o n . T h i s  was especially true by August, 1968, for 
on any standard of comparison the Costa e Silva government had 
far less popular support than its unpopular predecessor.^^
Opposition to the government appeared varied and ubiquitous 
and the government’s responses to it seemed to reflect the ten­
sions within the armed forces. On the one hand, many officers, 
frustrated over the daily responsibility for governing the na­
tion, expressed a desire for the military to withdraw from pol­
itics and return to its former poder moderador. They were, 
therefore, reluctant to support any governmental action that 
might draw the military even further into the political arena.
On the other hand, the purges and widespread threat of the return 
of the exiled to politics made withdrawal from politics an unten­
able alternative for the linha dura. This group was confident 
that, if all political restraints were removed, the "revolution” 
could resolve the crisis and better pursue its objectives.
The tense, deteriorating condition of the political system 
seemed to require a catalyst to bring the crisis to a head and 
to force the military to decide whether it would assume total 
power or withdraw completely from politics, since a revolution 
against the military government was quite unlikely.
^^See Sidney Lens, "Brazil's Police State," The Progressive, 
XXX (December, 1966), 34.
f \ 7 For an example of one comparison of the relative popular 
support of the first two "revolutionary" governments, see Paui. 
Montgomery, "Brazilian Poll Finds Dissention on Government,"
New York Times, May 22, 1968, p. 12.
‘ ''See Stepan, op. cit., p. 259.
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One incident that precipitated a solution to the deepening
crisis was a speech before Congress on September 3, 1968 by
Marcio Moreira Alves, Calling for a "boycott of militarism,"
he recommended that parents keep their children out of the
September 7 Independence Day parade as a gesture of protest
69against, what he termed, "the nest of torturera." Immediately,
the more conservative, middle level officers, already convinced
70of a conspiracy to discredit the armed forces, insisted that 
Alves be punished for his remarks. Costa e Silva, perhaps wary 
that yet another unpopular decision might incite another out­
burst of violence, approved the proceedings to cassate Alves, 
but insisted that ratification of the charges come from Congress 
itself.
The President's decision turned out to be a disastrous 
gamble. The best he could have hoped for was that the ARENA 
delegation would interpret his decision not to cassate Alves 
as a sign that his position was "softening." Congress might 
then have sacrificed one opposition deputy in the interest of 
encouraging further executive moderation. This done, the 
President’s popular support might then increase but would also 
place him in a position of having to make further concessions, 
lest he disappoint the now-expectant nation. But such a develop-
Perhaps the best account of Alves' speech can be found 
in Jose Yglesias, "What the Left Is Saying," New York Times 
Magazine, December 7, 1969, p. S3.
70Schneider, Political System, p. 271.
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ment was unlikely because throughout the 1968 session Congress
had remained insubordinate; ARENA deputies had frequently
crossed the aisle to vote with the opposition against the
government. It was possible, then, that a vote on Alves*
cassation might serve as a rough indicator of the regime’s 
71popularity.
Congress finally considered Alves* cassation on December
11, 1968, voting 216 to 141 against punishment; at least 93
ARENA deputies voted with the opposition. The defeat of such
a vital executive measure convinced the military that Congress
could no longer be allowed to function.
Furthermore, the officers tended to carry over 
Into the sphere of party politics a military con­
cept of discipline. Thus, "abandonment" of the 
government by centrist ARENA elements on a critical 
issue was viewed as partaking . . .  of desertion 
in the face of the e n e m y . 72
Although Costa e Silva had resisted demands by the linha dura
to decree an institutional act early in 1968, such a measure
now appeared inevitable.
Institutional Act #5 : Another Military Crisis Resolved
While there does not appear to have been an outright attempt
71Given the state of executive-legislative relations at 
this point, it seems highly unlikely that the popularity of the 
regime could not help but to influence Congress* vote more so 
than the real issue, that of freedom of speech.
72See Schneider, Political System, p. 72. Since there were 
only 123 MDB deputies, an "additional 93 votes were needed for 
the 216 votes against cassation. In addition, 12 blank ballots 
were cast. See Roett, op. cit., p. 39.
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to oust Costa e Silva (as there had been against Gastello in
1965) the President was forced to yield to enough hard line
demands that the December, 1968 crisis came to be called "a
71coup within a coup.” It seems that Gastello's promotion 
strategy had prevented a move of force by the linha dura 
against the President, but Gastello's appointees had not 
wielded sufficient influence to prevent the imposition of 
more political restrictions on the nation.
The President succumbed to the demands of the linha dura
in the form of the Fifth Institutional Act of December 13, 1968.
The Act was justified as necessary
. . .  to assure the authentic democratic order 
based on liberty, on respect for the dignity of 
the human being, on the combat of subversion and 
ideologies contrary to the tradition of our peo­
ple, on the fight against corruption . . .  in 
order to confront directly and immediately the 
problems of restoring the public order and 
international prestige of our c o u n t r y . 74
The thrust of this statement seems to suggest that at this point
the government interpreted its promise to restore democracy as
restoring stability to the present, "revolutionary” order of
politics, not restoring a purified version of "democracy” as
it had existed prior to 1964, "Normalization of politics” now
seemed to mean eliminating public discontent in what the
73Bruneau, op. cit., p. 517.
^^See Frances M. Poland,"The. Prospects for Brazil: Costa 
e Silva's Military Dictatorship," New Leader, LII (January 20, 
1969), 8.
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•'revolution" now seemed to believe was an already, authentic
democratic system.
Article II of the Act granted the President the power to
recess Congress, legislative assemblies, and municipal councils
by decreeing complementary acts; they were not to reconvene
until ordered to do so by the President. Coincident with the
promulgation of this Act was the decree of Complementary Act
#38, which, in the words of one observer, "dismissed Congress
with the ease and insouciance of a Fairy Godmother waving her 
75wand." The President was empowered "in the interest of the 
•revolution’" and "without limitations prescribed in the Con- 
stitution^’ to cancel the rights of any citizen for ten years, 
to place further restrictions on cassados, and cancel the man­
date of any elected official. In addition, the President, 
having been empowered to declare a state of seige under Article 
152 of the 1967 Constitution, was authorized to extend a state 
of seige beyond the Constitutional maximum of sixty days, to 
"confiscate the property of those who have enriched themselves 
illicitly" and to suspend the guarantees of habeas corpus in
political crimes against the national security and the economic
7fSand social order.
Just as the linha dura exploited a political crisis to
7 5"Flying Down to Rio,*' National Review, December 31, 
1968, p. 1307.
^^For an English translation of the Fifth Institutional 
Act, see Burns, History of Brazil, pp. 411-13.
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radicalize military opinion and to force Gastello to the right 
in 1965, now it had maneuvered Costa e Silva into a position 
where he was forced to submit to their demands. The military 
government's own Constitution, largely the work of the Sor- 
bonnists, had proved unacceptable to the linha dura ; by the 
end of 1968 they had found it necessary to violate it in order 
to assume unambiguous control over the nation. The last 
vestiges of democracy were thereby removed. The inconvenience 
of elected, civilian interference was suspended and the demon­
stration of anti-regime sentiment outlawed under the pretense 
of national security.
The Second Phase of the "Revolution": An Overview
During this phase of the "revolution” there had been fewer 
alterations in the patterns of political recruitment than there 
had been during Gastello's term, although the armed forces was 
utilized more as a source of government personnel during the 
Costa e Silva government. The Cabinet and other governmental 
positions, formerly held only by civilians, now showed a pre- 
pondrance of military figures. In addition, until he decreed 
the Fifth Institutional Act, Costa e Silva initiated few altera­
tions in the procedures that had become anticipated and accepted 
in the processing and implementation of demands under the 1967 
Constitution. Presumably in an attempt to favorably influence 
public opinion, he decreed fewer laws and exercised the powers 
of the presidency in a less authoritarian manner than his pre­
decessor. But in his attempt to win more civilian support for
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the ’’revolution” Costa e Silva actually laid the groundwork 
for the Fifth Institutional Act.
In his concern for military and public opinion Costa e 
Silva offered a dramatic contrast to Castello Branco. Whereas 
the latter remained steadfastly apolitical, refusing to mobilize 
support for his policies, Costa e Silva displayed a vacillating 
political style, striving to satisfy a variety of elements within 
the political system. Initially he realized a high level of pub­
lic support and an apparent high degree of independence from the 
linha dura, which he sought to placate by way of compromise. Yet, 
he still labored under the same types of restraints his pre­
decessor had.
In light of Castello’s experiences with the linha dura it 
was evident he had to remain true to the principles of the 
"revolution.” Policy changes were acceptable so long as they 
did not jeopardize continued economic recovery, political sta­
bility devoid of populism, and the elimination of corruption 
and subversion. Considerations of national security remained 
paramount. But during the interval between his election and 
his inauguration, Costa e Silva appeared to be oblivious to 
these restraints, speaking with ease about "democratic normali­
zation," establishing dialogues with the people, and "bringing 
prosperity to the people." It soon became evident that these 
kinds of policies could be pursued only to the extent they did 
not interfere with the military’s rigid doctrine of national 
security.
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Perhaps Costa e Silva’s greatest shortcoming was his re­
peated failure to convert a sufficient number of demands of 
the politically relevant members of the political system, who 
had been encouraged to demand more by Costa’s rhetoric, into
policy outputs or to give the impression that these demands
7 7would be fulfilled sometime in the future. The demands of 
a r e n a’s congressional delegation, the Catholic Church, and the 
students were largely ignored and many times interpreted as 
subversive in nature. In addition, Costa e Silva was forced 
to reverse certain policy changes once the effects of such 
changes came to be interpreted as detrimental to the national 
security. Both of these developments led to a steady erosion 
of support for the nation's leadership and the rules and norms 
that governed the decision-making process. Support for the 
authorities and regime reached such a low level that the 
Costa e Silva government was required to institute widesweeping 
institutional and procedural changes, once the influential mem­
bers of the linha dura determined that the military would not 
withdraw from politics.
David Easton asserts that a highly stratified political 
system, with only indirect communications between the members 
of the various levels, can persist even if it receives only a 
minimum of support from the ordinary members of the system, so 
long as each intermediary level of leadership evinces strong
7 7See Easton, op. cit., pp. 47-53 and Chapter 14.
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7 8attachment to the next higher level of leadership. In Brazil, 
primarily as a result of Costa e Silva’s policies, the political 
system had been polarized into two extreme positions with only 
a minute intermediary group. By interpreting opposition as sub­
version and denying its expression, the Costa e Silva govern­
ment removed the likelihood that the political system could 
continue to function without substantial modification. The 
concern of the linha dura for unity and political stability 
resulted in a second, progressive stage of isolation of the 
military government from the civilian population.
^^Ibid., p. 227.
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CHAPTER IV
REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES WITHSTAND A 
"REVOLUTION WITHIN THE REVOLUTION"
This chapter focuses on the period between the Fifth 
Institutional Act of December 13, 1968 and March, 1970, the 
sixth anniversary of the "revolution." The circumstances 
surrounding Costa e Silva's erosion of military support and 
the ensuing succession crisis are examined in some detail.
The military's solutions for this crisis suggested that true 
democracy would be realized only in the very indefinite future.
Implanting a Military Dictatorship
The promulgation of the Fifth Institutional Act once 
again served to indicate that the Brazilian political system 
had lost its capacity of jeitinho, or to slide through each 
crisis without violence or total breakdown of the existing 
political processes. As the political stakes had become 
more important, politics likewise had become more deadly 
serious. By the end of 1968 the traits of compromise and non­
violence, characteristics the Brazilian people had long imagined
^See leda S. and Howard J. Wiarda, "Revolution or Counter- 
Revolution in Brazil?" The Massachusetts Review, VIII (Winter, 
1967), 163.
152
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2their social order possessed, had been replaced by arbitrary 
decisions and violence. The overall effect of the Fifth In­
stitutional Act, in particular, was quite disruptive to Brazil's 
political processes and the expectations that the Brazilian 
people had for their government.
In seeking to restore political stability prior to issu­
ing the Fifth Institutional Act the military governments had 
continued to tinker with Brazil's political system, hoping that, 
perhaps with the re-writing of certain rules and the elimination 
of a few more opponent^, the system would begin to function 
according to its expectations. Prior to December, 1968, mili­
tary intervention in Brazil's political life had been justified 
as a temporary, instructional necessity with repeated lip- 
service given to the notion that "democracy" would shortly be 
restored. Even the 1967 Constitution retained a body of 
popularly-elected representatives, which although severely 
restrained could still act as a kind of "check" against the 
executive; the 1967 document also included an electoral appa­
ratus by which the military might withdraw from power. How­
ever, with the issuance of the Fifth Institutional Act tutelary
%democracy was supplanted by an open military dictatorship.
^The Brazilian self-image of being a non-violent society 
is tested by Henry H. Keith in his article, "The Nonviolent 
Tradition in Brazilian History: A Myth in Need of Explosion?" 
in Conflict and Continuity in Brazilian Society, ed. by Henry 
H. Keith and S . Fl Edwards (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 231-40.
*ZStepan, op. cit., p. 216.
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Apparently distraught over the regime’s dismal performance 
between March, 1964 and December, 1968, despite a successive 
increment of executive power during that time, the military 
renewed the unfinished task of defining its authority role; it 
did so by violating its own self-imposed, constitutional limita­
tions and, in the process, by expanding the scope of its govern­
ing authority. In the words of one author, after December 13, 
1968
Harsh repression quickly replaced benevolent 
semi-authoritarianism . . . .  The survival and 
permanence of the "revolution," it was announced, 
were vital, and its irreversibility had to be
guaranteed.4
Before undertaking to insure the permanence of the "revolu­
tion," however, Costa e Silva found it necessary to guarantee 
his continuation as President. In a speech before the Army's 
Command and General Staff school on December 16, 1968 he at­
tempted to recover the political initiative and to reassure 
skeptical members of the linha dura that he shared their com­
mitment to the principles of the "revolution." He pleaded that 
he was a "companion in arms," who "not even for one day forgets 
his loved days in the Brazilian military." He continued, "The 
tranquility and order of the country are our responsibility."^
He stressed that whenever conditions required it "revolutions 
within the revolution" should be made by the armed forces.̂
^Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Military Regime," 74.
^"Justifying the Crackdown," Time, December 27, 1968, p. 24. 
^Speaking before the predominantly military audience, Costa
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It appears that the emphasis placed on the military's re­
sponsibility to guarantee ’’order” and its obligation to promote 
"revolutionary” changes implied that the President perceived a 
political role for the armed forces which would require it to 
retain governing authority indefinitely. Withdrawal from pol­
itics, given this perception, seemed remote. Combined with the 
ascendant priority placed on order and stability, the strong 
likelihood that the military would continue to govern must have 
allayed the hard-liners’ fear of Costa e Silva’s revolutionary 
intentions. Having made his peace with the linha dura, the 
President moved to silence the regime’s critics.
On December 30, 1968 Costa e Silva exercised the power of 
cassation for the first time in his term, suspending the polit­
ical rights of eleven persons. Included in his list of cassados 
were: Carlos Lacerda, whose presidential aspirations were thus
7laid to rest for at least a decade; Marcio Moreira Alves, whose 
speech helped to precipitate the executive-legislative showdown; 
and other individuals associated with the Frente Ampla. These 
cassations were followed on January 16, 1969 with the most exten­
sive purge of the national legislature to date: two senators and
said, ”. . . ^  will make new revolutions." See Schneider, 
Political System, p. 276.
Who could have foreseen such a development back in 1964 
when in a speech praising the "revolution” Lacerda said: "In
Brazil today there is more freedom than ever before. Only those 
few who wanted to destroy liberty for everyone have lost the 
liberty to do so." See "Brazil: The New Government," Vital 
Speeches, XXX (September 15, 1964), 719.
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thirty-five deputies (primarily from the MDB) were expelled, 
principally because of their antagonistic actions toward the 
’’revolution" in the past. On February 7, thirty-three congress­
men were cassated, bringing the total to seventy-seven deputies
O
cassated under Institutional Act #5. Costa e Silva seemed in­
tent on making certain that when (and if) Congress was recon­
vened it would not again disappoint the "revolution's" expecta­
tions .
Upon the promulgation of the Fifth Institutional Act an
editorial in 0 Estado de Sao Paulo charged: "You can’t run a
gcountry of eighty million people like an army division." But 
the government thought otherwise. It invoked the Press Law 
and clamped a state of strict censorship on the communications 
media, proclaiming that anyone who published articles detri­
mental to the national security would be arrested. The armed 
forces occupied the offices of several of Brazil's leading 
newspapers and many of the country’s leading journalists were 
arrested.
Under the conditions of outright censorship many newspapers 
ceased publications altogether until the government eased its 
press policy and called for "self-censorship" on the part of the 
press and broadcast media. Even then no overt unfavorable
8See Schneider, Political System, p. 275. Note: Not all of 
the congressmen who were purged suffered cassation. The MDB was 
hardest hit by the purges, losing 40 percent of its strength in 
the Chamber.
^Cited in "Crackdown in Brazil," Time, December 20, 1968, 
p. 36.
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editorial comments on the government and its institutional acts 
were espoused because press and broadcast officials were re­
quired to adhere to strict governmental guidelines in order to 
resume operations.^® Still, the press occasionally conveyed 
the mood of the nation. With no reference to meteorological 
conditions, a front page Journal do Brasil weather report read:
Weather black. Temperature Suffocating. The 
air is unbreathable. The country is being 
swept by a strong wind.H
As the government's definition of subversive activity expanded 
in scope, however, the requirements of "self-censorship" became 
increasingly restrictive. As a result, in the succeeding years 
critical political commentary came to be noticeably absent in 
a nation that had traditionally enjoyed a free and often sensa­
tional press.
The purges of the forcefully closed Congress and the cen­
sorship of the media were accompanied by a renewed government 
effort to reform the rules and authority structures of the 
political system. With the final vestiges of representative, 
democracy stripped away, the Costa e Silva government steered 
a closely guided course to the right, toward the further involve 
ment of the military in more areas of Brazilian life.
Reforms Within the "Revolution Within the Revolution"
As Stepan explains, the increasing removal of "buffers,"
Rosenbaum, op. cit., 75.
^^Cited in "Crackdown in Brazil," op. cit., p. 36.
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such as Congress, "made the government even more exposed to the
1 ?conflicting demands coming from different military groups." "
The persisting tensions between the two dominant opinions within
the military regarding the issue of continued military presence
in Brazil’s political life had not been alleviated as a result
of the Fifth Institutional Act. They were merely rendered less
visible. Several reasons account for this situation.
First, press censorship prevented the publication of anti-
1 %government sentiment that existed within the armed forces.
As a result, the military was able to project a false image of 
unity.
Second, the resignation of Interior Minister Albuquerque 
Lima (who had been at odds with Costa e Silva since his unsuc­
cessful attempt to unseat the President in December, 1968) 
strengthened the President’s authority, at least initially.
The Cabinet was thereby reduced to a body of uniform opinion; 
presidential directives were implemented with a minimum of 
intra-government opposition. This development helped to dis­
guise the growing polarization of the military hierarchy and 
the lower levels of the command structure.
Finally, because of a new series of retirements and promo­
tions and the President's increasingly favorable disposition
1 ?Stepan, op. cit., pp. 261-62.
^^The press censorship clouded many of the details of 
developments within the military throughout 1969. See 
Schneider, Political System, p. 273.
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toward the principles of the linha dura,^^ by February, 1969
the hard line opinion had emerged as clearly as predominant
within both the government and armed forces. In this regard,
the military high command was perhaps more unified in opinion
than it had been since the 1964 ’’revolution.”
All of these conditions and developments helped Costa e
Silva present his government as one united in purpose, acting
first on the behalf of those civilians who still supported
the ’’revolution.” Yet simultaneously, this image of a united
front also masked the potential turmoil brewing within the 
15military, which, while it was not evident, increasingly in­
fluenced the direction the ’’revolution” took during 1969.
February 1, 1969 marked the beginning of a seven month 
period during which the authority structures and the rules of 
decision-making and political recruitment underwent extensive' 
modification. On that date Costa e Silva decreed the Sixth 
Institutional Act, which reduced the Supreme Court membership 
from sixteen to eleven justices and reaffirmed the jurisdiction 
of the Superior Military Court over national security crimes.
14Rosenbaum argues that Costa e Silva’s move to the right 
was designed to placate his hard-line critics within the mili­
tary. ’’Brazil’s Military Regime,” 74.
^^Some officers (up to the rank of colonel) were so dis­
enchanted with the military regime during 1968 that they estab­
lished contacts with Lacerda and Kubitschek to discuss how a 
military withdrawal might best be expedited. See Francis B. 
Kent, ’’Brazilian Storm Warning,” The Nation, February 10, 1969, 
p. 178. Their convictions were not easily dissuaded after such 
contacts were prevented by the Fifth Institutional Act.
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The first provision of the Act actually amended Article 113 
of the 1967 Constitution and represented a retreat from the 
regime's own Institutional Act #2, which had increased the 
membership from eleven to sixteen. (See Chapter II).
Why the Supreme Court was retained at all is not clear.
It, like Congress, had drawn the wrath of the government in 
the weeks before December 13, 1968 by granting writs of 
habeas corpus to some seventy-nine students who had been sum­
marily arrested by the military p o l i c e . A f t e r  three justices 
were forced into retirement on December 30, 1968 a succession 
of Supreme Court justices refused the "honor” of succeeding
the President of the Court; in fact, two more justices resigned,
17leaving the Court with only eleven judges. • Perhaps to avoid 
any further embarrassment in seeking replacements, Costa e 
Silva decided to freeze the Court's membership at this point.
The composition of the Supreme Court at the time of the 
Sixth Institutional Act was of limited significance because it 
was prohibited from hearing any cases except those the govern­
ment would allow it to review. All the acts initiated in accord 
with the Fifth Institutional Act and the "effects" of those acts 
were exempt from judicial review. In addition, the Supreme
Supreme Court decisions during the latter part of 1969 
were extremely unpopular with the military government, partic­
ularly in light of other simultaneous political developments. 
See Schneider, Political System, pp. 272-73.
17 fIn 1863 a similar series of resignations by Supreme 
Court justices■occurred. That case served as a precedent for 
the justices to follow in 1969. See Schneider, Political 
System, p. 2 75.
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Military Court held exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving 
national security, the volume of which increased as the concept 
of national security drew a progressively expanded definition. 
With the pretense of democracy dropped and the chances of an 
appeal to the Supreme Court all but nonexistent, the functions 
of the Supreme Court throughout 1969 and 1970 were just as sym­
bolic as its existence.
On February 26, 1969 Institutional Act #7 was issued. It 
provided for the cancellation of all elections scheduled to be 
held before the gubernatorial and congressional elections 
slated for November, 1970. The President was authorized to 
set new dates for elections as he felt necessary. This Act 
also recessed the MDB-controlled legislatures of Goias and 
Para and provided for governmental regulation over legisla­
tive assemblies and municipal councils in matters involving 
salaries and special sessions. This Act seemed to suggest 
that the military government would intervene in the affairs 
of state and municipal legislatures whenever it concluded those 
institutions were promoting policies (or sentiment) which might 
jeopardize the peaceful social order or interfere with the smooth 
implementation of national government policy.
Decree Law #477 also appeared on February 26. Unlike the 
Seventh Institutional Act, which authorized the closure of 
institutions whenever it appeared those institutions were 
facilitating conditions contrary to the interests of the gov­
ernment (and therefore the nation), the intent of Decree Law
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#477 seems to have been to correct conditions in order that
educational institutions might remain open. In the words of
Fagundes Bandeira, the decree law
. . . aimed at actions designed to bring to a 
standstill the activities of the [educational] 
institution; plots against persons or property;
acts designed to organize, or participate [sic]
in subversive movements, picketings, parades 
or unauthorized assemblies; the transportation, 
preparation, printing, possession or distribu­
tion of "subversive" material of any nature.18
The logic of the laws enacted on February 26 was all-
inclusive and in a strange way disclosed the priorities of the
military government. Under the provisions of the Institutional
Act, if an institution failed to perform up to the expectations
of the government, it would simply be closed. The national and
state legislatures had proven easy to close. But under the
decree law, the government seemed to have recognized it had a
vested interest in keeping the university system open. As the
government was aware, when the universities had closed students
19were freed to participate in demonstrations and terrorism. If 
the continued functioning of the universities was jeopardized, the 
decree law provided for the eradication of the detrimental condi­
tions and disruptive causes.
1AFagundes Bandeira, "Brazil: Subverting the Universities," 
The New Republic, November 8, 1969, p. 17. The author of this 
article teaches in Brazil.
^^Historically, Brazilian students have played an impor­
tant political role, especially when the universities have been 
closed down. See Robert 0. Myhr, "The University Student Tradi­
tion in Brazil." Journal of Inter-American Studies, XII (Jan­
uary, 1970), 126-40.
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Under military rule some of the country's institutions 
had to maintain a proper compatibility with a carefully con­
trolled political environment, while the same environment was 
manipulated to guarantee the proper functioning of other in­
stitutions. Regardless, the paramount consideration of the 
military was to guarantee the "order” and "tranquility” of 
Brazil.
Two interesting developments soon ensued. On April 25,
1969 the Minister of Education issued instructions authorizing 
anyone to bring charges of subversion against any member of 
an educational institution. If the director of such an insti­
tution, who had the responsibility of judging each accusation, 
found the accused not guilty, the case was automatically re-
2 0ferred to the Minister of Education for further consideration.
In cases involving charges of subversive activity in an educa­
tional facility, the accused stood guilty until proven innocent. 
In a case involving thirty-six students on trial for subversion, 
thirty-four were acquitted but two were punished because they
failed to "succeed in proving their innocence regarding recent
21movements of agitation in the school.”
20Bandeira, op. cit., p. 18.
^^0 Estado de Sao Paulo, July 30, 1969, cited in Bandeira, 
op. cit., p. *18. The presumption of guilt until innocence is 
proven is not entirely alien to the Brazilian legal system 
since it was derived from Roman Law. See Fernando de Azevedo, 
Brazilian Culture: An Introduction to the Study of Culture in 
Brazil (New York: Uafner Publishing Company, 1971), p. 186.
Also see Peterson, op. cit., p. 565.
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But the government’s measures of repression were not con­
fined to the academic community alone. In March, Costa e Silva 
issued decree laws calling for the punishment of anyone incit­
ing activity against the regime in private as well as in public. 
The law seemed to be aimed at those individuals engaged in 
guerrilla warfare, terrorism and sabotage and those suspected
of inciting racial discrimination, animosity toward the armed
22forces, subversion, and bank robbery. All of these activities 
were regarded as violations of the national security by the 
armed forces. The provision against bank robbery seemed to 
imply that crimes against a private institution, that is as 
vital to the economic and social order as a bank is, were now 
to be equated with crimes against the government itself. This 
was a rather indirect, albeit effective, way of punishing crimes 
that were disruptive of the social order as violations of the 
national security. In addition, it now appeared that meeting 
for the purpose of planning any of the aforementioned activi­
ties was a crime against the national security, even if the 
decisions made at the meeting were not carried out. The armed 
forces were now nearing that point of involvement in the coun­
try’s political life where the attempted regulation of what 
people were thinking seemed to be an inevitable next step.
Increasing numbers of civilians, who had long sympathized 
with the ’’revolution,” were now turning against the military
^^See ’’Brazil Tightening Her Security Laws,” The New York 
Times, March 23, 1969, p. 12.
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government both as a result of these additional restrictions on
civil liberties and because of the excessive application of
2 3earlier restrictions. In fact, when Costa e Silva delivered 
the state of the union address early in April, he divided it 
into four one-hour installments in order not to antagonize the 
television viewing audience by interfering with its favorite 
evening soap o p e r a s . B u t  while the government made rela­
tively minor concessions in order to minimize middle-class 
opposition, it found itself increasingly confronted by opposi­
tion elements which had completely dissociated themselves from 
the conventional means of opposition.
By 1969 opponents of the regime could be classified in 
one of two general groups. On the one hand there were the more 
moderate elements that were still convinced the best way to op­
pose the government and to promote social change and a rapid
return to democracy was to run opposition candidates in elec-
25tions, to distribute pamphlets and to call strikes. However, 
increasing numbers of Brazilians, alienated by the government's 
ban on political opposition in the name of national security, 
swelled the ranks of opposition elements committed to the pro-
23Rosenbaum writes: "Some individuals who formerly admired 
the political tranquility established by the regime became re­
sentful because their friends and relatives were subjected to 
harsh and sometimes brutal treatment." "Brazil's Military 
Regime," 76.
Cheers for the Heroes," Time, April 11, 1969, p. 36.
25por a discussion of this, the more moderate group's meth­
ods, as well as those of the more extreme groups, see Sanche de 
Gramont, "How One Pleasant Scholarly Young Man From Brazil Be­
came a Kidnapping, Gun-toting, Bombing Revolutionary," The New 
York Times Magazine, November 15, 1970, pp. 43-45.
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motion of social change via armed action and violence.
About the causes and ramifications of the growing appeal 
of armed action as an alternative to peaceful protest, Rosen­
baum has written:
The enemies of the regime were even more 
embittered than previously and some began to 
resort to terrorist methods. For instance, 
in the late winter and spring of 1969, polit­
ically inspired bank robberies, calculated to 
disrupt the economy, to finance future anti- 
government activities, and, eventually, to 
destroy the political system occurred almost 
daily in Sao Paulo and . . .  in Rio de Janeiro.
Bombings of government installations and mass 
communications facilities also became common.
The government’s response was the application 
of even sterner punishment.26
The greater the perceived threat to the survival of the regime,
2 7the more vigorous its response.
Costa e Silva had reacted to anti-government opposition in 
1968 by unintentionally closing the existing channels through 
which grievances could have been addressed and redressed. In 
the process, the President set in motion another cycle of ci­
vilian criticism, government repression of that criticism,
harsher and less conventional expressions of civil dissent,
2 8and further repression by the government. Those who remained
Rosenbaum, op. cit., 76.
2 7Stepan asserts that with the rise in terrorist activity 
against the government, the hard-liners became increasingly pre 
occupied with repressive measures and even less concerned with 
social reform. Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 114.
^^Stepan, op. cit., p. 262 and William G. Tyler, "Intro­
duction : An Overview," in Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Eco-
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politically active were, in turn, forced by the government’s 
national security policies to engage in activities that were 
in violation of those policies.
Despite indications to the contrary, a sizable number of 
Brazilians still remained fairly optimistic that a move toward
? Qconstitutional normalcy would soon occur. By April, 1969 
speculation abounded as to whom would be ARENA’S next Presi­
dent when Congress reconvened, even though the government’s 
statements as to when Congress would be called back into ses­
sion remained vague. This kind of speculation and accompany­
ing hopes were rudely disappointed when 199 individuals were 
purged from the universities and government service during the 
last week in April. With new ’’revolutions within the revolu­
tion" being made with unpredictable frequency, it appeared 
Brazil was headed more toward a kind of "revolutionary normalcy" 
than constitutional normalcy.
. The concept of democracy itself was undergoing yet another 
subtle transformation. In February, 1969 Justice Minister Gama 
e Silva defined democracy as "a magic word, a concept that varies
nomic and Political .Development, ed. by H. Jon Rosenbaum and 
William G. Tyler (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 9.
^^Political speculation was on the upswing by mid-1969 as 
indicated by two political polls. See Schneider, Political 
System, pp. 284, 287.
*̂̂ The concept of "revolutionary normalcy" was put forth by 
Justice Minister Gama e Silva to justify the continuation of tiie 
regime’s arbitrary powers; a return to constitutional normalcy 
was still referred to as being probably only in the indefinite 
future. See Schneider, Political System, p. 278.
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in time and place, principally in an instant, like that through
which we are passing, that is the moment of the Revolution.
Previous reference by the government to "democracy" suggested
that it was a preconceived system of interaction that would be
instituted once the "revolution" accomplished its objectives.
Now, "democracy" seemed to be coterminous with the "revolution,"
a pragmatic concept, devoid of principles, and subject to
redefinition according to the direction and character the
"revolution" assumed.
On May 18, 1969 the President decreed Institutional Act
#10, levying still more restrictions against cassados (those
deprived of their political rights). The Act, retroactive to
March 31, 1964, specified that the suspension of political
rights, also included (1) compulsory retirement from any public
enterprise that was in part state-owned, (2) termination of
any electoral mandate that had not already been cancelled and
(3) a prohibition on holding positions in foundations, public
service institutions, educational establishments or organiza-
32tions that were in any way concerned with national security. 
Restrictions like these must have had a deterrent effect on 
many kinds of political activity (except by the most radical) 
and must have served to reinforce political apathy. The intru­
sion of the military government into the private lives of
^^Quoted in Schneider, Political System, p. 2 78.
^^Facts on File Yearbook: 1969, ed. by Lester A. Sobel 
(New YoxTcT Facts on File, Inc. , 1970), pp. 362-63.
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Brazilians had now reached the point where it could deny a 
livelihood to anyone who lost his political rights.
Throughout 1969 urban terrorism and violence proliferated 
apace. According to Schneider, by the middle of 1969 the pri­
mary concern of the armed forces high command was one of de­
veloping a democratic system, which could defend itself against
the dangers of the pre-1964 modernizing elite and clientelistic 
33politics. The military government, on the other hand, seems 
to have become totally preoccupied with repressing its per­
ceived enemies; the desired end result of its repressive meas­
ures was not at all clear.Periodically tensions flared 
between the armed forces high command and the government and, 
though not serious in and of themselves, these tensions took 
on added significance-as Costa e Silva fell into disfavor with 
the various factions within the military.
It appears that by the middle of 1969 the issue of con­
tinued military rule had been resolved in the affirmative by 
the military leaders. But this resolution really represented 
contrasting opinions within the military. Lower ranking offi-
3 3Schneider, Political System, p. 288. Reference to the 
"high command" shall be understood to include all of those 
officers of four and five-star rank, or any officer exercising 
authority over strategic commands. The three military ministers 
in the Costa e Silva government can be considered as a part of 
the high command until they formed a junta on August 31, 1969.
^'^Stepan has written: "Politically, the military govern­
ment, since the Fifth Institutional Act of 1968, appeared to 
be without a program and without direction." Stepan, op. cit., 
p. 263.
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cers, who sided with Albuquerque Lima, sought to assert their ' 
dominance over the linha dura in order to pursue an "authentic 
revolution" in which national development (directed by the 
military) would receive greater attention. Given Albuquerque 
Lima’s earlier position, if this group acquired power, military
7 r
rule for up to fifteen years was planned. This group sought 
to align itself with the Castelista elements (those still loyal 
to the principles of Castello Branco), which, while sharing the 
view that the military should retain power in order to direct 
national development, envisioned a shorter duration of mili­
tary rule and a greater civilian voice in planning national 
development than did Lima’s counterparts. The Castelista’s 
prime concern was that the Costa e Silva government was a 
failure and that Brazil could not afford two more years of its 
incompetent rule.
The followers of Lima and the Castelistas were more united 
in their opposition to Costa e Silva and his perception of the 
governmental role of the armed forces than they were in agree­
ment as to what form continued military rule would acquire or
35See Stepan, op. cit., p. 260.
«7 ̂
The Castelistas had a particular disliking for Costa e 
Silva because they felt he exploited the 1965 crisis to his 
own benefit at Castello’s expense^ . See Schneider, Political 
System, pp. 289-90. Due to the question of national develop­
ment, Stepan argues that by this time the distinctions between 
the linha dura and the soft line had become more complex. The 
linha dura, he asserts, could more accurately have been termed 
"authoritarian nationalists" and soft-liners better termed 
"liberal internationalists." See Stepan, op. cit., pp. 250-52
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how long that rule would last.
The erosion of support for Costa e Silva and his policies 
should have served as a sign that unless the President shored 
up his support, his continuation in office was in serious dan­
ger. Having placed the military government in a position where 
it was largely dependent on the support of the armed forces. 
Institutional Act #5 also exposed the President to the real
threat of removal from office if his military support fell below
37a "threshold level." At this point there were noticeably 
fewer restraints on this kind of military action than there 
had been in October, 1965 when Gastello Branco was faced with 
a similar low level of support. There was no longer any pre­
tense that civilians had any function in determining the fate 
of the President, although declined civilian support was one
38factor leading many officers to desire Costa e Silva’s ouster. 
Also, in light of the constitutional developments since 1967, 
the constitutional limitations on military action against the 
President could hardly be counted on to deter the armed forces 
from removing the chief executive and commander-in-chief. The 
President himself had stated that whenever it was necessary, the
3?The Fifth Institutional Act created a situation wherein 
the military government was almost totally dependent on mili­
tary support. This condition offered a variation of Easton's 
concept of support and the effects of that support falling be­
low a minimum level. See Easton, op. cit., pp. 222-24.
will be recalled that Costa e Silva and his Cabinet 
came to power in response to the demands of more nationalist 
officers who wanted the military in general to be more popular 
with the people. See Chapter III.
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armed forces would make "new revolutions within the revolu­
tion."
A "Revolutionary" Development: A Military Junta Takes Over
The expansion of terrorism and violence during 1969, des­
pite (or because of) the adoption of stringent laws of national 
security, had a disquieting effect on the armed forces and con­
tributed to the growing sentiment within the military that a 
more effective executive was needed. A full-scale military 
crisis appeared imminent when highly respected General Moniz 
de Aragao and General Lyra Tavares, members of Costa e Silva's 
Cabinet, exchanged harsh accusations over the government’s 
handling of a case involving alleged subversive activity by
T Q
a high-ranking officer. The suspension of Moniz de Aragao 
from the Army's high command, because of his remarks, only 
increased the possibility that the armed forces might move 
against Costa e Silva. But Brazil was saved this spectacle 
and was treated to another kind of "revolutionary" develop­
ment.
On August 31, 1969 Brazilians were notified that Costa e 
Silva had suffered a "circulatory impediment." The President 
had suffered a stroke, leaving him partially paralyzed and 
unable to speak. Contrary to the constitutional provision
^^For an account of the circumstances surrounding the 
dismissal of Colonel Francisco Boaventura Cavalcanti and the 
ensuing Moniz de Aragao-Tavares dispute, see Schneider, Polit­
ical System, pp. 286, 290.
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stating that the Vice President "shall replace the President 
i£ he is incapacitated,"^® it was simultaneously suggested that 
Vice President Pedro Aleixo, a civilian personally selected by 
Costa e Silva for the position, would not replace Costa e Silva. 
Principally because of Aleixo's opposition to Institutional Act 
#5 and convinced by the rise in terrorism that they were con­
fronted with a military w a r t h e  Ministers of Navy, Army, and 
Air Force decreed Institutional Act #12 on August 31, authoriz­
ing them to form a military junta to replace the stricken Presi­
dent. There was not even any mention of the Vice President, but 
then, perhaps that was not necessary. After all a "revolution 
within the revolution" was in the making.
In part, the Act read:
The situation that the country is experienc­
ing . . . precludes the transfer of the respon­
sibilities of supreme authority and supreme 
command of the Armed Forces, exercised by his 
excellency, to other officials, in accordance 
with the constitutional provisions.
As an imperative of National Security, it 
falls to the ministers of the Navy, of the Army ■ 
and of'the Air Force to assume, for as long as 
the head of the Nation is incapacitated, the 
duties given to his excellency by the constitu­
tional documents in f o r c e . '^2
^®Article 79 of the 1967 Constitution, see Burns, History 
of Brazil, p. 40 7.
Thomas G. Sanders, "Institutionalizing Brazil’s Conser­
vative Revolution," American Universities Field Staff Reports: 
East Coast South America Series, XIV, Nol 5 (December, 19 70), 
pp l '8-9 '.
'^^Roett, op. cit., p. 41.
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For the first time in the nation's history, in the interest of 
the "national security" a military junta would govern Brazil, 
at least until the President recovered. Once again, the armed 
forces' perception of the imperatives of the "revolution" had 
displaced the already frequently modified constitutional norms. 
For the second time since promulgating its constitution, the 
military had blatantly violated the provisions of that docu­
ment.
By the latter half of August, Costa e Silva had fallen out 
-of favor with the great body of the armed forces. His stern 
application of the anti-subversion laws had evoked a new series 
of condemnations from the Catholic Church,which complained 
more loudly as the government's repression grew more intense. 
Many within the armed forces felt the further alienation of 
the Church and its followers could have been avoided by a more 
prudent application of the laws. This, coupled with the general 
aimlessness of the government and its handling of the Moniz de 
Aragao-Tavares dispute, led to discussions among officers of 
initiating a pre-emptive golpe against the President.Only 
Costa e Silva's sudden illness prevented his suddenly being
Costa's policies succeeded in uniting the conservative 
and progressive Catholics against the regime. During the last 
week of September, the Brazilian National Conference of Bishops 
called for the end of military dictatorship, indicating the 
junta's policies of repression earned the anger of the con­
servative Church also. See "Brazilian Bishops Criticize Junta," 
America, October 4, 1969, p. 250.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 294.
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removed from office by force.
The tripartite junta was comprised of Admiral Rademaker 
Grünewald, General Lyra Tavares, and Brigadier Marcio Sousa 
e Mello. Because of the Aragao-Tavares dispute and its mem­
bers' general low esteem with the armed forces, the "caretaker” 
junta found itself in a weak position to command the obedience 
of the armed forces. But what it lacked in popular military 
support, the junta more than compensated for in its resolve to 
guarantee the "revolution."
There seems to be little evidence to suggest that the 
junta would serve only as a temporary replacement for the 
duration of the President's illness. In assuming the supreme 
authority of the nation it seemed clear that the junta repre­
sented the general will of the military that the President be 
4 7replaced. But due to the questionable ability of the junta 
to act as the supreme command of the armed forces, it was also 
apparent the junta would serve as a substitute successor until 
a more suitable, permanent successor to Costa e Silva could 
be found. Nonetheless, during the interim period the junta was 
forced to confront a crisis precipitated by terrorists and to 
decree its own brand of punitive, national security legislation.
45costa's decision to hold partial municipal elections in 
November, 1969 only augmented his opposition within the mili­
tary. Given his extremely low level of support, it is difficult 
to imagine how he could have possibly finished out his term.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 294.
47Roett, op. cit., p. 44.
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The junta’s precarious position vis à vis the armed 
forces was even more severely tested after the kidnapping of 
the American Ambassador to Brazil, C. Burke Elbrick, on Sep­
tember 3, 1969. Terrorists, seeking to demonstrate the extent 
of underground opposition and to maximize publicity for their 
demands, abducted Elbrick from his limousine, leaving behind a 
’’manifesto,” part of which read:
With the kidnaping of the Ambassador we want 
to demonstrate that it is possible to defeat the 
dictatorship and the exploitation if we arm and 
organize ourselves. We show up where the enemy 
least expects us and we disappear immediately, 
tearing out the dictatorship, bring terror and 
fear to the exploiters, the hope and certainty 
of victory to the midst of the exploited.
In exchange for the victim’s safe return the terrorists issued
two demands that had to be fulfilled. First, they demanded the
release of fifteen political prisoners and their safe passage
to either Algeria, Chile, or Mexico (where political asylum
awaited them) within forty-eight hours. Second, they demanded
that the preceding ’’manifesto" be published in its entirety in
Brazil’s highly censored press. If these conditions were not
met, the "manifesto" ended, the abductors would be forced to
carry out "revolutionary justice" and execute the Ambassador.
As Schneider points out, Elbrick’s kidnapping and the 
accompanying demands placed the junta in an "extremely delicate 
p o s i t i o n . I n  attempting to satisfy the United States desire
48^ more complete account of the manifesto may be found 
in Facts on File, p . 570.
49schneider, Political System, p. 295.
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for Elbrick*s safe return, the junta only further alienated 
officers already disenchanted with the regime. By this time 
the officers closely identified with the linha dura had 
adopted a less pro-American and more nationalist stance.
These and other highly-nationalist officers seemed quite 
willing to risk Elbrick*s lifp and an estrangement of rela­
tions with the United States rather than to bow unhesitatingly 
to this threat to the social and political order. Of course, 
they had a point. In light of the widespread publicity this 
situation would receive if the government gave in to these 
demands, other terrorists would be encouraged to conduct more 
kidnappings. The entire affair was further complicated be­
cause the prisoners the terrorists selected for exchange 
seemed to be those the military would be most reluctant to 
see set free,
Much to the dismay of the military high command, the fif­
teen prisoners were rounded up and released on September 6, 
but not until the government thwaited the effort of a number 
of officers and enlisted men who attempted to prevent the
c 2freedom flight from taking off. Elbrick*s safe return several
“^See Stepan, op. cit., pp. 250-51.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 295. The author explains 
that the careful selection of the individuals involved guaran­
teed internal dissention within the military. For interviews 
with the exchanged prisoners see Andy Truskier, "The Urban 
Guerrillas in Brazil," Ramparts, October, 1970, pp. 30-34.
^^Facts on File, p. 571.
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days later had little favorable impact on the disgruntled
officers- The entire episode tended to place the continued
survival of the junta in doubt.
Presumably foreseeing the unsettling effect that their
decision to release the prisoners would have on the already
alienated officers, the junta decreed Institutional Act #13
on September 5, which empowered the executive to banish any
Brazilian considered ’’manifestly harmful and dangerous to
5 3national security." Actually, the Act served to legitimize
the liberation of the fifteen prisoners who were banished by
a subsequent complementary act.
The provisions of Institutional Act #13 seemed to be
designed to deal with the Elbrick situation alone. Also
formulated on September 5, but not announced publicly until
September 9 (probably so as not to endanger Elbrick’s release),
was Institutional Act #14. The preamble read:
. . . considering the acts of adverse psycho­
logical warfare and revolutionary and subver­
sive war that, actually disturb the life of 
the country and maintain it in a climate of 
intranquility and agitation, these deserve 
more severe repression.
"Adverse psychological warfare" was defined as
the employment of propaganda, of counter­
propaganda, and actions in the political, 
economic, psycho-social, and military fields, 
with the intention of influencing or provok­
ing opinions, emotions, attitudes, and be­
havior of foreign groups, unfriendly, neutral.
^̂ Ibid,
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or friendly, against the execution of na­
tional objectives.
Exactly what the "national objectives" were was not entirely
clear, but for actions intending to influence opinions, one
could conceivably receive the maximum penalty of death, a
punishment abolished in 1891 and expressly prohibited in
Article 150 of the 1967 Constitution. With this and other
kinds of punishment for those convicted of subversive activity
there was no need to banish them from Brazil--Institutional Act
#14 superseded Institutional Act #13. The junta had not com-
I
pletely bowed before the terrorists demands after all.
The junta’s actions propelled the military into a position
of still further involvement in the national life of Brazil.
. •
Military courts, which were assigned jurisdiction over all 
cases stemming from Institutional Act #14, were required to 
rule on an individual’s motivations and the intent of propa­
ganda. In addition, the military had assumed the responsi­
bility of providing answers to basic questions of life itself: 
could the holding of certain ideas be sufficient cause to 
necessitate the ending of an individual's continued survival?
In a very real sense the military had become indistinguishable 
from the state, for it alone possessed the right to use vio­
lence. How far from the classical national security function
C CBandeira, op. cit., p. 18.
^^It seems that at this point instead of existing as a 
means of violence to be utilized at the state|s discretion, 
the armed forces were in a position to determine under what
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of the armed forces--that of defending the nation from ex­
ternal aggression--the Brazilian armed forces had deviated.
Despite its promulgation of excessively repressive acts 
and its general crackdown on suspected oppositionists, the 
junta remained in low esteem with the bulk of the officer 
corps. A permanent successor to Costa e Silva had to be 
found.
The search to locate a successor gained momentum through­
out September, 1969. Since it was evident that no civilian
would even be considered and because Congress was still in 
5 8recess, the question of succession of necessity was resolved 
in a typically military fashion, on the basis of seniority.
All generals of four-star rank were instructed to compile a
circumstances their force should be used. This corresponds 
closely to what Weber has written about the relationship be­
tween force and the state: "Specifically . . . the right to
use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to 
individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it." 
Only in the present case the armed forces were in a position 
to make this decision. See Max Weber, "Politics as a Voca­
tion," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. 
by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New YorkT Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1946), p. 78.
5 7Bengt Abrahamsson discusses the apparent correlation 
between military professionalization and increased political 
activity by the military in Military Professionalization and 
Political Power (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications,
1972), pp. 101-50.
^^By this time the military in general had adopted a rather 
cynical view of civilian politicians, not because they were 
corrupt, but because the officers felt none of them possessed 
an adequate concept of national security. Until a civilian 
developed an adequate concept, none could be trusted to govern 
Brazil. See Schneider, Political System, p. 289.
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list of the three most preferred candidates of their command; 
when all the military regions had been polled, the various 
lists were to be reduced to a single list of preferred can­
didates. From this list, high-ranking officers would then 
select Brazil's next President.
By the end of September after a kind of intra-military 
campaign. Generals Garrastazu Medici, Orlando Geisel, Antonio 
Muricy, and Albuquerque Lima emerged as the leading contenders. 
The armed forces command structure seemed to be functioning
much like a political party trying to select its strongest 
59nominee. In this case, however, a nomination was the equiv­
alent of an election.
The consensus of opinion gradually coalesced around Medici, 
a long-time associate of Costa e Silva. The high command agreed 
Medici possessed the appropriate qualifications: his close 
association with Costa e Silva would soften the image of an 
illegitimate succession; he was not an extreme nationalist and 
was, therefore, acceptable to the international finance commun­
ity; and was not associated with the Escola Superior de Guerra, 
the anathema of civilian and military nationalists.^^ However, 
the high command's inevitable election of Medici was not 
accepted without question.
See Schneider, Political System, p. 299. The author 
writes that the command structure came to be Brazil's major 
political party. At the time, the command structure was really 
the only political party.
60See Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 115.
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Albuquerque Lima, who had built a vast basis of support 
among lower-ranking officers since his resignation, tried to 
preclude Medici's "election" by demanding that the interests 
other than those of the high command be considered.This 
attempt by a three-star general to question the electoral pro­
cedures decided upon by his superiors drew a swift response 
from Army Minister Tavares. "This [the military] is not a 
political institution," he said. "We can not have those be- 
low dictate to those on top." Seniority prevailed, as on 
October 7 Medici was elected by a majority of the 230 top 
ranking officers and confirmed by the three member junta.
The election of a President was still not a routine practice 
in Brazil. (See Chapter I.)
With regard to the "succession crisis" of 1969, Stepan 
has remarked that the senior officers were "barely able to
In a letter to Lyra Tavares, Albuquerque Lima wrote:
"If those responsible for the final decision do not agree to 
hear and respond with realism and patriotism to the desires, 
not of a few but of the majority of the armed forces, we can 
not foresee the risks the nation will be running, when other 
leaders, perhaps more audacious and less resistant to the 
temptations of power, may dare to pass the military chiefs." 
Lima was not alone in his condemnations. About the selection 
process Admiral Baptista Mello said it could better be called 
"a cold military coup." See Facts on File, p. 638.
^^See "The Generals' Choice." Newsweek, October 20, 1969, 
p. 64.
^^Sanche de Gramont, op. cit., p. 44. Other sources indi­
cate Medici’s election was by a unanimous vote. See, for 
example, Facts on File, p. 638. Schneider, Political System, 
suggests 239, not 2 30, officers participated in thè “erection, 
pp. 298-99.
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carry the day" and install their candidate. This may well
have been the case because as Schneider points out
Fully half of the generals participating in the 
selection of Brazil’s new President occupied . . . 
desk jobs and, in varying degrees, were out of 
touch with the sentiment of the middle grade offi­
cers exercising troop comands.
Initially, then, it is quite possible that Medici's support
came primarily from the military hierarchy, with only a minimum
of support from lower-ranking officers and enlisted men. If
the members of the military hierarchy were sufficiently out of
touch with lower echelon officers that outright animosity toward
Medici existed, then military obedience of presidential orders
would be difficult to guarantee.
It seems that the procedure the armed forces used in 
selecting Costa e Silva's successor was founded on two faulty 
assumptions. First, permitting members of the armed forces to 
specify their preference for President implied that the military 
could resolve an essentially political question on the basis of 
democratic procedures (and in this respect the high command 
gave the impression they viewed the military as a political 
institution, despite Tavares' disclaimer). Yet, the ultimate
^^Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 114.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 300. In many ways this 
situation was much like the one confronting Goulart and his 
cobertura railitar (military cover) in 1964. As Stepan has 
observed: '‘Officers closest to him, who urged him [Goulart] 
forward on his course of increasing pressure on Congress, 
were more and more out of touch with the bulk of military 
sentiment." Stepan, op. cit., 193.
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decision had to fall within parameters defined by "those on 
top," just as Tavares' statement implied. The military hier­
archy refused to abide by any decision other than its own.
As developments since March, 1964 had revealed, only to the 
extent that the opinions of those outside of the high command 
(in this case middle grade and lower-level officers) coincided 
with the opinions of the high command did democracy exist.
Second, permitting an intense political campaign also 
implied that there was as small a range of political opinions 
within the body of the military as there was in the high com­
mand. In fact, political opinions were quite varied and fre­
quently antagonistic. The campaign tended to demarcate these 
antagonisms and to demonstrate the polarity of high command 
and lower echelon opinion. As Stepan asserts, "Ranks were 
finally closed behind the choice of the senior generals, but 
only because of the specter of complete military fragmentation."^^
So, it appears that primarily for the sake of military ex­
pedience, many officers shelved their political persuasions with 
the hope that by doing so military unity would be restored. It 
seemed, however, that for the immediate future President Medici 
would have to reckon with the political unity, as well as the 
institutional unity, of the armed forces.
^^Stepan, op. cit., p. 264.
.^^One of the components of civil-military relations in 
Brazil mentioned in Chapter I is that a politicized military 
is the norm. The presidential campaign resulted in a high 
degree of politicization of the military, except that in this
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Congress "Elects" Medici: Recreating the Facade of Democracy
President-designate Medici could not constitutionally 
succeed Costa e Silva for a year and a half, or until March, 
1971 when Costa's term expired. The high command, however, 
had decided Costa e Silva had to be replaced immediately, so 
this constitutional obstacle posed little problem; after all 
their candidate had been elected by a clearly unconstitutional 
procedure.
In order to diminish charges of impropriety, the junta had 
requested that a respected French physician examine Costa e 
Silva, presumably to announce the stricken President unfit to 
resume office. When it became evident that such a prognosis 
would not be forthcoming,^^ the junta, not wanting to delay 
Medici's accession, decreed Institutional Act #16 on October 
14, 1969, The Act stated, "considering that the superior in­
terests of the country require the immediate and permanent fill­
ing of the office of President," the position of President "is 
declared v a c a n t . F i l l i n g  the presidency was no problem: 
Medici had been elected one week before by the high command.
case it was political actors within the military who attempted 
to co-opt fellow servicemen, instead of civilian politicians 
outside the military institution attempting to co-opt the 
military, as had customarily been the case.
^^The physician in question stated that Costa might fully 
recover but only after-prolonged rest and therapy. See 
Schneider, Political System, p. 298. The doctor never did 
pronounce Costa unable to resume his duties. See Rosenbaum, 
op. cit., 78.
^^Cited in Roett, op. cit., p. 46.
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Hence, the inevitability of Medici's accession under the "un­
written constitution" became a mere formality under the pro­
visions of the latest addition to the "written constitution." 
(See Chapter I.)
Complementary Acts #72 and #73, decreed on October 14 
under the auspices of Institutional Act #16, called for Con­
gress to reconvene on October 22 for the purpose of electing 
Brazil's next President and Vice-President on October 25.
But this did not mean Congress' ten month military-imposed 
recess was being concluded in order that the presidential 
election might be more democratic; instead it was ended 
principally so that Congress could meet and ratify the mili­
tary's "election" of Medici and his vice-presidential running 
mate. Admiral Grünewald Rademaker. There was little reason 
for Congress to believe it had been reconvened for any other 
electoral function since Medici delivered his inaugural speech
on October 7, a full two weeks before Congress was even re - 
70opened.
Medici and Rademaker were going to be Brazil's next Presi­
dent and Vice-President, of that the military commanders were 
certain; but in order to insure maximum compliance within the 
military for the choices of these officers, the junta also
Even members of the international community recognized 
the October 7 "election." Shortly after the generals "elected" 
Medici, the Shah of Iran cabled his best wishes to the new 
President. See "New President; Medium Hard," Time, October 31, 
1U6D, p. 33.
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decreed Institutional Act #17 on October 14.
There was a curious inclusion in the preamble of this Act.
One sentence of the preamble stated that the armed forces, "as
institutions that serve to sustain the constituted powers of
law and order, are organized on a basis of the principles of
71hierarchy and discipline." This expression apparently repre­
sented a redefinition of the powers of the armed forces: the 
phrase ". . . and subject to the limits of the law," which
followed a similar definition of the powers of the armed forces
72in the 1967 Constitution, had now been deleted. So, while the 
armed forces were charged with the responsibility of sustaining 
the constituted laws, the actions of the armed forces were seem­
ingly no longer subject to the limitations of those laws. The 
armed forces did, however, remain under the supreme authority 
of the President.
The provisions of the Seventeenth Institutional Act were 
designed to silence those within the military who were disen­
chanted with the selection of Medici and the course of events
71since Costa e Silva's stroke. One provision authorized the 
President to
transfer to the reserve, for a specified period, 
military who [sic] have made an attempt against
^^Cited in Roett, op. cit., p. 47.
^^See Article 92 of the 1967 Constitution in Burns, 
History of Brazil, p. 408.
^^This is the conclusion of both Roett, op_̂  cit., p. 47 
and Schneider, Political System, p. 309.
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the unity of the armed forces, thereby divorcing 
themselves of their constitutional mandate.74
The effect of this Act was to extend to the President the power
to impose the will of the military hierarchy (the President,
the service ministers in the Cabinet, and the high ranking
division commanders) on the remainder of the armed forces with-
7out having to rely on coercion or intimidation.
The implication of Institutional Act #17 was that the 
divisiveness within the military, exacerbated by the "Presi­
dential campaign," had progressed to the point that the armed 
forces high command could no longer depend* on the unquestioning 
allegiance and obedience of lower ranking officers. That the 
cohesion of the armed forces had to be guaranteed at all by 
such a measure is an indication of how much the authority of 
the command structure had been eroded by the high degree of 
politicization of the armed forces: the Act also tended to 
demonstrate how superficial the high command felt the decision 
to close ranks behind Medici had been. The kind of political 
conformity the high command had been trying to impose of the 
civilian sector it now found vital to impose on the body of 
the armed forces.
The decision to reconvene Congress seems to have reflected
^^Cited in Facts on File, p. 730. It will.be recalled that 
a transfer to the reserves is the equivalent of retirement.
^^This kind of development almost suggests the high command 
now equated military unity with unanimous opinion within the 
military.
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the confidence of the military government that civilian poli­
ticians had been intimidated enough so that a representative 
body would now function according to its (the government's) 
expectations. Since December 13, 1968, the date of the Fifth 
Institutional Act, the government had purged eighty-eight 
federal deputies (sixty-one MDB and twenty-seven ARENA), 
thirteen alternate federal deputies (six MDB and seven ARENA), 
five MDB senators, and one alternate MDB senator.Those 
federal congressmen who escaped the last list of cassations 
on September 30, 1969 must haVe been those whom the government 
felt could be expected to support the "revolution" out of 
loyalty or renewed intimidation; congressmen who remained 
recalcitrant after Congress reopened could easily be purged.
Given their reprieve from political extinction, civilian 
politicians performed according to the military government's 
desires. ARENA dutifully nominated General Medici and Admiral 
Rademaker Grünewald on October 17; the MDB offered no opposi­
tion slate. On October 25 Me'dici and Grünewald were ’-'elected" 
by a combined congressional vote of 293 in favor and 76 absten­
tions.^^ Civilian politicians had learned their lessons well. 
Perhaps "democracy" could function in harmony with "revolution-
Brazilian embassy figures cited in Facts on File, p. 730 
It might also be noted that, since March, 1964, one-hundred 
eighty-eight Congressmen had been purged.
^^This was the final vote as reported by the Brazilian 
press. Of the total 369 votes cast, I have been able to ac­
count for 368, by using data furnished by Roett, Schneider, 
and the Facts on File. See Appendix A.
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ary" developments.
Members of Congress had to have been aware that other 
legislative functions would be just as symbolic as this "elec­
tion ." On October 20, a full five days before the presidential 
election. Constitutional Amendment Number One was made public 
and, as a result, legislative functions were curtailed so much 
that there was not really very much for a legislative body to 
do.
Constitutional Amendment #1, sometimes referred to as
f
the Constitution of 1969 even though 95 percent of the 1967 '
7 8Constitution survived intact^ was actually a series of 
fifty-eight amendments which significantly increased the 
legislative prerogatives of the executive at the expense of 
Congress. The President was given expanded authorization to 
decree laws on national security, public finance (including 
tax policy), and to establish public offices and determine 
their functions. Legislative assemblies were prohibited from 
introducing any constitutional amendments; and congressmen 
were no longer protected by congressional immunity when they 
made, declarations "injuring national security," meaning con­
siderations of national security took precedence over the 
rights of legislators. In addition. Congress was reduced from
409 to 293 members, with the representation to be calculated on
79the number of votes rather than the number of inhabitants.
7 R
See Roett, op. cit., p. 47.
79prior to this reapportionment, the populous, illiterate
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The Amendment removed the presidential power of veto, but 
Congress could be impelled to "re-examine" any one of its de­
cisions. The death penalty for those convicted of "external, 
psychological, subversive, or revolutionary war," which had 
been reinstated by Institutional Act #14, was made a permanent 
part of the Constitution, And finally, all institutional acts 
decreed since December 13, 1968 were to remain in full effect 
for as long as the President wishes, which seems to suggest 
that the executive retained indefinitely the power to decree
onthe recess of Congress "during a state of seige, or otherwise." 
Once reconvened. Congress would be on trial and the President 
would be the judge of its performance.
Because Amendment #1 was actually issued on October 17 it 
is interesting to conjecture as to whom within the -military 
authorized its decree, since the presidency was declared 
"vacant" on October 14. The rough outline of the Amendment 
took shape during the final months of Costa e Silva’s term 
but he was incapacitated before it acquired its final version.
The three-man junta added its own provisions (e.g., death pen­
alty) but did not decree the Amendment during its reign of
states held a large representational advantage over the modern­
izing, urban centers. It is interesting to note that the new 
membership total for Congress was the same as the total number 
of votes Medici received when Congress elected him, although 
there is no evidence to suggest the government actually was 
able to foresee such a development,
^^See Article 2 of the Fifth Institutional Act in Burns, 
History of Brazil, p. 411.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
192
power. Because the junta had removed itself from power by 
declaring the presidency vacant, it appears the person most 
likely to have accepted the final version of the Amendment was 
Garrastazu Medici, who had been "elected" President by the 
military hierarchy on October 7, and for all intent and pur­
poses Me'dici acted in a presidential capacity after that 
date.^^
If Medici did decree the Constitutional Amendment, then 
he authorized full-scale changes in the constitutional frame­
work of the government before he was actually "constitutionally" 
verified as the President of Congress on October 25. This in 
itself would demonstrate the military’s disdain for its own 
self-imposed constitutional limitations and how lightly it 
regarded the congressional "election" of the President; The 
military seemed to be operating under the provisions of some 
"unwritten constitution." That the constitutionality of 
Me'dici’s election may be regarded as a moot point only further 
emphasizes the emptiness of Congress' functional existence.
If the Constitutional Amendment was decreed by someone 
other than Medici, say members of the high command, then the 
military's failure to find or to provide a "constitutional" 
basis for these changes only displays their complete contempt 
for the existing constitutional procedures. This kind of
^^Admittedly this is speculation on my part, but it does 
seem quite probable that it would have been extremely difficult 
for the junta to adopt policies against the wishes of Medici 
after he was "elected" by the officer corps.
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disposition foreshadowed a bleak future for democracy, for, 
despite the reopening of Congress, Brazil clearly was not 
headed in the direction of constitutional normalcy. She was 
headed instead for a kind of transient normalcy that shifted 
course with the "revolution.”
Medici; Hope, Wait, and See
In his October 7th inaugural speech Medici conceded that
"Brazil is still far from being a developed nation, being
8 2under a regime we can not consider fully democratic." He
explained, "There must be freedom but there can be no license
to contradict the political desires of the nation . . . .  To
have freedom institutions must free themselves from minority
83groups that preach violence and corruption." As a compromise 
candidate of the military moderates and the linha dura, the 
new President announced the two major goals of his administration 
would be (1) accelerated economic and social development and (2) 
the "installation of democracy" by the end of his term in March,
O A1974. He seemed to be offering more to the moderates than to 
the linha dura. He appeared to be challenging Brazilians to
^^See Schneider, Political System, p. 301.
^^These sentences from Medici's inaugural speech are taken 
from excerpts of the speech quoted in "New President; Medium 
Hard," Time, October 31, 1969, p. 34 and "The Generals' Choice," 
Newsweek, October 20, 1969, p. 64.
peripheral dispute in Medici's election was whether or 
not he would merely finish out Costa’s unexpired term or be en­
titled to a full term. The high command finally decided Medici's 
term would last four years.
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dare to hope that they, and not the military hierarchy, might 
elect his successor.
Once reconvened, Congress seemed to represent the predom­
inant mood of the nation. Members of both ARENA and the MDB 
pledged cooperation with the government either by public 
announcements or by their actions, suggesting that they were 
testing the government's intentions by taking the path of least 
resistance and provocation. Perhaps they hoped that, con­
fronted with just symbolic opposition as it determined the 
"political desires" of the nation, the Medici government would 
have no reason to recess Congress or to cancel upcoming congres­
sional and state elections. However, in its capacity as the 
political director of Brazil, as well as the overseer of the 
national security, it was also inevitable that members of the 
high command would be assigned to help institutions "free" 
themselves of violent and corrupt influences. This kind of 
development would render any drive toward democracy a specious 
one.
The constitutional modifications included in Constitutional 
Amendment No. 1 preserved certain provisions of the National 
Security Law of 1967 and expanded others. Subversive propaganda, 
as a result, came to be defined by the government as:
1. Using any organ of social communication, such 
as newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, 
bulletins, pamphlets, radio, television, 
cinema, theater, and related media as a 
vehicle of propaganda for adverse psycho­
logical war, or revolutionary or subversive 
warfare.
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2. Inciting people in their places of work or 
study.
3. Holding assemblies, public meetings, or 
public demonstrations.
4. Holding forbidden strikes.
5. Causing injury, libel or defamation, when 
the offended party is an organ or entity 
that exercises public authority, or an 
official in the course of his duties.
6. Manifesting'solidarity with any of the acts 
listed above.
As Bandeira has observed:
All offenses under the anti-subversive law 
(penalties vary from 6 months to 20 years) are 
tried before a military court. During pre-trial 
investigation a person may be held in prison for 
30 days, 10 days incommunicado. After the de­
fense has been presented, the court may convict
the accused of an offense not specified in the
accusation, even if such an offense involves a 
more serious penalty than that imposed for the 
original charge . . . .  Roughly 70 per cent of 
those charged are convicted.86
If these provisions and procedures were an attempt by Medici
to purify the political system as a first step in implementing
democracy, it appeared that, given the high rate of conviction
and the longevity of punishment, for many years there would be
only a few Brazilians who could participate in the military's
system of democracy. Apparently Brazilians could undertake
or support (number six above) any kind of contradiction to the
"political desires of the nation" only at the risk of losing
85
^Ibid.
'’cited in Bandeira, op. cit., p. 18. 
86
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what small measures of freedom they presently enjoyed.
During the last few months of 1969 the government vigor­
ously clamped down on anti-government terrorist activities, 
which had continued without respite since the Elbrick affair.
On November 4, Carlos Marighella, the charismatic leader of the 
terrorist movement, was assassinated by military police. His 
death seemed to mark the beginning of the decline of terrorism. 
Possibly because it sensed the battle against subversion and 
terrorism was being won, the government relied more frequently 
on increasingly excessive policies.
Reports of police torturing civilians, including nuns and 
priests, dramatically increased. Documented cases revealed 
that the military police were using "unusual methods" in order
to extract information from those suspected of subversion or
8 7actions detrimental to the national security. Under pressure 
from Pope Paul VI (who had received and personally discussed 
the problem of police torture with Dorn Helder Camara), the 
President announced that his administration would eliminate 
any police personnel found guilty of torture. Medici, fully 
cognizant of the dangers caused by arousing the Church, seemed 
to be willing to mold government policies somewhat by public
^^Periodically since 1964 there had been sporadic reports 
of police torture, but only during the latter half of 1969 did 
they receive widespread attention. Ralph Della Cava discusses 
some of the different kinds of torture tactics employed by the 
police in his article "Torture in Brazil," Commonweal, XCII 
(April 24, 1970), 135-41. Also see Robert H. Bolton, "Brazilian 
Torture: Specifically New, Specifically Terrible," The Christian 
Century, April 1, 1970, 387-88.
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opinion. But any kind of hope that the military regime would 
be receptive to public opinion soon proved to be ill-founded, 
when it became evident that the Medici government would sur­
render to public opinion only in those cases involving world 
opinion.
Early in 1970 Medici abandoned his promise to restore 
democracy by 1974, stating that the military would remain in 
power
as long as it might take to implant the polit­
ical, administrative, judicial, social, and 
economic structures capable of raising all 
Brazilians to the minimum level of well-being.&&
The restoration of democracy now appeared to be more condi­
tional and improbable than it had been since 1964. With 
political stability all but guaranteed, economic development, 
another dimension of national security, received new attention. 
Once again democracy was to be subordinated to the newly-defined 
goals of the "revolution." Only to the extent that these goals 
were achieved and enhanced the national security would It be 
possible for Brazilians to participate in the formulation of 
the policies that determined their destinies.
Excerpts from this May, 1970 speech can be found in 
Rollie E. Poppino, "Brazil's Third Government of the Revolu­
tion," Current History, LX (February, 1971), 104.
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CHAPTER V
THE NEW FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS
Deviation from the p o d e v  m o d e v a d o v
Writing in 1970 Charles Wagley made this assessment of
Brazilian politics:
The history of Brazilian politics since 1964 
is one of a steady increase of military power 
over civilian power, until in 1970 the mili­
tary rules almost outright, with only the 
shadow of any legalistic validation.
It would seem that the Brazilian "game of 
politics" was over, at least for some time.l
Perhaps, however, it was not so much that the "game of politics" 
was over as it was that the outcomes of the "game" could no 
longer disappoint the expectations of the military high com­
mand.
The application of the poder moderador by the armed forces 
between 1945 and 1964 created a framework of expectations on the 
part of civilians with regard to the execution of that function. 
This framework resulted in a limitation being placed on military 
intervention at the removal of the President and ruled out the 
assumption of governmental power by any of the officers involved, 
While military intervention was regarded as legitimate, mili-
^Charles Wagley, An Introduction to Brazil (New York 
Columbia University Press, 19 71) , PP* 3 U 6 - 71
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tary rule was considered illegitimate.̂
In addition to this type of civilian expectation for mili­
tary intervention into politics, it must also be recognized 
that high-ranking military officers developed a framework of 
expectations for the functional performance of the political 
system between 1945 and 1964. At first the armed forces 
applied the poder moderador only after being requested to do 
so by civilian elites and, then, only in accordance with the 
specifics of the civilian demands.^ Gradually, however, the 
armed forces assumed more autonomy in exercising the poder 
moderador, until in 1960 the high-ranking officers, disillu­
sioned with the performance of the civilian politicians, imple­
mented a fundamental change in the governmental structure; they 
transformed Brazil from a presidential to a parliamentary form 
of government even though they were not specifically instructed 
to do so by the civilian sector. Military intervention had not 
even been requested in this instance and so it was clear that 
the poder moderador had been modified in two ways: first, in 
the determination as to when that power would be applied and, 
second, the manner in which that power would be applied.
After over three years of political disorder under Joao
^Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 115.
^ibid., p. 102. The author writes ”. . . civilians rarely 
gave the military carte blanche to decide for themselves what 
action to take. Demands were often quite specific as to the 
limits and purposes of military intervention into politics.
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Goulart, civilian elites demanded his removal by the armed 
forces. The armed forces obliged by removing Goulart and by 
assuming governmental power, a move not all Brazilians either 
supported or opposed. By assuming power the military officers 
seemed to be indicating that they were no longer content to 
act in the capacity of political arbitrators and were now 
going to act as political directors for an indefinite period 
of time. And, so, after a series of developments that had 
made it ’’psychologically easier" for the officers to inter­
vene in politics,̂  they decided to retain power and direct 
Brazil's politics on a continuing basis rather than on a 
periodic, temporary basis. For all practical purposes, the 
poder moderador had been abandoned.
The gradual expansion of the military’s political prerog­
atives under the poder moderador seemed to parallel the grow­
ing concern of military officers about communism and subversion 
during the 1950’s and early 1960’s. They seem to have become 
convinced that civilian politicians were either directly abet­
ting the ruination of the political system by condoning the 
presence of communists in government or were indirectly promot­
ing its downfall by failing to enact comprehensive policies of 
economic development so that the conditions on which communism 
thrived might be removed. The officers felt Brazil was defi-
^de Dubnic argues that the post-election coup of 1955 by 
one faction within the military made it "psychologically easier" 
for other groups to intervene in the subsequent decade. Po~ 
litical Trends in Brazil, p. 16.
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cient in both o£ the areas suggested by her national motto: 
Order and Progress. Both deficiencies, they felt, had to be 
corrected if Brazil was not to succumb to communism. Due to 
the strong influence of the linha dura, the restoration of 
political and social order received the highest priorities 
after the armed forces assumed power in 1964. Between 1964 
and 1970 political activity was permissible only so long as, 
and to the extent that, it did not endanger the "national 
security," a concept that drew an increasingly broader défini 
tion as the military regime sought to cleanse the political 
system of corrupt or subversive influences.
Historically, the office of the presidency, as well as 
congressional seats, seem to have been regarded as purely 
political prizes by civilian politicians rather than as in­
stitutions designed to process and implement demands and to 
coordinate Brazil's national affairs. Hence, when Brazil 
began to experience a high rate of social mobilization after 
1945, she lacked both the political community and political 
institutions sufficiently developed to mediate, refine, or 
moderate group political interaction.^ When the leaders of 
one of these institutions sought to assume the initiative, 
they were forced by intra-government wrangling to pursue
^In this sense Brazil was highly characteristic of a "prae 
torian society." In the absence of effective political insti­
tutions power was fragmented and authority over the system as 
a whole was transitory. See Huntington, Political Order in 
Changing Societies, pp. 196-97.
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extreme or extra-legal courses of action. On these occasions 
the armed forces, charged with the function of upholding the 
Constitution, were summoned forth to exercise its poder 
moderador. Each time the officers acted more independently 
of civilian instructions, perhaps with the intention of 
effecting enough structural and procedural changes that 
those political institutions could begin to process the high 
volume of political demands. When these efforts were frus­
trated,^ the officers decided that in addition to "modernizing” 
the nation’s political institutions, the high level of political 
participation had to be checked if political stability was to 
be restored.
After assuming governmental power, the military leaders 
sought to impose political order on Brazil by altering the 
process of political recruitment and by modifying the patterns 
of the decision-making process. The effects of these kinds of 
policies were (1) to introduce an increasingly larger number of 
military personnel into governmental positions and (2) to cen­
tralize more and more power in the executive office. The offi­
cers welcomed both of these developments as necessary for the 
national security.
Under Gastello Branco the military regime was not concerned 
with public opinion; this was understandable since dedication to
national referendum conducted on January 6, 1963 scrapped 
the parliamentary system and returned Brazil to a presidential 
form of government.
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one's duties and the necessary reforms, even in the absence of 
popular support, was a major maxim of the doctrine of the Escola 
Superior de Guerra. It was as if the Gastello Branco govern­
ment diagnosed Brazil's sickness and administered the bitter 
medicine prescribed for stabilization and recovery, caring little 
for the amiability of the doctor-patient relationship.^ A purged 
and intimidated Congress was expected to support the government's 
policies and when it repeatedly failed to enact executive pro­
posals, the President exercised more and more legislative dis­
cretion by decreeing laws.
Near the end of the Gastello Branco government the basic
»
differences of opinion over what course Brazil's political 
recovery was to take became more intense. The linha dura 
faction, which had professed the necessity of prolonged and 
repressive military rule, now wanted the "revolution" (as the 
military regime and its civilian supporters were referred to) 
to be more popular as it continued to direct Brazil's politi­
cal recovery. On the other hand, the Sorbonnists, interested 
in short-term, reformative military rule, held a vision of an 
"ideal democracy," which they felt Brazil could realize only 
after more unpopular reforms had been instituted. The essen­
tial difference seems to have been that the linha dura de­
sired prolonged military rule over a complacent civilian pop­
ulation, while the Sorbonnists desired a temporary, reform-
^Schneider, Political System, p. 201. Also see Stepan, 
op. cit., pp. 182-BT. ' '
^This analogy is adopted from Stephen Clissold, L&tin 
America; New World. Third World (New York: Praeger Publish-
ers, 1972), p. 210.
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oriented military rule over a temporarily displeased civilian 
population. The inability of these factions to resolve their 
differences resulted in a situation which subjected the mili­
tary governments to the vacillating influence of one and then 
the other group. The ascendance of one group's influence over 
the other's resulted in a continual redefinition of the goals 
and objectives of the "revolution," which in turn necessitated 
the postponement of the restoration of democracy.
As the linha dura emerged as the predominant force, a cycle 
of civilian dissent--government repression--more extreme civilian 
dissent--more extensive repression was set in motion when the 
civilian sector grew disillusioned with Costa e Silva's failure 
to live up to his campaign promises to promote the "redemocrati­
zation" of Brazil. Soon civilians began to challenge the regime 
by terrorist and violent tactics, which had the effect of en­
couraging the military to interpret these actions as "subversive" 
and to formulate even more comprehensive policies of repression 
to preserve the national security. In doing so, the military 
seemed to be equating the continued survival of the military 
regime with the national security of Brazil. Between 1967 and 
19 70 only a kind of "democratic" system that was harmonious 
with the preservation of military leadership was allowed to 
function.
By 1970 it appeared that "democracy" was a type of polit­
ical interaction wherein
. . . elected officials at all levels [would] 
be held by members of a single, disciplined
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party immediately responsive to the policies 
and directives of the chief executive.9
In this context, politics were democratic only in a very super­
ficial sense in that participation was permitted at all. The 
"game of politics" was clearly more manageable and its outcome 
more highly predictable.
Isolation of the Military Regime from Civilian Influences
As the officers' concept of internal national security 
expanded from one that sought to eradicate all corrupt and 
subversive influences to one that seemed to necessitate con­
trolling the social and political behavior of all Brazilians, 
the military government was incrementally isolated from the 
civilian sector.
In the period between April, 1964, when the armed forces 
assumed power, and December, 1968, when Institutional Act #5 
was decreed, the military regime permitted a trial run of 
tutelary democracy but increasingly restricted the political 
prerogatives of the elected representatives because of national 
security considerations. The powers of the executive were 
gradually increased at the expense of the legislative branch; 
when the legislators retaliated by obstructing executive pro­
posals, the officers began to equate them with subversives.
It seems that as the military leaders broadened the scope of 
their institution's doctrine of internal national security and
^Poppino, "Brazil's Third Government," 104
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increased the extent of their political involvement, they lost 
the capacity to distinguish their military roles from their 
political roles. Perhaps this was because the officers came 
to regard their institution's political functions as synonymous 
with its defense functions. The officers interpreted the fail­
ure of Congress to revoke Deputy Alves' congressional immunity 
much like desertion in the face of the e n e m y . T h e  military 
regime subsequently closed Congress and, thereby, concluded 
its experiment in limited, instructional democracy.
During the period between the promulgation of the Fifth 
Institutional Act and the re-opening of Congress on October 22, 
1969, the isolation of the military government from civilian 
inputs achieved its zenith. Since civilian participation had 
not resulted in favorable officer responses, even after a suc­
cessive curtailment of civilian political prerogatives, civil­
ian participation was eliminated altogether. This development 
had several consequences for the military as an institution.
First, the framework of political expectations that mem­
bers of the high command had held for the civilian population 
was transferred to the body of the armed forces. Prior to 
the decree of Institutional Act #5, "democratic” procedures 
had been adhered to so long as the end result of those pro­
cedures conformed with the results anticipated by the high 
command. To the extent there had been conformity, "democracy"
^^See Chapter III
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had existed--to the extent conformity was absent, the concept 
of democracy was revised. Just as the high-ranking officers 
had expected civilians to perform up to their expectations 
for a ’’democratic" form of government, after civilian partic­
ipation was denied, these officers transferred similar expec­
tations to the political performance of the armed forces.
For example, after assembling a list of probable candidates 
(in a highly, internally-democratic fashion) to succeed Costa e 
Silva, officers of the high command dispelled any moves by 
lower-level officers and enlisted men that might have endan­
gered the election of Garrastazu Medici, the popular choice 
of the high command. As in the period prior to December, 1968, 
to the extent widespread participation appeared capable of 
rendering the results anticipated by the high command, "demo­
cratic" procedures were retained, lüien it appeared that those 
results might be jeopardized, participation was restricted or 
suspended, and the concept of democracy correspondingly rede­
fined.
Second, by closing Congress, Costa e Silva forced the 
armed forces to probe within the military government for the 
sources of problems; there were no longer any civilian scape­
goats to blame. The expansion of anti-government terrorism 
during this time must have convinced many officers that the 
terrorism was a product of repression, a reaction against 
oppression. In a sense, they concluded that Costa e Silva’s 
policies of political repression were creating a permanent
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national security threat and that a more effective executive 
was needed. Isolation of the government seemed to have re­
sulted in a demand for increased executive accountability to 
the armed forces.
A third and related consequence of the denial of civilian 
participation was that a kind of "mini-political system" was 
created within Brazil’s existing political system. That is, 
the relationship between the military government and the armed 
forces came to resemble the kind of relationship one usually 
observes between a government and the public sector in a po­
litical system that provides for civilian participation. In 
this case, the armed forces were substituted for the civilian 
sector.
After Institutional Act #5 was decreed the President and
his government were made almost exclusively dependent on the
12support of the armed forces. It was pointed out in Chapter 
IV that Costa e Silva ignored the erosion of his military sup­
port at his own peril. There was a greater likelihood that 
Costa e Silva would have been forcefully removed from office
^^In 1965 the armed forces had held Castello Branco, as 
head of the Sorbonne faction, responsible for the "revolu­
tion’s" disastrous showings at the polls. In that instance 
the President was caught between the struggle of the two 
dominant factions within the military. In 1969, however, it 
seems to have been a case of the military government versus 
the armed forces; Costa e Silva, as head of the military govern 
ment, was held increasingly accountable personally for the per­
formance of the government, especially after the closure of 
Congress,
12See Stepan, op. cit., p. 261.
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if his support fell below a "threshold level" than there had 
been in 1965 when Castello Branco experienced a similar de­
cline in support. (See Chapter IV.)
When the question of presidential succession was broached, 
the armed forces were directed to resolve this purely political 
dilemma. Owing to the absence of civilian participation as
well as the failure of the military regime to develop an insti-
1 %tutionalized succession process, the members of the armed 
forces were required to participate in an improvised electoral 
procedure and the norm of a highly politicized military under­
went a radical transformation.
The traditional pattern of civil-military relations had 
included attempts by the major political actors to co-opt the 
military,however, in the 1969 presidential "campaign" cer­
tain high-ranking military officers attempted to win the po­
litical support of fellow servicemen. One effect of the "cam­
paign" was to expose and to polarize the existing, but hereto­
fore latent, political animosities within the armed forces. 
Only because of their dedication to military discipline and 
due to the real possibility of complete institutional frag­
mentation did the lower- and middle-grade officers and the
^^See H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Introduction: An Overview," in 
Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Devel­
opment, ed. by H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 26.
^ ^ S e e "Aspects of Civil-Military Relations in Brazil," 
Chapter I.
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enlisted men close ranks behind the presidential selection of 
the high command.
Perhaps realizing that the conditions conducive to intra­
military demagoguery and ’’palace coups” had been created,
Medici sought to ”de-politicize” the armed forces and to re­
move the threat of a politically-inspired military coup against 
him. Whereas the military regime had reacted to antagonistic 
civilian opinions by isolating the government, once it realized 
the government was unable to impose political conformity on the 
civilian sector, it now attempted to insulate the government 
against a politically fragmented military opinion via military 
procedures. In this instance the officers realized, as they 
had in 1964 when Goulart had attempted to divide the armed 
forces along political lines, that the political unity of the 
armed forces was an essential factor in the institutional unity 
of that body. After all, a military in political disorder 
could hardly expect to promote political order in the civilian 
population.
A facade of democracy was re-instituted in October, 1969 
when the severely restrained national Congress was reconvened. 
Devoid of any substantive functions, the Congress was comprised 
of the loyal, pro-regime legislators of the ARENA and only the 
most carefully scrutinized members of the MDB, the now very
^^DuTLng the Costa e Silva term, however, the officers 
themselves iiad helped to create the conditions that resulted 
temporarily in a politically divided military.
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loyal opposition party. A series of cassations between Decem­
ber, 1968 and October, 1969 had helped to guarantee legislative 
as well as judicial cooperation with the executive once civil­
ian participation was restored. Perhaps during the first two 
phases of the '’revolution” this was precisely what the leaders 
of the military regime had desired: a functioning political 
system that was highly manageable and predictable and com­
patible with the officers' doctrine of national security.
This was hardly democracy. But in view of the officers 
comprising the armed forces hierarchy and their determination 
to continue to provide political directorship, there were 
literally no alternative forms of participation open to ci­
vilians. The survival of the military government depended on 
a degree of civilian participation. Considerations of internal 
national security prevented that participation from being more 
than symbolic.
Prospects for the Restoration of Democracy
When one speaks of the possibilities of the armed forces 
"restoring” democracy in Brazil, he must recognize that the 
word "restore” means to re-establish or to bring back. If one 
accepts the premise that the Brazilian political experience 
between 1945 and 1964 was democratic, then references to the 
armed forces "restoring” democracy would imply that the offi­
cers would recreate a prior condition, or would re-establish 
the political conditions and practices that existed during that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
212
era. That populist or demagogic politics will ever return to 
Brazil, while the military regime supervises any kind of 
"democratic” transition, is beyond the realm of possibility. 
Therefore, references to the "restoration of democracy" must 
be confined to a discussion of the re-establishment of civil­
ian participation in the political processes.
Any kind of a re-establishment of meaningful civilian 
participation will result in the creation of a system of po­
litical interaction that will be necessarily different than 
the pre-1964 system. Such a system will likely not be demo­
cratic, except in a very limited sense.
*
The restoration of sufficient civilian participation 
that the Brazilian political system may be accurately labelled 
as truly democratic seems to be inextricably dependent on the 
complete withdrawal of the armed forces from politics. Until 
the armed forces do withdraw, the regime's system of democracy 
will only be as open to civilian participation as the officers' 
considerations of national security will permit. Given the 
officers' recent proclivity to centralize power, to make the 
"restoration of democracy" dependent on the achievement of an 
increasingly larger number of "revolutionary" goals, and to 
increase the extent of military surveillance over civilian 
affairs, participation by civilians promises to be extremely 
limited and, at most, symbolic.
So the question appears to be, what factors may bring 
about a military withdrawal from political power?
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Several of the same factors that shaped the historical 
development of Brazil’s civil-military relations and enabled 
the officers to assume governmental power in 1964 might also 
be useful in trying to identify some of the probably factors 
that might result in the military's withdrawal from power.
Having won her independence from Portugal in a relatively 
peaceful manner which did not require a sustained military con­
frontation, Brazil was not indebted to a generation of military 
heroes. Subsequently, unlike in the Spanish-American republics 
where the armed forces were held in contempt and suspicion, the 
Brazilian armed forces were respected and trusted by civilians. 
After the military assumed the function of the poder moderador 
in 1889, civilians continued to assign the military a political 
function each time a new Constitution was adopted. Military in­
volvement in politics was authorized under certain conditions.
Because Brazil has not engaged in hostilities with her 
neighbors since 1864, the armed forces have not been pre­
occupied with defending the nation from external aggression. 
Instead, the armed forces were free (and welcomed by civil­
ians) to participate in civil assistance programs and to 
develop alternative proposals for national development in
For a discussion of how the civilian sectors in the 
Spanish-American nations have looked upon their armed forces, 
see Johnson, Military and Society, pp. 153-73. The author 
describes how the Brazilian experience with its armed forces 
has been at odds with that of her neighbors. See pp. 177- 
223.
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its national "war" college.
Because of the unique development of civil-military rela­
tions and because they found themselves surrounded by a "low 
conflict environment," the Brazilian armed forces functioned 
in an atmosphere that legitimized military participation in 
civilian social and political affairs. However, in 1964 the 
armed forces violated the implicit trust that had been an 
intrinsic part of civil-military relations, which means the 
armed force will never again act as the poder moderador even 
if the officers withdraw from governmental power. So long as 
the region remains peaceful, military withdrawal from power is 
not likely to advance beyond the point where the armed forces
would exercise a veto power over any decisions made by a
17civilian government. And a civilian government, which would 
remain in power only at the sufferance of the military in this 
kind of arrangement, could only succeed so long as the officers 
felt the civilians possessed adequate concepts of national 
security.
The outbreak of international hostilities in Latin America 
could act as a double-edged sword with regard to military with­
drawal from power. On the one hand, increased international 
tensions could result in the officers being preoccupied with 
Brazil's external defense to the extent that they would turn 
the day-to-day responsibility for administering the government
^^See Needier, Latin American Politics in Perspective, 
p. 68.
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over to civilians ; here, too, the officers might act in a
veto capacity. A more likely result, however, would be that
if Brazil were to be confronted with the threat of external
aggression, the military regime would be further entrenched
in power in order to coordinate a national effort against an
aggressor. In this case, the regime would most likely be
more repressive than ever, suspending all civilian participa-
1 8tion and eliminating all sources of social tension.
Considerations of what the officers define as the national 
security will undoubtedly influence how much political power 
they will surrender to the civilian sector. Regardless, Brazil 
will never again experience a political reality in which the 
armed forces act as only an indirect influence in the shaping 
of that reality.
1 O In a speech before military planners in late 1970,
Medici said, "National security strategy must take into account 
the elimination of the sources of social tensions and the rais­
ing of the cultural and economic standards of our people." See 
"Popular Brazilian Chief," The New York Times, December 8, 1971, 
p. 24. The need to eliminate the sources of internal tensions 
would be most intense in a time of national emergency.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX A
Congressional vote for President: October 25, 1969
Membership by House
December 1968 
Purged
Deputies
409
- 101
Senators
66
- 6
October 1969 308 60
Membership by Party: Deputies 
ARENA MDB
Senators 
ARENA MDB
December 1968 277 132 47 19
Purged - 34 - 67 - 6
October 1969 243 65 47 13
Straight Party-line vote :
ARENA (for Medici) 245 + 47 = 290*
MDB (abstention) 6 5 + 1 3 =  78
-Since the final total was 293 for Medici, three MDB Con 
gxessmen probably voted for Medici.
Sources :
Riordan Roett, "The Changing Role of the Brazilian Mili 
tary," in Brazil in the Sixties, ed. by Riordan Roett (Nash­
ville: Vanderbilt University Press, 197 2), p. 37, Ronald M. 
Schneider, The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a 
"Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime,~TÏÏ6+-1970^(New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1971), ppl 2/5, 503. F a cts 
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